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An	   increase	   of	   public	   and	   scientific	   pressure	   resulting	   in	   recent	   reforms	   of	   New	   Zealand’s	  
National	  Policy	  Statement	  for	  Freshwater	  Management	  (NPS-­‐FM)	  has	  instigated	  a	  reliance	  on	  
Overseer	  to	  regulate	  nutrient	  losses	  from	  agricultural	  land.	  Overseer	  was	  previously	  used	  as	  a	  
qualitative	  tool	  for	  farmers	  to	  assess	  fertiliser	  requirements	  for	  the	  folowing	  season,	  but	  has	  
now	   changed	   to	   a	  quantitative,	   compliance	   tool	   in	   use	   by	   a	   number	   of	   regional	   councils.	  
Understanding	   farmers’	   perceptions	   of	   this	   new	   approach	   is	   vital	   to	   its	   efectiveness	   as	   a	  
management	   technique.	   This	   research	   presents	   an	   analysis	   of	  fifteen	  semi-­‐structured	  
interviews	   of	   farmers	  and	   farm	   consultants	  from	   two	   locations	   in	   the	   Bay	   of	   Plenty:	  The	  
Rangitāiki	   Plains,	   who	   use	   Overseer	   for	   decision-­‐support,	   and	   the	   Rotorua	   Lakes,	   who	   use	  
Overseer	   for	   compliance.	  This	   research	   has	   found	   that	   the	   role	   of	   numbers,	   power	   and	  
authority,	  model	  credibility,	  perceived	  fairness,	  social	  identity,	  and	  the	  relationship	  to	  data	  
production	   were	   significant	   to	   farmers’	   perceptions	   of	   Overseer.	   The	   perceptions	   farmers	  
have	  of	  Overseer	  is	  a	  key	  influence	  in	  their	  acceptance	  of	  nutrient	  regulation	  and	  adoption	  of	  
sustainable	   nutrient	   management	   practices.	  By	   taking	   the	   focus	   away	   from	   individual’s	  
technical	  understandings	  of	  scientific	  knowledge,	  this	  research	  has	  attempted	  to	  explore	  the	  
social	   identities	   that	   characterise	   public	   responses	   to	   regulations.	   Trust	   and	   credibility	  
emerged	  as	  key	  themes	  in	  the	  development	  of	  perceptions	  to	  the	  use	  of	  Overseer	  by	  farmers,	  
shaped	   by	   the	   working	   relationships	   between	   farmers	   and	   council	   staf,	   council	   scientists,	  
private	  consultants,	  members	  of	  the	  public,	  and	  industry	  representatives.	  It	  was	  found	  that	  
when	  considering	  Overseer,	  many	  farmers	  focus	  on	  contextual	  factors	  surrounding	  its	  use,	  
	   ii	  
rather	  than	  the	  practicalities	  of	  the	  model	  itself.	  This	  shows	  that	  continued	  eforts	  to	  improve	  
the	   scientific	   accuracy	   of	   Overseer	   wil	   not	   resolve	   issues	   of	   distrust	   between	   farmers	   and	  
Overseer.	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NOF	  	   National	  Objectives	  Framework	  
NPS-­‐FM	   National	  Policy	  Statement	  for	  Freshwater	  Management	  
Overseer	   OVERSEER®	  Nutrient	  Budgets	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   Resource	  Management	  Act	  
RTALP	  	   Rotorua	  Te	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  Programme	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  Water	  and	  Land	  Plan	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Chapter	  1	  
Introduction	  
Responding	   to	   mounting	   public	   and	   scientific	   concern	   about	   the	   condition	   of	  the	   nation’s	  
water	  bodies,	  in	  2009	  the	  New	  Zealand	  government	  initiated	  a	  freshwater	  reform	  programme	  
(Ministry	   for	   the	   Environment	   (MfE),	   2013a).	   A	   fundamental	   component	   of	   the	   freshwater	  
reform	   programme	   was	   the	   release	   of	   the	   2011,	   and	   later	   amended	   2014,	   National	   Policy	  
Statement	  for	  Freshwater	  Management	  (NPS-­‐FM),	  guided	  by	  the	  1991	  Resource	  Management	  
Act	  (RMA).	  A	  key	  objective	  of	  the	  NPS-­‐FM	  is	  to	  set	  enforceable	  limits	  for	  water	  quality	  and	  
quantity	   in	   al	   regions	   of	   New	   Zealand,	   aiming	   to	   maintain	   or	   improve	   water	   conditions	   to	  
meet	  community	  and	  tāngata	  whenua	  values	  (MfE,	  2014a).	  The	  amended	  NPS-­‐FM	  includes	  a	  
National	  Objectives	  Framework	  (NOF)	  which	  requires	  regional	  councils	  across	  New	  Zealand	  to	  
set	   water	   quality	   freshwater	   objectives,	   a	   term	   defined	   in	   the	   NPS-­‐FM	   as	   “an	   intended	  
environmental	  outcome	  in	  a	  freshwater	  management	  unit”	  (MfE,	  2015,	  p.	  20).	  The	  objectives	  
are	   to	   be	   achieved	   by	   meeting	   environmental	   limits,	   defined	   as	   “the	   maximum	   amount	   of	  
resource	  use	  available,	  which	  alows	  a	  freshwater	  objective	  to	  be	  met”	  (MfE,	  2015,	  p.	  21).	  The	  
NOF	  aims	  to	  set	  out	  a	  nationaly	  consistent	  process	  for	  objective	  setting	  (MfE,	  2013b),	  with	  
regional	  councils	  being	  required	  to	  assess,	  and	  if	  necessary,	  change	  regional	  policy	  statements	  
and	  plans	  to	  ensure	  the	  NPS-­‐FM	  objectives	  and	  policies	  are	  met	  (MfE,	  2015).	  	  
In	  order	  to	  implement	  the	  NPS-­‐FM	  and	  appropriately	  assess	  compliance	  with	  rules	  in	  regional	  
plans,	   regional	   councils	   are	   now	   facing	   the	   chalenges	   of	   setting	   resource	   limits	   and	  
quantifying	   environment	   efects,	   in	   particular	   of	   the	   difuse	   nutrient	   polution	   arising	   from	  
agriculture.	  While	  Europe	  has	  adopted	  what	  has	  become	  known	  in	  New	  Zealand	  as	  an	  inputs-­‐
based	  approach	  to	  nutrient	  management,	  which	  restricts,	  for	  example,	  the	  amount	  of	  fertiliser	  
that	   can	   be	   used	   on	   land,	   New	   Zealand	   has	   adopted	   an	   outputs-­‐based	   approach	   which	  
regulates	  the	  level	  of	  nutrients	  leaving	  the	  root	  zone	  of	  land	  (Duncan,	  2014).	  Nutrients	  can	  be	  
a	  significant	  contributor	  to	  declining	  freshwater	  body	  values	  (MfE,	  2015),	  and	  in	  order	  to	  limit	  
the	  efects	  of	  agriculture	  and,	  in	  some	  regions,	  set	  relevant	  catchment	  limits,	  regional	  councils	  
require	  data	  on	  current	  and	  expected	  amounts	  of	  nutrient	  outputs	  that	  can	  potentialy	  make	  
their	  way	  into	  water	  bodies.	  In	  many	  areas	  of	  New	  Zealand,	  agriculture,	  especialy	  dairy	  farms,	  
are	   a	   major	   supplier	   of	   nutrient	   input	   to	   waterways;	   difuse	   farm	   sources	   of	   nitrogen	   and	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phosphorus	  can	  cause	  negative	  impacts	  on	  stream,	  lake	  and	  estuary	  water	  quality	  (Murray	  et	  
al.,	  2016).	  Landcare	  Research	  argues	  that	  measuring	  nitrogen	  losses	  from	  individual	  farms	  can	  
cost	   tens	   of	   thousands	   of	   dolars	   per	   year	   due	   to	   soil	   and	   urine	   patch	   variability	   across	  
paddocks	  (Lilburne	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Due	  to	  this	  impracticability	  and	  expense	  of	  directly	  measuring	  
nutrient	  outputs	  for	  individual	  farms,	  modeling	  is	  the	  most	  feasible	  way	  of	  estimating	  farm	  
nutrient	   inputs	   into	   the	   waterways	   arising	   from	   the	   surrounding	   environment.	  Regional	  
councils	  “wil	  need	  to	  use	  modeling	  to	  identify	  and	  estimate	  difuse	  [contaminant]	  discharges	  
from	  farmland…”	  (MfE,	  2015,	  p.	  82)	  to	  gather	  the	  large	  volume	  of	  farm	  nutrient	  data	  required	  
to	  facilitate	  compliance	  with	  regional	  freshwater	  requirements.	  	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  research	  is	  
the	  use	  of	  the	  model	  Overseer	  that	  has	  become	  widely	  used	  for	  calculating	  nutrient	  losses	  
from	  dairy	  farms	  around	  New	  Zealand.	  
OVERSEER®	  Nutrient	  Budgets	  (Overseer)	  is	  a	  New	  Zealand-­‐developed	  management	  tool	  used	  
to	  model	  the	  nutrient	  flows	  of	  farm	  blocks.	  Overseer	  was	  established	  to	  be	  a	  decision-­‐support	  
tool	   for	   farmers	   and	   farm	   consultants	   to	   estimate	   fertiliser	   requirements	   for	   a	  farm.	  	  
Importantly,	  it	  has	  recently	  been	  adopted	  for	  regulatory	  purposes	  by	  regional	  councils.	  Along	  
with	   Overseer’s	   comprehensible	   user-­‐interface	   which	   has	   aimed	   to	   be	   user-­‐friendly	   for	  
farmers	  (Shepherd	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  regional	  councils	  have	  embraced	  Overseer	  partly	  because	  it	  
alows	  them	  to	  employ	  an	  efects-­‐based	  approach	  to	  controling	  nutrient	  outputs	  rather	  than	  
controling	  farming	  inputs	  (like	  fertiliser	  volume	  and	  stock	  numbers),	  which	  create	  the	  nutrient	  
losses	  (Arbuckle,	   2015).	   Integrating	   years	   of	   applied	   farm	   research,	   Overseer	   produces	   a	  
nutrient	   budget	   for	   an	   individual	   farm	   and	   evaluates	   the	   farm’s	   nutrient	   losses	   using	   farm	  
system	  parameters.	  Farm	  nutrient	  management	  decisions	  can	  then	  be	  based	  on	  the	  models	  
predicted	   outcomes,	   stimulating	   new	   management	   ideas	   to	   reduce	   nutrient	   losses,	   rather	  
than	  reducing	  fertiliser	  applications	  or	  stock	  numbers	  (Murray	  et	  al.,	  2016).	  An	  efects-­‐based	  
control	  on	  outputs	  is	  seen	  by	  resource	  users	  as	  more	  “preferable	  to	  input	  controls	  as	  they	  are	  
regarded	  as	  more	  flexible,	  eficient	  and	  efective”	  (Wasley,	  2015,	  p.	  5).	  Overseer	  aims	  to	  ofer	  
flexibility	  for	  farmers	  by	  analysing	  several	  farm	  nutrient	  management	  methods	  for	  their	  ability	  
to	   reduce	   nutrient	   losses,	   thereby	   encouraging	   innovation	   in	   the	   primary	   sector.	   While	  
Overseer’s	   popularity	   has	   increased	   within	   regional	   councils	   who	   are	   aiming	   to	   develop	   or	  
update	  regional	  plans	  in	  response	  to	  the	  NPS-­‐FM,	  its	  use	  as	  a	  policy	  tool	  is	  not	  new.	  Beginning	  
in	  2003,	  the	  Waikato	  Regional	  Council	  employed	  the	  use	  of	  Overseer	  to	  manage	  farm	  nutrient	  
runof	   into	   Lake	  Taupō	  (Waikato	   Regional	   Council,	   2011).	   With	   the	   ability	   to	   aid	   council	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regulation	   by	   quantifying	   nutrient	   losses	   on	   farms	   to	   meet	   water	   quality	   limits,	   and	   the	  
familiarity	  farmers	  have	  with	  the	  model	  due	  to	  its	  use	  as	  a	  decision-­‐support	  tool,	  Overseer’s	  
use	   by	   regional	   councils	   for	   regulatory	   and	   compliance	   purposes	   is	   predicted	   to	   increase	  
(Arbuckle,	  2015).	  
Setting	   freshwater	   quality	   and	   quantity	   limits	   under	   the	   NPS-­‐FM	   is	   a	   significant	   task	   for	  
regional	  councils.	  Overseer’s	  growing	  use	  as	  a	  compliance	  tool	  to	  facilitate	  achieving	  regional	  
water	   objectives	   opens	   important	   questions	   about	   the	   limitations	   of	   using	   models	   for	  
environmental	   regulation.	   For	   the	   successful	   implementation	   of	   Overseer	   as	   a	   compliance	  
tool,	  al	  persons	  afected	  by	  its	  estimates	  should	  feel	  confident	  in	  its	  use	  (OVERSEER®,	  2015b).	  
Dairy	  farmers	  afected	  by	  nutrient	  limits,	  via	  accredited	  consultants,	  wil	  be	  required	  to	  work	  
closely	   with	   Overseer	   to	   meet	   nutrient	   limits	   and	   individual	   reductions	   set	   by	   regional	  
councils.	  	  
Overseer	   was	   designed	   to	   be	   a	   qualitative	   tool,	   providing	   descriptive	   feedback	   on	   the	  
performance	  of	  diferent	  farming	  practices	  (McCrone,	  2015).	  With	  its	  adoption	  by	  regional	  
councils	  and	  increasing	  shift	  to	  use	  in	  regulation,	  Overseer	  has	  become	  a	  quantitative	  tool,	  
with	   farmers	   either	   meeting	   or	   failing	   to	   meet	   compliance.	  The	   expectation	   has	   been	   that	  
Overseer	   would	   provide	   certainty	   and	   clarity	   in	   the	   implementation	   of	   regional	   council	  
nutrient	  management	  rules,	  regulations	  and	  limits.	  However,	  a	  range	  of	  chalenges	  have	  been	  
identified	   to	   achieve	   this	   vision.	  In	   particular,	  Duncan	   (2014)	  identifies	   the	   social-­‐political	  
dimensions	  of	  rule	  by	  numbers	  and	  models	  and	  predicts	  that	  farmer	  encounters	  with	  Overseer	  
and	  how	  they	  use	  the	  model	  wil	  be	  diferent	  depending	  on	  the	  stakes	  involved.	  Duncan	  (2014)	  
argues	  that	  if	  the	  stakes	  are	  high,	  as	  they	  are	  in	  resource	  management,	  farmers	  are	  likely	  to	  
look	   far	   more	   closely	   at	   the	   intricacies	   of	   the	   model	   and	   find	   ways	   to	   interpret	   the	   input	  
requirements	  of	  the	  model	  to	  stay	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  numbered	  rules	  
To	  gain	  further	  insight	  into	  the	  social-­‐political	  dimensions	  of	  quantification	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  farmers	  are	  responding	  to	  the	  new	  quantitative	  regulatory	  regime,	  this	  research	  has	  
focused	  on	  questions	  such	  as:	  	  What	  perception	  do	  dairy	  farmers	  hold	  on	  the	  use	  of	  Overseer	  
as	  a	  quantitative	  regulatory	  model?	  How	  can	  the	  farm	  environment,	  a	  complex	  and	  dynamic	  
series	  of	  processes	  and	  states	  be	  defined	  accurately	  by	  Overseer?	  What	  is	  compromised	  in	  
Overseer’s	  rendition	  of	  farm	  processes,	  and	  how	  do	  these	  compromises	  afect	  dairy	  farmer	  
perceptions	   of	   the	   model?	   These	   questions	   examine	   the	   important	   relationship	   between	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resource	   users	   and	   a	   regulatory	   tool,	   which	   usualy	   escape	   critical	   attention.	  This	   research	  
seeks	  to	  examine	  the	  perceptions	  of	  dairy	  farmers	  and	  farm	  consultants	  who	  use	  Overseer	  to	  
quantify	  farming	  processes;	  specificaly	  focusing	  on	  Overseer’s	  shift	  from	  a	  decision-­‐making	  
to	  compliance	  tool	  for	  nutrient	  management.	  Overseer	  is	  currently	  in	  use,	  and	  wil	  soon	  be	  
roled	  out	  in	  many	  places	  in	  New	  Zealand.	  It	  is	  being	  used	  to	  benchmark	  environmental	  states	  
for	  future	  management	  and	  monitoring.	  Investigating	  these	  questions	  wil	  help	  understand	  
the	   implementation	   practicalities	  of	   using	   the	   model	   in	   compliance,	   gaining	   insight	   into	  
whether	  the	  goal	  of	  sustainable	  nutrient	  management	  using	  an	  outputs-­‐based	  model	  can	  be	  
achieved	  via	  this	  method.	  
The	   research	   includes	   the	   development	  of	   a	  theoretical	  framework	   for	   analysing	   interview	  
data	   that	   draws	   together	   ideas	   on	   quantification,	   the	   role	   of	   numbers	   in	   policy,	   and	   the	  
chalenges	  of	  standardising	  people	  and	  the	  environment	  from	  authors	  including	  Porter	  (1996),	  
Duncan	  (2014),	  Stone	  (2002)	  and	  Busch	  (2011).	  Using	  the	  Bay	  of	  Plenty	  as	  a	  case	  study,	  dairy	  
farmers	  and	  farm	  consultants	  from	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes,	  where	  Overseer	  has	  been	  introduced	  
for	  compliance	  and	  management	  of	  nutrient	  limits,	  and	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains,	  where	  Overseer	  
has	   not	   been	   introduced	   in	   a	   policy	   setting,	   have	   been	   interviewed.	   With	   a	   focus	   on	   the	  
relationship	   between	   resource	   user	   and	   regulatory	   tool,	   this	   research	   identifies	   potential	  
implications	   and	   consequences	   for	   freshwater	   and	   agricultural	   management	   as	   a	   result	   of	  
Overseer’s	  regulatory	  use	  in	  policy.	  
1.1	  Purpose	  of	  this	  research	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  research	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  perceptions	  of	  dairy	  farmers	  with	  and	  without	  
the	  use	  of	  Overseer	  for	  regulation.	  Understanding	  how	  Overseer’s	  change	  from	  a	  decision-­‐
support	  to	  a	  compliance	  tool	  has	  impacted	  upon	  how	  farmers	  encounter	  and	  engage	  with	  the	  
model,	   its	   outputs	   and	   the	   regulations	   underpinned	   by	   the	   model	   outputs	   is	   important	   if	  
farmers	   are	   to	   be	   meaningfuly	   engaged	   in	   addressing	   the	   issue	   of	   water	   quality	   in	   New	  
Zealand.	  To	  achieve	  this	  aim,	  the	  research	  question	  is:	  
•	  How	  has	  Overseer’s	  shift	  from	  decision-­‐support	  to	  compliance	  tool	  altered	  perceptions	  
of	  regulation	  and	  the	  prospects	  of	  achieving	  sustainable	  nutrient	  management?	  
In	  order	  to	  answer	  this	  question,	  the	  research	  objectives	  are:	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a)	  Assess	   the	   diferences	   in	   perception	   between	   farmers	   using	   Overseer	   for	   decision-­‐
support,	  versus	  farmers	  using	  Overseer	  for	  compliance	  purposes.	  
b)	  Evaluate	   how	   standardisation	   afects	   perceptions	   of	   the	   on-­‐farm	   applicability	   of	  
Overseer	  and	  its	  credibility	  as	  a	  regulatory	  tool.	  
c)	  Identify	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   use	   of	   Overseer	   as	   a	   compliance	   tool	   for	   nutrient	  
management	   and	   the	   chalenges	   these	   present	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   water	  
quality	  limits.	  
1.2	  Structure	  of	  this	  thesis	  
Chapter	  2	  outlines	  the	  contextual	  background	  of	  this	  topic.	  This	  is	  folowed	  by	  chapter	  3,	  the	  
theoretical	   framework	   used	   in	   this	   research.	   This	   includes	   a	   summary	   of	   the	   literature	  
regarding	  the	  role	  of	  quantification,	  objectivity	  and	  numbers	  in	  policy,	  and	  an	  introduction	  to	  
the	  theory	  of	  standards	  and	  standardisation.	  Chapter	  4	  revisits	  the	  research	  aim,	  questions	  
and	   objectives,	   and	  outlines	   the	   methodology	   used	   to	   conduct	   this	   study,	   and	   colect	   and	  
analyse	  data	  for	  this	  research.	  Chapter	  5	  sets	  out	  the	  results	  of	  this	  study.	  Chapter	  6	  discusses	  
the	  results	  by	  linking	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  3	  to	  the	  results	  set	  out	  in	  
chapter	  5.	  Chapter	  7	  provides	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  research,	  drawing	  conclusions,	  considering	  
limitations	  and	  outlining	  the	  potential	  for	  future	  research.	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Chapter	  2	  
Background	  
2.1	  New	  Zealand’s	  legislative	  background	  
Replacing	   over	   50	   town	   planning	   and	   resource	   management	   laws	   in	   1991,	   the	   Resource	  
Management	   Act	   (RMA)	   is	   New	   Zealand’s	   primary	   piece	   of	   natural	   resources	   legislation	  
(Ministry	  for	  the	  Environment	  (MfE),	  2017).	  The	  RMA	  presents	  a	  comprehensive	  system	  for	  
the	  sustainable	  management	  of	  the	  country’s	  land,	  air	  and	  water	  resources	  (MfE,	  2015;	  Ruru,	  
2011)	  by	   outlining	   environmental	   protection,	   resource	   management,	   and	   urban	   planning	  
requirements	  (RMA,	  1991).	  Under	  the	  RMA’s	  structure	  of	  responsibilities,	  the	  role	  of	  central	  
government	  is	  to	  address	  national	  concerns	  and	  issues	  as	  they	  arise,	  and	  influence	  the	  running	  
of	   the	   RMA	   through	   nationaly	   binding	   environmental	   standards	   and	   national	   policy	  
statements.	   Environmental	   governance	   is	   delegated	   to	   two	   levels	   of	   local	   government:	  
regional	   councils	   and	   territorial	   authorities,	   who	   operate	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   Local	  
Government	   Act	   2002	  (LGA).	  Local	   governments	   develop	   regional	   policy	   statements	   and	  
identify	  resource	  issues	  and	  develop	  strategies	  to	  manage	  and	  resolve	  these	  (Ruru,	  2011). 
2.1.1	  Resource	  consents	  
At	   its	   core,	   the	   RMA	   works	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   no	   individual	   or	   company	   can	   perform	   any	  
activities	  which	  contradict	  any	  one	  rule	  in	  a	  relevant	  regional	  plan,	  unless	  alowed	  otherwise.	  
For	   example,	   by	   obtaining	   a	   resource	   consent;	   regional	   councils	   authorise	   consents	   that	  
permit	  resource	  use	  (e.g.,	  water	  takes	  or	  discharges	  to	  water)	  under	  specified	  conditions.	  As	  
stated,	  the	  RMA	  embraces	  an	  ‘efects-­‐based’	  approach	  to	  assess	  the	  suitability	  of	  proposed	  
activities.	  The	  concept	  of	  ‘sustainable	  management’	  underpins	  this	  ‘efects-­‐based’	  	  legislation,	  
which	  directs	  that	  the	  efects	  of	  any	  activity	  are	  regulated,	  not	  the	  activities	  themselves	  (Berke	  
et	   al.,	   2006).	   Al	   applications	   for	   resource	   consent	   must	   include	   a	   detailed	   ‘assessment	   of	  
environmental	  efects’	  outlining	  any	  potential	  efects	  from	  the	  proposed	  activity.	  As	  described	  
in	   the	   RMA,	   the	   term	   ‘efects’	   includes,	   and	   is	   not	   limited	   to,	   any	   positive	   or	   adverse,	  
temporary	   or	   permanent,	   and	   cumulative	   efects	   caused	   by	   any	   aspect	   of	   the	   proposed	  
activity	  (RMA,	  1991).	  An	  activity	  or	  development	  is	  likely	  to	  gain	  consent	  if	  the	  efects	  of	  the	  
activity	  can	  be	  demonstrated	  to	  not	  adversely	  afect	  the	  environment,	  or	  if	  the	  efects	  can	  be	  
avoided	  or	  suitably	  mitigated	  (Berke	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  By	  adopting	  an	  efects-­‐based	  approach,	  it	  is	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expected	  that	  flexibility	  is	  provided	  within	  the	  consent	  process	  where	  an	  extensive	  range	  of	  
techniques	  can	  be	  integrated	  to	  mitigate	  or	  avoid	  adverse	  environmental	  efects	  (Berke	  et	  al.,	  
2006).	  	  
2.1.2	  The	  National	  Policy	  Statement	  for	  Freshwater	  Management	  
In	   response	   to	   concerns	   about	   water	   quality	   and	   aiming	   to	   strengthen	   the	   legislative	  
framework	  of	  the	  RMA,	  the	  NPS-­‐FM	  was	  introduced	  in	  2011	  and	  later	  reformed	  in	  2014	  by	  the	  
Ministry	  for	  the	  Environment	  (MfE)	  (MfE,	  2015).	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  NPS-­‐FM	  is	  to	  introduce	  
quantitative	  environmental	  limits	  for	  water	  quality	  and	  quantity	  which	  are	  to	  be	  decided	  and	  
enforced	   by	   local	   authorities.	   As	   part	   of	   the	   NPS-­‐FM	   2014	   reform	   process,	   a	   National	  
Objectives	  Framework	  (NOF)	  was	  established	  to	  provide	  guidance	  to	  local	  authorities	  on	  the	  
setting	  of	  objectives	  for	  water	  quality	  across	  New	  Zealand.	  The	  NOF	  afects	  al	  water	  bodies,	  
“freshwater	  or	  geothermal	  water	  in	  a	  river,	  lake,	  stream,	  pond,	  wetland,	  or	  aquifer,	  or	  any	  
part	   thereof,	   that	   is	   not	   located	   within	   the	   coastal	   marine	   area”	  (MfE,	   2015,	   p.	   25).	   The	  
framework	  aims	  to	  specify	  which	  quality	  and	  quantity	  attributes	  require	  management	  within	  
a	   freshwater	   body,	   and	   the	   minimum	  accepted	   environmental	   states	   within	   that	   attribute.	  
Attributes	   are	   described	   as	   “a	   measurable	   characteristic	   of	   fresh	   water,	   including	   physical,	  
chemical	   and	   biological	   properties”	  (MfE,	   2014a,	   p.	   7).	   Regional	   councils	   can	   use	   the	  
framework	   when	   setting	   freshwater	   objectives	   and	   in	   regional	   plans,	   by	   considering	   which	  
quality	  and	  quantity	  attributes	  are	  relevant	  and	  desired	  at	  what	  level	  by	  the	  community	  of	  the	  
catchment	  or	  what	  is	  known	  under	  the	  NPS-­‐FM	  as	  a	  freshwater	  management	  unit	  (FMU).	  The	  
limits	  required	  to	  be	  set	  under	  the	  NPS-­‐FM	  (which	  are	  separate	  from	  the	  NOF)	  are	  expected	  
to	  achieve	  the	  objectives	  communities	  set.	  One	  aim	  of	  limit-­‐setting	  under	  the	  NPS-­‐FM	  is	  to	  
reduce	   resource	   over-­‐alocation,	   which	   describes	   a	   situation	   where	   the	   resource	   has	   been	  
divided	  up	  for	  users	  beyond	  a	  limit	  where	  the	  freshwater	  objectives	  for	  quality	  and/or	  quantity	  
are	   no	   longer	   being	   met	  (Environment	   Foundation,	   n.d.).	  Another	   aim	   is	   to	   identify	   the	  
capacity	  of	  the	  resource	  for	  realocation	  or	  what	  has	  become	  known	  as	  ‘headroom’	  which	  is	  
the	  extent	  of	  the	  resource	  not	  being	  used	  below	  a	  limit	  (Duncan,	  2014)	  
2.1.3	  Changing	  conditions	  for	  governance	  	  
The	  RMA	  was	  initialy	  welcomed	  as	  a	  progressive	  method	  of	  managing	  natural	  resources	  due	  
to	  its	  efects-­‐based	  approach	  and	  the	  delegation	  of	  responsibility	  to	  local	  government	  (Lennox	  
et	   al.,	   2011).	   Regional	   councils	   may	   release	   regional	   plans	   to	   identify	   and	   address	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environmental	   issues	   in	   their	   jurisdiction,	   however,	   often	   these	   plans	   are	   delayed	   or	   not	  
released	  or	  only	  partialy	  released	  due	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  taken	  to	  gain	  approval.	  Without	  
a	  regional	  plan	  in	  place,	  resource	  alocation	  and	  management	  around	  the	  country	  has,	  in	  many	  
regions,	  relied	  solely	  on	  the	  authorization	  of	  resource	  consents	  (Gunningham,	  2008;	  Lennox	  
et	  al.,	  2011).	  Often	  there	  are	  no	  overarching	  limits	  or	  thresholds	  managing	  the	  alocation	  of	  a	  
resource,	  rather,	  resource	  consent	  has	  been	  alocated	  on	  a	  first-­‐in,	  first-­‐served,	  consent-­‐by-­‐
consent	  basis,	  resulting	  in	  a	  lack	  of	  sustainable	  future-­‐proofing	  for	  many	  areas	  of	  New	  Zealand	  
(Gunningham,	  2008),	  especialy	  those	  with	  scarce	  resources.	  Critics	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  lack	  
of	  nationaly	  consistent	  policy,	  and	  the	  reliance	  on	  resource	  consents	  under	  the	  RMA	  has	  led	  
to	  the	  continued	  decline	  of	  New	  Zealand’s	  water	  resources	  (Gunningham,	  2008).	  	  
While	  water	  quality	  has	  been	  brought	  to	  the	  foreground	  as	  an	  important	  concern	  for	  New	  
Zealand,	  difuse	  polution	  remains	  a	  chalenging	  policy	  issue	  for	  the	  government	  (MfE	  &	  Stats	  
NZ,	  2017).	  Quantifying	  and	  mitigating	  the	  efects	  of	  nutrient	  losses	  with	  regulation	  remains	  
dificult	   due	   to	   the	   crossing	   of	   complex	   spatial	   and	   temporal	   scales.	   For	   example,	   difuse	  
polution	   from	   a	   dairy	   farm	   can	   take	   years	   to	   filtrate	   through	   the	   soil	   profile	   to	   reach	  
groundwater	  (MfE	  &	  Stats	  NZ,	  2017)	  ,	  and	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  travel	  great	  distances	  from	  the	  
source	   by	  groundwater	  (DairyNZ,	   2013;	   Murray	   et	  al.,	   2016).	   For	   these	   reasons,	   regulating	  
nutrients	   is	   burdened	   with	   the	   practical	   chalenges	   of	   assigning	   responsibility	   for	   nutrient	  
losses.	  
As	  instigated	  by	  the	  NPS-­‐FM,	  regional	  councils	  are	  now	  reviewing	  and	  updating	  their	  regional	  
plans	   to	   address	   the	   most	   pressing	   environmental	   water	   issues	   afecting	   their	   region.	  
Folowing	  the	  objectives	  in	  the	  NOF,	  regional	  councils	  across	  the	  country	  are	  expected	  to	  set	  
freshwater	   limits	   specific	   to	   regional	   community	   needs	   by	   modeling	   the	   extent	   of	   the	  
resource	  (MfE,	  2013a).	  Regional	  councils	  must	  ensure	  appropriate	  limits	  and	  land	  use	  rules	  
and	  nutrient	  discharges	  are	  put	  in	  place	  to	  mitigate,	  manage	  or	  reduce	  resource	  degradation.	  
The	   NPS-­‐FM	   encourages	   regional	   councils	   to	   employ	   a	   model-­‐guided	   environmental	  
accounting	   regime	   to	   identify	   over	   and	   under-­‐alocation	   (MfE,	   2014)	  due	   to	   the	   apparent	  
benefits	   quantification	   and	   numbers	   have	   in	   policy	   implementation	  (Norton	   et	   al.,	   2009;	  
Porter,	  1996).	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2.2	  Regulating	  the	  New	  Zealand	  dairy	  industry	  
New	  Zealand’s	  success	  in	  international	  markets	  is	  characterised	  by	  its	  primary	  sector,	  with	  the	  
dairy	  industry	  bringing	  in	  a	  forecasted	  three	  bilion	  dolars	  to	  the	  national	  economy	  (DairyNZ,	  
2016).	  It	  is	  expected	  that	  the	  dairy	  industry	  wil	  continue	  to	  grow	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future	  
(2016).	  Recent	  farming	  intensification	  has	  mainly	  been	  driven	  by	  the	  success	  of	  dairy	  farming,	  
with	  the	  total	  area	  of	  dairy	  farming	  land	  in	  New	  Zealand	  increasing	  by	  28%	  between	  2002	  and	  
2012	  (MfE	  &	  Stats	  NZ,	  2015).	  In	  catchments	  dominated	  by	  agriculture,	  the	  results	  of	  past	  land	  
management	   practices,	   for	   example,	   excessive	   fertiliser	   use,	   deforestation,	   and	   grazing	   on	  
erosive	  slopes,	  are	  meeting	  with	  the	  latest	  efects	  of	  nutrient	  losses	  from	  intensified	  land	  use	  
and	   water	   abstraction	  (Duncan,	   2017;	   MfE,	   2009;	   Parliamentary	   Commissioner	   for	   the	  
Environment	  (PCE),	  2015).	  
Degraded	  conditions	  of	  waterways	  in	  New	  Zealand	  have	  been	  explored	  in	  scientific	  studies	  by	  
researchers	   (Gluckman	   (2017);	   Houlbrooke	   et	   al.	   (2004);	   Smith	   et	   al.	   (2013);	   Wilcock	   et	   al.	  
(1995)	  and	  have	  also	  been	  acknowledged	  by	  members	  of	  the	  public	  (Hughey	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  
Hughey	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  found	  that	  the	  wider	  public	  has	  a	  predominantly	  negative	  view	  of	  dairy	  
farming	  due	  to	  the	  efects	  of	  the	  industry	  on	  water	  quality	  degradation.	  Complementing	  these	  
views	  are	  numerous	  scientific	  studies	  which	  find	  correlations	  between	  depleting	  water	  quality	  
and	  catchments	  containing	  high-­‐intensity	  dairy	  farms	  (Houlbrooke	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Smith	  et	  al.,	  
2013;	  Wilcock	  et	  al.,	  1995).	  Due	  to	  the	  financial	  benefits	  of	  continued	  development	  of	  the	  
dairy	   industry,	   the	   compromise	   between	   the	   economy	   and	   the	   environment	   is	   managed	  
through	   policy	   regulations	   aiming	   to	   not	   hinder	   industry	   growth	   while	   minimising	  
environmental	  damage	  (Hughey	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  	  
2.2.1	  Environmental	  issues	  
Farming	   intensification	   increases	   stock	   numbers	   and	   escalates	   cultivation	   cycles,	   usualy	  
alongside	  additional	  inputs	  of	  fertiliser,	  feed	  supplements,	  water,	  and	  energy;	  al	  aiming	  to	  
harvest	  more	  food	  from	  the	  same	  land	  area.	  Studies	  by	  Harding	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  and	  Hamil	  and	  
McBride	   (2003)	  both	   found	   that	   the	   degree	   of	   negative	   environmental	   impact	   directly	  
correlates	  to	  livestock	  density	  in	  a	  catchment.	  Alongside	  the	  addition	  of	  concentrated	  nitrogen	  
and	  phosphorus	  to	  the	  environment,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  environmental	  impacts	  from	  
stocking	  rates	  and	  cultivation	  cycles	  is	  soil	  compaction,	  which	  can	  result	  in	  increasing	  nutrient	  
run-­‐of	  and	  leaching,	  alongside	  a	  reduction	  in	  N-­‐fixation	  by	  plants	  (Mackay,	  2008;	  Menneer	  et	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al.,	  2005).	  MfE	  &	  Stats	  NZ	  (2015)	  summarised	  regional	  council	  soil	  surveys	  which	  reported	  78%	  
of	  dairy	  farm	  sites	  not	  meeting	  the	  target	  for	  soil	  physical	  status.	  Mackay	  (2008)’s	  report	  also	  
highlighted	  the	  continued	  depletion	  of	  organic	  carbon	  and	  nitrogen	  in	  soils	  due	  to	  intensive	  
pastures,	   and	   the	   on-­‐going	   addition	   of	   harmful	   soil	   contaminants	   (cadmium	   and	   fluoride),	  
which	  are	  supplied	  from	  phosphorus	  fertilisers	  and	  zinc	  tablets	  (used	  for	  facial	  eczema).	  
Nitrogen	  &	  Phosphorus	  
Eliott	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  found	  using	  national	  scale	  modeling	  to	  determine	  nutrient	  volumes	  lost	  
from	   land	   and	   transported	   to	   the	   sea,	   that	   difuse	   sources	   accounted	   for	   97%	   of	   the	   total	  
nitrogen	  load,	  and	  98%	  of	  the	  total	  phosphorus	  load.	  Gluckman	  (2017)	  summarises	  that	  on	  a	  
per	  hectare	  basis,	  land	  used	  for	  dairy	  farming	  inputs	  a	  disproportionaly	  large	  load	  of	  nitrogen	  
into	  waterways;	  dairy	  farming	  holds	  the	  greatest	  difuse	  polution	  footprint	  for	  nitrogen	  in	  the	  
country.	  A	  MfE	  &	  Stats	  NZ	  (2015)	  report	  highlights	  that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  impacts	  of	  
nitrogen	   in	   New	   Zealand’s	   rivers	   is	   nuisance	   slime	   and	   algae	   growth.	   Growth	   of	   these	   can	  
decrease	   dissolved	   oxygen	   levels,	   change	   river	   flows	   and	  cause	   blockages	   of	   irrigation	   and	  
water	   supply	   intakes,	   among	   other	   impacts.	   49%	   of	   monitored	   river	   sites	   in	   the	   report	  
contained	  enough	  nitrogen	  to	  trigger	  nuisance	  slime	  and	  algae	  growth.	  	  
The	  cycle	  of	  nutrients	  in	  a	  simplified	  dairy	  farm	  include	  the	  inputs:	  fertilisers,	  imported	  feeds,	  
and	   plant	   nitrogen-­‐fixation;	   and	   the	   outputs;	   (meat,	   milk,	   feed	   etc.),	   gaseous	   losses	   to	   the	  
atmosphere,	   surface	   run-­‐of	   to	   waterways,	   and	   leaching	   down	   into	   groundwater	  (DairyNZ,	  
2013).	  New	  Zealand	  has	  a	  pasture-­‐based	  dairy	  production	  system,	  with	  supplementary	  feed	  
being	   grown	   on	   the	   farm	   as	   maize,	   or	   bought	   in	   externaly.	   Dairy	   shed	   efluent	   and	   urine	  
patches	   from	   dairy	   cows	  add	   high	   levels	   of	   nitrates	   to	   the	   soil,	   with	   very	   high	   nutrient	  
concentration	  levels	  found	  in	  random	  locations	  as	  cows	  urinate	  randomly	  (PCE,	  2004).	  The	  
nitrogen	   from	   urine	   patches	   can	   be	   transported	   through	   the	   soil	   profile	   into	   groundwater	  
sources,	  resulting	  in	  an	  influx	  of	  nitrogen	  into	  lakes	  and	  rivers	  potentialy	  far	  from	  the	  source	  
(DairyNZ,	  2013).	  	  
Farmers	  add	  nutrients	  (nitrogen,	  phosphorus,	  sulphur,	  magnesium	  etc.)	  to	  pasture	  blocks	  to	  
maximise	  grass	  growth,	  resulting	  in	  higher	  milk	  production	  and	  therefore,	  higher	  economic	  
gain	  (PCE,	  2004).	  It	  is	  in	  a	  dairy	  farmer’s	  best	  interest,	  economicaly,	  to	  use	  fertilizers	  on	  their	  
land.	  In	  terms	  of	  environmental	  degradation,	  surplus	  nutrients	  not	  required	  for	  plant	  growth	  
or	   significant	   rainfal	   events	   result	   in	   runof	   and	   leaching	   within	   the	   soil	   profile	   into	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groundwater,	  runof	  into	  surface	  streams	  and	  into	  the	  atmosphere.	  While	  it	  is	  not	  profitable	  
for	  a	  farmer	  to	  have	  excess	  nutrients,	  in	  many	  cases	  the	  fertilizer	  rates	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  
overestimated	   than	   underestimated,	   as	   the	   initial	   expense	   is	   out-­‐weighed	   by	   the	   potential	  
production	  gain	  (PCE,	  2004).	  
2.3	  Nutrient	  limits	  and	  regulation	  
2.3.1	  Farm-­‐scale	  modeling	  for	  limit	  setting	  
The	  availability	  of	  farm	  scale	  models	  is	  critical	  to	  the	  vision	  of	  limit	  setting	  for	  nutrient	  losses	  
from	   agricultural	   land;	   the	   approach	   of	   limiting	   land	   intensification	   before	   environmental	  
thresholds	  are	  breached	  is	  necessary.	  The	  forecasted	  growth	  of	  the	  dairy	  industry,	  coupled	  
with	   the	   push	   from	   public	   and	   science	   sectors	   to	   improve	   conditions	   of	   the	   country’s	  
freshwater	   resources,	   has	   brought	   nutrient	   management	   into	   the	   foreground	   as	   a	   leading	  
chalenge	  in	  environmental	  management.	  	  
It	  would	  be	  more	  certain	  for	  environmental	  outcomes,	  fairer,	  less	  
time-­‐consuming	  and	  more	  cost	  efective,	  if	  appropriate	  water	  quality	  
objectives	  and	  related	  nutrient	  load	  limits	  were	  established	  before	  the	  
assimilative	  capacity	  of	  a	  lake	  (or	  a	  river	  system)	  is	  exceeded…	  
Measurable	  plan	  objectives	  and	  nutrient	  load	  caps	  would	  clearly	  
quantify	  the	  sustainable	  capacity	  of	  the	  lakes	  in	  terms	  of	  catchment	  
land	  use	  (Norton	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  as	  cited	  in	  Duncan,	  2014,	  p.	  379).	  
The	  central	  purpose	  of	  the	  NPS-­‐FM	  is	  to	  establish	  quality	  and	  quantity	  limits	  for	  al	  freshwater	  
bodies,	   enforceable	   by	   local	   government	  (MfE,	   2015).	  Norton	   et	   al.	   (2010)	  states	   that	   by	  
linking	   water	   quality	   objectives	   to	   the	   setting	   of	   resource	   use	   limits,	   an	   increased	   clarity	  
surrounding	  predicted	  environmental	  outcomes	  can	  be	  achieved.	  This	  is	  alongside	  the	  ability	  
to	  estimate	  and	  manage	  difuse	  nutrient	  losses,	  and	  predict	  their	  cumulative	  efects	  on	  the	  
environment.	   Attempting	   to	   resolve	   the	   aforementioned	   practical	   chalenge	   of	  assigning	  
responsibility	  to	  breaching	  nutrient	  limits,	  enforcement	  has	  been	  made	  more	  achievable	  by	  
the	  employment	  of	  quantitative	  models	  that	  are,	  at	  least	  in	  theory,	  able	  to	  link	  catchment	  
scale	  nutrient	  loads	  with	  individual	  farm	  scale	  compliance.	  Norton	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  explain	  that	  
farm	  scale	  models	  can	  be	  used	  to	  determine	  nutrient	  limit	  alocations	  for	  singular	  properties	  
and	   entire	   catchments,	   resulting	   in	   the	   development	   of	   preventative	   (and	   any	   currently	  
needed)	  nutrient	  management	  measures	  before,	  or	  as	  a	  result	  of,	  breaching	  the	  nutrient	  limit.	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2.3.2	  The	  rise	  of	  Overseer®	  Nutrient	  Budgets	  into	  policy	  
Overseer	   is	   a	   nutrient	   budgeting	   model	   co-­‐owned	   by	   AgResearch,	   Ministry	   for	   Primary	  
Industries	  (MPI)	  and	  Fertiliser	  Association	  of	  New	  Zealand	  (FANZ).	  Overseer	  was	  developed	  by	  
AgResearch	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   as	   a	   complete	   farm-­‐system	   nutrient	   budgeting	   approach,	  
replacing	   the	   simple	   ‘farm-­‐gate’	   nutrient	   accounting	   which	   only	   compared	   total	   nutrient	  
inputs	  and	  outputs	  within	  a	  property.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  calculate	  a	  nutrient	  budget,	  Overseer	  requires	  users	  to	  enter	  information	  about	  
their	  property.	  This	  is	  achieved	  by	  selecting	  from	  attributes	  from	  a	  list,	  and	  entering	  figures	  
which	  represent:	  








•	  Efective	  Areas	  
Using	  this	  information	  specific	  to	  an	  individuals	  property,	  Overseer	  then	  calculates	  a	  nutrient	  
budget	  by	  estimating	  al	  nutrient	  inputs.	  For	  the	  nitrogen	  budget,	  Table	  2.1	  lists	  the	  folowing	  
inputs	  and	  outputs	  which	  represent	  most	  of	  the	  nitrogen	  within	  the	  farming	  system	  (Overseer,	  
2015a):	  
Table	  2.1	  Overseer’s	  nutrient	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  
Nutrient	  inputs:	   Nutrient	  outputs:	  
Atmospheric	  (e.g.	  nutrients	  in	  rain)	   Produce	  (e.g.	  milk,	  meat)	  
Fertiliser	   Animal	  Transfers	  Out	  (e.g.	  in	  gut	  of	  animal)	  
Animal	  transfer	  (e.g.	  in	  gut	  of	  animal)	   ·∙Supplements	  (e.g.	  hay,	  silage)	  
Supplements	  fed	  on	  block	   Atmospheric	  Losses	  (e.g.	  nitrous	  oxide)	  
Irrigation	  (e.g.	  nutrients	  in	  water)	   Leaching/	  Runof	  
The	  nutrient	  budget	  represents	  the	  amount	  of	  nutrients	  entering	  the	  property,	  against	  the	  
amount	   of	   nutrients	   leaving	   the	   property.	   Regional	   council	   are	  mainly	  interested	   in	   the	  
leaching	  and	  runof	  output,	  as	  this	  is	  what	  significantly	  efects	  water	  quality	  (Freeman	  et	  al.,	  
2016).	  There	  is	  no	  practical	  way	  to	  accurately	  measure	  leaching	  and	  runof	  (Lilburne	  et	  al.,	  
2011).	  Put	   simply,	   Overseer	   estimates	   the	   figure	   by	   calculating	   the	   diference	   between	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nutrient	   inputs	   and	   nutrient	   outputs	   (i.e.	   al	   attributes	   listed	  above,	  excluding	   Leaching/	  
Runof),	  alongside	  the	  incorporation	  of	  farm-­‐specific	  data	  provided	  by	  the	  model	  user.	  	  
Using	   a	   model	   to	   estimate	   future	   nutrient	   losses	   enables	   an	   ‘efects-­‐based’	   approach	   to	  
nutrient	  management	  (Overseer,	  2016),	  which	  aligns	  wel	  with	  the	  RMA	  which	  is	  focused	  on	  
“avoiding,	   remedying	   or	   mitigating	   any	   adverse	   efects	   of	   activities	   on	   the	   environment”.	  
Model	  owners	  and	  regional	  councils	  maintain	  that	  output	  controls	  are	  more	  flexible,	  eficient	  
and	  efective	  than	  input	  controls	  for	  nutrient	  management	  (Wasley,	  2015,	  p.	  5).	  	  
The	  programme	  is	  designed	  to	  aid	  farmer	  nutrient	  and	  lime	  application	  decisions,	  nutrient	  use	  
eficiencies	  on	  the	  farm	  and	  provide	  numbers	  for	  environmental	  reporting	  (Massey	  University,	  
2016a).	  Due	  to	  the	  impracticability	  of	  routinely	  measuring	  difuse	  nutrient	  losses	  from	  farming	  
systems	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  focus	  on	  output	  parameters,	  the	  use	  of	  Overseer	  to	  model	  nutrient	  
discharges	  from	  properties	  is	  attractive	  to	  regional	  councils.	  Overseer’s	  appeal	  includes	  having	  
a	  farmer-­‐friendly	  interface,	  representing	  farm	  and	  singular	  block	  (e.g.	  pasture,	  efluent,	  crop)	  
scales,	  using	  relevant	  New	  Zealand	  data	  and	  providing	  feedback	  on	  mitigation	  options.	  As	  an	  
empirical	  model,	  the	  data	  used	  to	  create	  Overseer	  is	  managed	  through	  AgResearch,	  utilising	  
both	  New	  Zealand	  and	  overseas	  research.	  
Overseer	  is	  being	  used	  as	  a	  regulatory	  tool,	  producing	  separate	  reports	  on	  nutrient	  budgets	  
(farm	   and	   separate	   blocks),	   nitrogen	   and	   phosphorus	   reports,	   greenhouse	   gases,	   energy,	  
pasture	  production	  and	  maintenance	  nutrient	  requirements	  (Massey	  University,	  2016b).	  Once	  
users	  run	  the	  Overseer	  model	  for	  a	  property,	  they	  are	  presented	  with	  these	  reports	  for	  review	  
and	   are	   able	  to	   compare	   any	   mitigation	   options.	   For	   example,	   if	   Overseer	   shows	   a	   high	  
nitrogen	  leaching	  potential,	  the	  user	  can	  try	  diferent	  mitigation	  options	  like	  reducing	  nitrogen	  
fertilizer	  application	  amounts	  or	  rates,	  reduce	  the	  stocking	  rate	  of	  the	  farm,	  or	  winter-­‐of	  cows	  
from	  the	  property.	  The	  user	  can	  then	  input	  the	  new	  data	  and,	  checking	  that	  al	  relating	  inputs	  
have	  been	  amended,	  can	  receive	  a	  new	  report	  from	  Overseer	  for	  review.	  In	  order	  to	  accurately	  
use	  Overseer,	  the	  user	  requires	  sound	  technical	  understanding	  on	  the	  use	  of	  the	  programme	  
and	  have	  significant	  farm	  system	  knowledge	  (Watkins	  &	  Selbie,	  2015).	  It	  is	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  
model	  that	  is	  intended	  to	  foster	  good	  management	  practices	  and	  drive	  down	  nutrient	  losses	  
from	  the	  farm.	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2.3.3	  Use	  of	  Overseer	  by	  regional	  councils	  
Al	   regions	   are	   now	   required	   to	   implement	   the	   objectives	   set	   by	   the	   NPS-­‐FM.	   This	   means	  
regional	  councils	  wil	  review	  and	  update	  regional	  plans	  to	  set	  and	  manage	  freshwater	  quality	  
limits.	  Overseer	  has	  become	  central	  to	  limit-­‐setting	  under	  the	  NPS-­‐FM	  which	  means	  the	  use	  
of	  Overseer	  has	  shifted	  into	  a	  regulatory	  setting	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  implementing	  nutrient	  limits	  due	  
to	  the	  benefits	  of	  quickly	  modeling	  complicated	  environmental	  processes	  and	  predicting	  the	  
nutrient	  losses	  for	  any	  farm	  system	  changes.	  
Arbuckle	  (2015)	  provides	  a	  stocktake	  of	  regional	  council	  Overseer	  use,	  which	  is	  a	  review	  of	  
regional	   plans	   and	   literature	   with	   staf	   from	   seven	   diferent	   regional	   councils.	   Key	   issues	  
identified	  in	  the	  Arbuckle	  (2015)	  report	  include	  the	  acknowledgement	  from	  various	  regional	  
council	  staf	  that	  while	  Overseer	  has	  been	  designed	  as	  an	  advisory	  tool	  in	  the	  past,	  it	  has	  an	  
important	  role	  as	  a	  regulatory	  tool.	  Councils	  also	  acknowledge	  that	  there	  are	  major	  chalenges	  
in	  utilising	  Overseer	  as	  a	  regulation	  tool	  in	  policy	  development.	  Arbuckle	  (2015)	  found	  that	  
currently,	  the	  folowing	  regional	  councils	  have	  included	  the	  use	  of	  Overseer	  as	  a	  regulatory	  
tool	  within	  a	  regional	  plan:	  
•	  Waikato	  Regional	  Council	  
•	  Bay	  of	  Plenty	  Regional	  Council	  (BOPRC)	  
•	  Hawkes	  Bay	  Regional	  Council	  
•	  Horizons	  Regional	  Council	  
•	  Environment	  Canterbury	  Regional	  Council	  
•	  Otago	  Regional	  Council	  
Waikato	  Regional	  Council’s	  Variation	  5	  changes	  rules	  in	  its	  regional	  plan	  for	  managing	  land	  use	  
in	  the	  Taupō	  catchment	  (Mackay,	  2008).	  Management	  is	  based	  on	  a	  ‘grandfathering’	  approach	  
where	  previous	  losses	  of	  nitrogen	  for	  each	  farm	  are	  calculated	  using	  a	  baseline	  which	  relies	  
on	  Overseer,	  and	  this	  figure	  is	  used	  as	  a	  cap	  for	  nitrogen	  leaching	  from	  each	  property.	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2.3.4	  Chalenges	  of	  using	  Overseer	  for	  regulation	  –	  a	  recent	  example	  
A	  diferent	  management	  system	  has	  been	  adopted	  by	  the	  Horizons	  One	  Plan	  whereby	  nutrient	  
losses	  from	  current	  land	  use	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  natural	  soil	  characteristics	  for	  each	  property.	  
The	  plan	  alocated	  nitrogen	  loss	  limits	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  natural	  capital	  of	  the	  soil	  (Clothier	  
et	  al.,	  2008).	  Folowing	  the	  release	  of	  the	  Horizon’s	  One	  Plan,	  an	  administrative	  issue	  quickly	  
emerged	  after	  an	  expected	  model	  update.	  Due	  to	  Overseer’s	  version	  change	  which	  updated	  
the	  science,	  the	  number	  of	  land	  owners	  requiring	  a	  consent	  review	  went	  from	  20%	  to	  80%,	  
resulting	  in	  a	  large,	  unexpected	  burden	  on	  the	  administrative	  staf	  at	  the	  regional	  council	  and	  
a	  large,	  unexpected	  number	  of	  unhappy	  land	  owners	  (Duncan,	  2014).	  What	  happened	  with	  
Horizon’s	   One	   Plan	   provides	   insight	   into	   the	   complicated	   relationship	   between	  improving	  
scientific	  certainty	  in	  the	  model	  and	  how	  this	  overlaps,	  on	  practical	  terms,	  into	  efective	  policy	  
(Duncan,	  2017).	  Reducing	  scientific	  uncertainties	  in	  Overseer,	  through	  updating	  the	  model,	  
resulted	  in	  a	  loss	  of	  credibility	  in	  the	  One	  Plan’s	  regulation	  process.	  Overseer	  has	  also	  been	  
used	  by	  regional	  councils	  for	  farm	  extension	  and	  nutrient	  use	  advice,	  catchment	  modeling,	  
and	   limit	   setting.	  Arbuckle	  (2015)	  concluded	   that	   regional	   council	   use	   of	   Overseer	   wil	  
continue	  to	  significantly	  increase	  in	  the	  future	  due	  to	  al	  councils	  updating	  their	  regional	  water	  
management	  and	  limit	  setting	  polices	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  NPS-­‐FM.	  
2.3.5	  Emerging	  concerns	  in	  model	  use	  
Murray	  et	  al.	  (2016)	  discusses	  how	  the	  chalenges	  of	  using	  modeled	  information	  in	  regulation	  
are	   now	   being	   tested	   in	   several	   regional	   plans,	   including	   the	   Bay	   of	   Plenty	   Regional	   Plan,	  
regarding	  the	  Rotorua	  lake	  catchment.	  The	  requirement	  to	  manage	  difuse	  nutrient	  discharges	  
from	  farms	  has	  raised	  expectations	  of	  employing	  Overseer	  as	  a	  regulatory	  compliance	  tool;	  
along	   with	   the	   requirement	   of	   a	   strong	   analytical	   understanding	   of	   Overseer	   as	   a	   model,	  
having	  a	  good	  understanding	  of	  farming	  systems	  is	  essential	  for	  appropriate	  compliance	  use	  
(Murray	  et	  al.,	  2016).	  	  
Another	   concern	   emerges	   from	   Overseer’s	   apparent	   ability	   to	   calculate	   multiple	   ‘correct’	  
nutrient	  budget	  figures	  depending	  on	  who	  is	  inputting	  the	  data.	  Discrepancies	  between	  users	  
of	   Overseer	   can	   result	   in	   very	   diferent	   results	   from	   the	   same	   farm	   inputs.	  Roberts	   and	  
Watkins	  (2014)	  discuss	  how	  important	  consistent	  inputs	  from	  consistent	  users	  are	  for	  accurate	  
nutrient	  discharge	  estimates.	  Inputs	  into	  the	  model	  have	  a	  major	  efect	  on	  the	  final	  output.	  In	  
particular,	   the	   descriptive	   elements	   of	   the	   model	   can	   cause	   the	   largest	   efects,	   where	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variations	   due	   to	   personal	   opinions	   and	  farm	   systems	   knowledge	   are	   more	   apparent.	   To	  
address	   the	   issue	   of	   personal	   bias,	   Overseer	   ‘Best	   Practice	   Data	   Input	   Standards’	  
(Overseer2015a)	  were	   developed	   by	   a	   technical	   advisory	   group,	   drawing	   on	   their	   personal	  
knowledge	  of	  dairy	  management	  and	  guidelines	  from	  several	  other	  agricultural	  organisations.	  
The	  standards	  were	  reviewed	  and	  later	  endorsed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  government	  and	  industry	  
organisations	  including	  MPI,	  MfE,	  and	  Irrigation	  New	  Zealand.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  user	  standards	  
aim	  to	  provide	  consistent	  outputs	  for	  comparable	  situations	  (i.e.	  fit	  for	  purpose)	  and	  employ	  
a	  rating	  system	  of	  assessing	  the	  certain	  definitions	  requested	  by	  Overseer	  (Roberts	  &	  Watkins,	  
2014).	  	  
A	   2015	   article	   in	  The	   Press	  by	   John	  McCrone	   (2015),	   reported	   on	   several	   concerns	   from	  
farmers	  regarding	  the	  uncertainties	  of	  Overseer	  standards.	  Overnight	  updates	  to	  the	  model,	  
altering	  some	  of	  the	  environmental	  inputs,	  resulted	  in	  large	  changes	  to	  nutrient	  estimates.	  
These	  rapid	  changes	  altered	  user	  faith	  in	  the	  model	  as	  estimates	  rose	  or	  fel,	  some	  drasticaly	  
diferent	  from	  the	  previous	  day	  (McCrone,	  2015).	  Other	  users	  commented	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  (at	  
this	  time	  in	  2015)	  Overseer	  assumed	  blackcurrants	  were	  the	  same	  as	  grapes,	  resulting	  in	  a	  
shift	  from	  6	  kg/ha	  to	  45	  kg/ha	  of	  nitrogen	  leaching	  from	  the	  property.	  These	  changes	  might	  
be	  acceptable	  when	  Overseer	  is	  being	  used	  as	  a	  decision-­‐support	  tool	  as	  users	  are	  able	  to	  
adjust	  their	  estimates	  when	  it	  is	  most	  feasible,	  but	  changes	  like	  this	  during	  Overseer’s	  tenure	  
as	  a	  compliance	  tool	  creates	  problems	  for	  perception	  of	  model	  credibility	  (Duncan,	  2014).	  Due	  
to	  compliance	  use,	  alterations	  in	  user	  faith	  of	  Overseer	  result	  in	  tension	  as	  users	  are	  faced	  
with	   large	   number	   changes	   and	   the	   prospect	   of	   needing	   to	   alter	   farming	   management	  
practices	  wel	  beyond	  what	  was	  expected	  to	  meet	  with	  compliance.	  
Model	  assumptions	  
The	  assumptions	  embedded	  in	  Overseer	  are	  openly	  documented	  (Massey	  University,	  2016a),	  
and	  they	  include:	  
•	  Long-­‐term	   annual	   averages:	  Overseer	   uses	   many	   long-­‐term	   average	   inputs,	  which	  
result	   in	   annual	   average	   outputs,	   not	   compensating	   for	   monthly,	   weekly	   or	   daily	  
variations	   (e.g.	   rainfal	   is	   recorded	   by	   Overseer	   as	   average	   rainfal	   over	   one	   month,	  
whereas	  in	  reality,	  the	  total	  monthly	  rainfal	  may	  be	  one	  singular	  large	  storm	  event	  in	  
24	  hours).	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•	  Near	  equilibrium	  conditions:	  Overseer	  assumes	  minimal	  changes	  to	  the	  farm.	  If	  a	  farm	  
has	  recently,	  or	  wil	  be	  converting	  to	  another	  agricultural	  type	  (i.e.	  sheep	  and	  beef	  to	  
dairy),	   significant	   changes	   to	   farming	   inputs	   can	   last	   up	   to	   10	   years.	   For	   example,	  
changes	  to	  the	  soil	  structure	  due	  to	  diferent	  stocking	  types	  (e.g.	  sheep	  to	  dairy)	  wil	  
instead	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  constant	  from	  year	  to	  year.	  
•	  Actual	   and	   reasonable	   data	   inputs:	  If	   parameters	   are	   changed	   in	   one	   part	   of	   the	  
programme,	  Overseer	  wil	  not	  recognise	  that	  al	  associated	  input	  parameters	  require	  
change.	  This	  can	  be	  a	  problem	  when	  mitigation	  features	  are	  later	  added	  and	  Overseer	  
wil	  not	  alert	  to	  any	  issues,	  it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  user	  to	  confirm	  al	  inputs	  have	  been	  modified.	  
•	  Good	   management	   practices:	  Overseer	   cannot	   distinguish	   between	   farmers	   who	  
folow	  good	  farming	  practices	  and	  those	  who	  do	  not.	  This	  must	  be	  checked	  by	  the	  user	  
(e.g.	   is	   the	   fertilizer	   being	   spread	   evenly	   across	   the	   field	   away	   from	   natural	   water	  
features?	  The	  answers	  influence	  significant	  changes	  to	  nutrient	  run-­‐of	  risk).	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  issues,	  drawing	  from	  a	  workshop	  with	  staf	  representing	  several	  regional	  
councils	  in	  November	  2013,	  Park	  (2014)	  discusses	  how	  council	  oficers	  perceived	  that	  there	  
was	   no	   realistic	   alternative	   to	   using	   Overseer,	   therefore	   making	   it	   the	   most	   suitable	   for	  
nutrient	  regulation	  at	  this	  time.	  Given	  that	  milions	  of	  dolars	  and	  countless	  hours	  of	  time	  have	  
been	  invested	  in	  Overseer,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  regional	  councils	  wil	  withdraw	  their	  use	  of	  it	  for	  
compliance	  (Arbuckle,	   2015).	   Currently,	   Overseer’s	   legitimacy	   and	   credibility	   come	   from	  
testimonials	   stating	   it	   is	   the	  “best	   product	   of	   its	   type	   currently	   available”	   and	   its	   use	   for	  
compliance	   is	   suitable	   when	   it	   is	   “used	   correctly	   and	   its	   limitations	   are	   understood”	  
(Canterbury	  Regional	  Council,	  2012,	  p.	  2).	  	  However,	  there	  is	  growing	  concern	  that	  Overseer	  
is	   being	   used	   beyond	   its	   essential	   purpose	   resulting	   in	   inappropriate	   compliance	   use	   (see	  
Duncan,	  2014;	  Arbuckle,	  2015;	  McCrone,	  2015).	  Hence,	  understanding	  the	  social	  dimensions	  
of	  the	  use	  of	  Overseer	  and	  its	  implications	  as	  a	  compliance	  tool	  for	  nutrient	  management	  is	  
essential	  for	  guiding	  sustainable	  nutrient	  management	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
2.4	  Summary	  
With	  dairy	  farming	  having	  the	  largest	  footprint	  for	  difuse	  nitrogen	  polution	  in	  the	  country	  
and	  with	  growth	  of	  the	  dairy	  industry	  forecasted	  to	  increase,	  nutrient	  management	  has	  been	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brought	  into	  the	  foreground	  as	  a	  leading	  chalenge	  in	  environmental	  management	  as	  nutrient	  
limit	  setting	  is	  implemented	  nationwide.	  
Methods	  to	  model	  and	  manage	  nutrients	  at	  the	  farm	  scale	  have	  been	  developed	  in	  an	  attempt	  
to	  overcome	  the	  issue	  of	  assigning	  responsibility	  for	  nutrient	  losses.	  The	  Overseer	  modeling	  
program	  has	  resulted,	  and	  can	  be	  used	  for	  establish	  a	  regulatory	  link	  between	  the	  individual	  
farm	   and	   the	   catchment,	  aiding	   in	   the	   implementation	   of	  nutrient	   management	   and	  
mitigation	  measures	  before,	  or	  as	  a	  result	  of,	  breaching	  a	  nutrient	  limit.	  
Accurate	   use	   of	   Overseer	  requires	   sound	   technical	   understanding	   on	   the	   use	   of	   the	  
programme	  as	   wel	   as	  significant	   farm	   system	   knowledge;	   this	   is	   intended	   to	   incite	   good	  
management	   practices	   and	   drive	   down	   nutrient	   losses	   from	   the	   farm.	   There	   is	   growing	  
concern	   that	   Overseer	   is	   being	   used	   beyond	   its	   essential	   purpose	   for	   estimating	   nutrient	  
budgets,	   resulting	   in	   regulation	   that	   uses	   inaccurate	   representations	   of	   the	   interactions	   of	  
farm	  systems	  and	  the	  environment.	  The	  issues	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  Horizon’s	  One	  Plan	  show	  
that	  in	  addition	  to	  technical	  competency,	  understanding	  the	  social	  dimensions	  of	  Overseer	  
and	   its	   implications	   as	   a	   compliance	   tool	   for	   nutrient	   management,	  is	   essential	   for	   guiding	  
sustainable	  nutrient	  management	  in	  the	  future.	  
This	  thesis	  wil	  argue	  that	  the	  claims	  of	  gaining	  clarity	  surrounding	  nutrient	  regulations,	  due	  
to	   the	   employment	   of	   a	   quantitative	   model	   (Overseer)	   to	   quantify	   nutrient	   losses,	   fails	   to	  
recognise	   the	   importance	   of	   user-­‐acceptance	   of	   modeling	   and	   associated	   numbers	   in	  
quantification.	  The	  case	  study	  aims	  to	  highlight	  important	  chalenges	  in	  the	  enforcement	  of	  
nutrient	  limit	  policy,	  which	  links	  modeling	  and	  numbers	  to	  compliance	  and	  enforcement.	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Chapter	  3	  
Theoretical	  Framework	  
This	  chapter	  introduces	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  used	  to	  direct	  the	  analysis	  of	  data	  derived	  
from	  the	  case	  study.	  
The	   previous	   chapter	   explored	   the	   actions	   that	  have	  led	   to	   the	  key	   role	  of	   Overseer	   in	  
improving	   New	   Zealand’s	   freshwater	   management.	   Due	   to	   the	   continued	   deterioration	   of	  
waterways	  and	  the	  escalation	  of	  agricultural	  intensification	  around	  the	  country	  (see:	  Culen	  et	  
al.	  (2006)	  and	  Mackay	  (2008)),	  using	  Overseer	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  most	  suitable	  method	  
of	   regulating	   nutrient	   management	   for	   compliance	   within	   regional	   plans	  (Arbuckle,	   2015).	  
However,	   criticism	   of	   the	   model	   from	   researchers	   such	   as	  Duncan	   (2014),	  Wiliams	   et	   al.	  
(2013),	  and	  Edmeades	  (2013)	  argue	  that	  Overseer	  is	  being	  used	  beyond	  its	  essential	  purpose,	  
and	  policy	  does	  not	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  many	  limitations	  of	  using	  a	  numeric	  regulatory	  
approach	  and	  relying	  on	  a	  highly	  contingent	  computer	  model	  to	  generate	  the	  policy	  numbers.	  
This	  chapter	  presents	  a	  critical	  examination	  of	  the	  role	  of	  numbers	  in	  public	  policy.	  The	  chapter	  
explores	  the	  political	  processes	  involved	  in	  the	  ordering	  of	  nature,	  the	  use	  of	  numbers,	  and	  
the	   role	   technology	   in	   modern	   environmental	   policy.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   the	   themes	   of	  
quantification,	   objectivity,	   and	   standardisation	   in	   policy	   are	   derived	   from	   work	   by	  Porter	  
(1995,	  1996),	  Stone	  (2002),	  Busch	  (2000,	  2011)	  and	  (Latour,	  1992,	  1999),	  among	  others.	  
Quantifying,	  or	  assigning	  numbers	  to	  represent	  complex	  processes	  and	  aspects	  of	  nature,	  has	  
been	   the	   halmark	   of	   science	   used	   in	   policy.	   Quantification	   is	   the	   foundation	   of	  
standardisation,	   which	   has	   been	   described	   by	   researchers	   including	  (Scott,	   1998b),	   and	  
Lampland	   and	   Star	   (2009)	  as	   a	   process	   of	   using	   numbers	   to	   make	   the	   dissimilar,	   regular.	  
Objectivity	  is	  an	  assumed	  key	  attribute	  of	  numbers.	  	  Porter	  (1953)	  argues	  that	  objectivity,	  as	  
a	  theoretical	  concept,	  is	  an	  essential	  component	  necessary	  in	  measurement,	  in	  which	  order	  is	  
obtained	  by	   folowing	   rules.	  Attaining	  objectivity	  with	   the	   use	   of	  numbers	  is	  assumed	   to	  
overcome	  distance	  and	  generate	  trust,	  as	  numbers	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  universal	  and	  rule-­‐
bound	  (Porter,	   1995).	   Quantification	   encompasses	   the	   idea	   that	   “through	   measurement,	  
counting,	  and	  calculation,	  [quantification]	  is	  among	  the	  most	  credible	  strategies	  for	  rendering	  
nature	  or	  society	  objective”	  Porter	  (1995,	  p.	  74).	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Overseer	  is	  a	  nutrient	  budgeting	  model	  that	  represents	  farming	  systems	  using	  software	  which	  
relies	  on	  the	  language	  of	  mathematics.	  This	  type	  of	  numeric	  representation	  has	  been	  highly	  
useful	  for	  nutrient	  measurement	  and	  management,	  but	  is	  now	  being	  used	  for	  environmental	  
regulation.	   Overseer	   has	   been	  branded	   as	   providing	   clarity	   of	   farm-­‐system	   processes	   and	  
holding	  the	  ability	  to	  be	  used	  within	  and	  across	  regions	  of	  New	  Zealand.	  By	  analysing	  dairy	  
farmer	  perceptions	  of	  Overseer	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  quantification,	  it	  is	  hoped	  that	  a	  clearer	  
understanding	  of	  the	  model’s	  acceptability	  wil	  emerge.	  
3.1	  Quantification	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  objectivity	  
’Objectivity’	  arouses	  the	  passions	  as	  few	  words	  can.	  Its	  presence	  is	  
evidently	  required	  for	  basic	  justice,	  honest	  government,	  and	  true	  
knowledge…	  Mapping	  the	  mathematics	  onto	  the	  world	  is	  always	  
dificult	  and	  problematical.	  Critics	  of	  quantification	  in	  the	  natural	  
sciences	  as	  wel	  as	  in	  social	  and	  humanistic	  fields	  have	  often	  felt	  that	  
reliance	  on	  numbers	  simply	  evades	  the	  deep	  and	  important	  issues.	  
Even	  where	  this	  is	  so,	  an	  objective	  method	  may	  be	  esteemed	  more	  
highly	  than	  a	  profound	  one.	  Any	  domain	  of	  quantified	  knowledge,	  like	  
any	  domain	  of	  experimental	  knowledge,	  is	  in	  a	  sense	  artificial.	  
(Porter,	  1995,	  pp.	  3-­‐5).	  
According	  to	  Porter	  (1995),	  quantification,	  as	  a	  form	  of	  measurement,	  is	  vital	  when	  attempting	  
to	  achieve	  homogeneity	  across	  distances	  and	  overcome	  distrust	  among	  actors.	  Quantification,	  
or	  measurement,	  is	  the	  representation	  of	  an	  object’s	  or	  phenomenon’s	  characteristics	  on	  an	  
arbitrary	  scale,	   usualy	   represented	   with	   a	   numerical	   value.	   Examples	   of	   these	  
“characteristics”	   include	   mass,	   height,	   and	   volume,	   with	   possible	   “values”	   being	   numbers	  
relating	  to	  kilograms,	  metres,	  and	  cubic	  metres,	  respectively.	  Values	  could	  also	  be	  represented	  
by	  descriptive	  scales:	  smal,	  medium,	  high.	  The	  definition	  of	  objectivity	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  its	  
similarity	  to	  terms	  such	  as	  neutral,	  impartial,	  and	  fair.	  Porter	  (1995)	  explains	  that	  in	  policy,	  
recommendations	  using	  quantitative	  estimates	  are	  sometimes	  given	  reasonable	  backing	  even	  
without	  compeling	  validity.	  This	  is	  because	  decisions	  using	  numbers,	  or	  clear-­‐cut	  rules,	  project	  
the	  appearance	  of	  being	  fair	  and	  objective.	  
3.1.1	  Objective	  policy	  
It	   is	   favourable	   to	   pursue	   objectivity	   during	   the	   process	   of	   quantification	   and	   in	   producing	  
corresponding	   policy;	   objectivity	   ofers	   favourable	   policy	   characteristics	   such	   as	   neutrality,	  
impartiality,	  and	  fairness.	  Porter	  (1995)	  explains	  that	  “in	  a	  political	  culture	  that	  idealizes	  the	  
rule	  of	  law,	  it	  seems	  bad	  policy	  to	  rely	  on	  mere	  judgement,	  however	  seasoned”	  (p.	  8)	  and	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seeming	  objective	  results	  in	  a	  “lending	  [of]	  authority	  to	  oficials”	  (p.	  8);	  the	  public	  is	  more	  likely	  
to	   trust	   and	   accept	   what	   is	   perceived	   to	   be	   objective	   policy.	  When	  considering	  objectivity	  
within	  quantification,	  Busch	  (2011)	  lists	  the	  folowing	  positive	  attributes:	  
•	  the	  ability	  to	  measure	  things	  precisely	  
•	  avoiding	  human	  subjectivity	  by	  using	  non-­‐human	  measurement	  techniques	  
•	  the	  emergence	  of	  standards	  from	  a	  community	  or	  practitioners	  
•	  respecting	  the	  outcomes	  of	  environmental	  processes.	  
Busch’s	   first	   attribute	   refers	  to	   the	   application	   of	   appropriate	   methods	   and	   measures	   to	  
quantify	  the	  item	  of	  interest.	  Busch’s	  second	  attribute	  of	  objectivity	  is	  the	  removal	  of	  human	  
perceptions	   and	   bias	   from	   measurement	   techniques	   by	   employing	   computers	   and	   models.	  
This	  is	  similar	  to	  how	  Porter	  describes	  objectivity,	  where	  objectivity	  removes	  researcher	  bias	  
from	  any	  study	  outcomes	  through	  the	  use	  of	  sanctioned	  scientific	  methods.	  This	  is	  obtained	  
from	   the	   use	   of	   numbers	   derived	   by	   means	   of	   impersonal	   rules	   and	   calculations.	   These	  
methods	  can	  derive	  neutral,	  objective	  facts,	  separate	  to	  expert	  knowledge	  gained	  through	  a	  
career	  tainted	  by	  personal	  experiences.	  Busch’s	  third	  positive	  attribute	  of	  objectivity	  describes	  
the	  ability	  to	  reach	  expert	  consensus;	  and	  lastly,	  objectivity	  preserves	  the	  matching	  of	  theory	  
to	  reality,	  so	  that	  concepts	  remain	  true	  across	  al	  environments.	  	  
When	  considering	  the	  practicalities	  of	  maintaining	  objectivity	  within	  policy,	  Jasanof	  (1990)	  
explains	  one	  issue	  where	  scientists	  often	  have	  the	  tendency	  to	  personalise	  their	  opinion	  of	  
scientific	  data	  even	  when	  they	  are	  without	  proof	  of	  the	  objectiveness	  of	  the	  research.	  “When	  
an	  objective	  or	  scientific	  test	  of	  experimental	  quality	  is	  unavailable	  …	  scientists	  freely	  turn	  to	  
non-­‐scientific	  criteria	  of	  excelence,	  such	  as	  faith	  in	  the	  experimenter’s	  honesty,	  the	  size	  and	  
prestige	  of	  the	  laboratory,	  and	  even	  personal	  qualities	  like	  nationality	  or	  professional	  group	  
afiliations”	  (Jasanof,	  1990,	  p.	  14).	  There	  is	  an	  assumption	  that	  science	  guarantees	  truth	  and	  
scientific	   opinions	   are	   objective,	   thus	   indispensable	   to	   policy	   making.	   While	   the	   ideals	   of	  
objectivity	  are	  sought	  by	  policy	  makers	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  good	  policy,	  Jasanof	  explains	  that	  
in	   practice,	   objectivity	   is	   dificult	   to	   achieve	   and	   measure	   (or	   prove).	   In	   policy	   contexts,	  
resorting	  to	  objective	  criteria	  is	  usualy	  impossible	  and	  decisions	  about	  ‘good	  policy’	  are	  often	  
left	   to	   perceptions	   regarding	   social	   factors	   (e.g.	   trust,	   reputation,	   and	   credibility	   of	   those	  
issuing	  policy).	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3.1.2	  Ordering	  nature	  
Quantification,	  or	  measuring,	  is	  a	  process	  of	  ordering.	  Ordering	  aims	  to	  overcome	  messiness	  
and	   bring	   structure	   to	   complex	   realities.	   Nature	   is	   complex	   and	   messy,	   made	   up	   of	  
intertwining	  processes	  and	  phenomena.	  Porter	  (1995)	  explains	  that	  the	  desire	  to	  order	  nature	  
derives	  from	  the	  appeal	  of	  establishing	  power	  and	  control	  over	  nature.	  Porter	  suggests	  that	  
measurement	  goes	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  expectations	  of	  precision	  and	  objectivity,	  which	  then	  
impose	  control	  over	  nature	  through	  the	  ability	  to	  simplify	  and	  categorise	  natural	  occurrences	  
as	   measured	   phenomena	  (see	   also	   Scott	   1998).	  Ordering	   and	   measuring	   processes	   invoke	  
ideas	  of	  authority	  and	  control.	  The	  act	  of	  measuring	  an	  object	  or	  phenomenon	  comes	  with	  
the	   assumption	   that	   it	   is	   actualy	   possible	   to	   measure	   the	   object	   or	   phenomenon.	  Porter	  
(1995)	  explains	   that	   the	   measurer	   defines	   the	   boundaries	   for	   where	   the	   object	   or	  
phenomenon	   does	   and	   does	   not	   exist,	   portraying	   confidence	   to	   others	   that	   it	   can	   be	  
quantifiable	  and,	  thereby,	  able	  to	  be	  controled.	  When	  aspects	  of	  nature	  are	  measured,	  the	  
attributes	  can	  be	  assigned	  by	  the	  measurer,	  resulting	  in	  a	  form	  of	  control	  over	  this	  aspect	  of	  
nature.	  
In	  environmental	  policy,	  Stone	  (2002)	  maintains	  that	  the	  first	  step	  for	  inciting	  change	  is	  to	  
measure	  and	  quantify	  the	  item	  or	  issue	  of	  interest.	  In	  today’s	  world,	  the	  process	  of	  measuring	  
incites	   the	   need	   for	   action,	   as	   measurement	   only	   occurs	   when	   change	   is	   already	   desired,	  
otherwise	  there	  is	  no	  point	  measuring	  it	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (Stone).	  Measurement	  implies	  that	  
something	  is	  important	  enough	  to	  quantify	  and	  understand,	  and	  conveys	  a	  message	  to	  others	  
that	  the	  phenomenon,	  regardless	  of	  its	  quantity,	  could	  have	  wider	  efects	  and	  interactions.	  
Stone	  uses	  an	  example	  of	  the	  phrase	  “parts	  per	  bilion”	  in	  a	  scientific	  context	  where,	  on	  one	  
hand,	   the	   substance	   amount	   is	   very	   smal	   and	   rare,	   but	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   because	   the	  
substance	  has	  actualy	  been	  measured,	  it	  carries	  a	  certain	  significance	  and	  appears	  toxic.	  
3.1.3	  Constructing	  scientific	  facts	  
Science	   produced	   for	   policy	   is	   diferent	   than	   science	   generated	   in	   a	   pure	   research	  
environment.	  Jasanof	   (1990)	  examined	   this,	   explaining	   how	   science	   and	   policy	   are	   closely	  
integrated	  at	  each	  step	  of	  policy	  science	  production,	  alongside	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  understanding	  
of	   science	   created	   for	   policy	   is	   influenced	   by	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  society	   then	   uses	   the	  
knowledge.	  Jasanof	  (1990)	  describes	  scientific	  knowledge	  for	  policy	  as	  being	  produced	  and	  
constructed	  by	  a	  social	  process,	  from	  “the	  laboratory,	  where	  most	  scientific	  claims	  originate”	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to	  “wider	  communities,	  including	  the	  news	  media	  and	  the	  lay	  public”	  (pp.	  13).	  To	  simplify,	  
social	  factors,	  imperatives	  and	  institutions	  influence	  what	  research	  is	  undertaken,	  and	  which	  
facts	   are	   deemed	   true.	  Jasanof	   argues	   that	  “scientific	   activity	   in	   any	   period	   is	   merely	   that	  
which	  conforms	  to	  the	  prevailing	  paradigm”	  that	  defines	  “what	  problems	  are	  worth	  solving	  
and	   shapes	   scientists’	   expectations	   of	   what	  they	   are	   likely	   to	   see	   when	   they	   investigate	  
nature”	  (pp.	  13).	  Jasanof	  (1990)	  also	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  how	  facts	  are	  socialy	  constructed;	  
facts	  are	  regarded	  as	  true	  due	  to	  endorsement	  from	  perceived	  experts.	  The	  construction	  of	  
facts	  begins	  in	  the	  laboratory,	  but	  ends	  up	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  public	  and	  media.	  Scientific	  facts	  
are	   tested	   and	   questioned	   alongside	   objective	   criteria;	   accepted	   scientific	   procedures	  
conform	   to	   the	   current	   model	   in	   society	  (Jasanof,	   1990).	   Issues	   requiring	   scientific	  
interjection	   are	   defined	   by	   this	   paradigm,	   shaping	   the	   perceptions	   of	   scientist’s	   and	   public	  
expectations	  and	  understandings	  of	  what	  they	  see	  in	  nature.	  
In	   policy,	   the	   apparent	   impartiality	   of	   numbers	   alows	   decisions	   to	   be	   made	   without	   the	  
appearance	  of	  a	  subjective	  decision	  by	  policymakers.	  Describing	  issues	  in	  terms	  of	  numbers	  
ofers	  confidence	  in	  a	  resolution.	  Once	  a	  problem	  has	  been	  quantified,	  its	  chosen	  parameters	  
can	   be	   manipulated	   and	   measured	   against	   other	   variables	   with	   the	   same	  denominator	  
(kilograms,	  metres,	  degrees	  Celsius	  etc.).	  As	  Stone	  (2002)	  states,	  “[numbers]	  make	  it	  possible	  
to	  reduce	  conflicts	  to	  the	  single	  dimension	  of	  size	  –	  big	  versus	  little,	  more	  versus	  less”	  (p.	  197).	  
Stone	  is	  referring	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  numbers	  to	  take	  a	  complex	  process	  or	  object	  and	  define	  it	  
in	  a	  way	  that	  alows	  comparisons,	  resulting	  in	  an	  argument	  for	  or	  against	  change.	  Disregarding	  
the	   complex	   context	   of	   the	   process	   or	   object,	   having	   a	   numerical	   representation	   focuses	  
attention	  on	  the	  numbers.	  When	  measurements	  are	  undertaken	  using	  universaly	  accepted	  
methods	  they	  are	  trusted	  to	  be	  true	  and	  authoritative	  (Porter,	  1995).	  In	  New	  Zealand,	  multiple	  
scientific	  reports	  show	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  same	  freshwater	  quality	  parameters	  in	  New	  Zealand	  
lowland	  rivers	  (Houlbrooke	  et	  al.	  (2004);	  Smith	  et	  al.	  (2013);	  Wilcock	  et	  al.	  (1995)).	  As	  a	  result	  
of	  the	  consistency	  of	  reports,	  freshwater	  quality	  is	  underpinned	  by	  the	  quantification	  of	  these	  
similar	  freshwater	  parameters,	  
3.1.4	  Remaining	  credible	  with	  a	  black	  box	  
Overseer’s	   internal	   processes,	   which	   take	   input	   figures	   and	   calculate	   a	   variety	   of	   output	  
figures,	  are	  hidden	  from	  the	  view	  of	  the	  user.	  The	  term	  ‘black	  box’	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  complex	  
scientific	  or	  technical	  processes	  in	  which	  the	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  can	  be	  known,	  but	  the	  internal	  
mechanisms	  which	  drive	  the	  process	  and	  derive	  the	  outputs	  are	  not	  accessible	  and	  hence	  not	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understood.	  Shwed	  and	  Bearman	  (2010)	  describe	  an	  example	  of	  a	  black	  box	  as	  a	  computer,	  
where	  the	  keyboard	  is	  its	  input	  and	  the	  screen	  is	  its	  output.	  The	  internal	  processes	  are	  invisible	  
to	  its	  user.	  Latour	  (1987)	  describes	  a	  set	  of	  decisions	  we	  make	  when	  presented	  with	  a	  black	  
box:	  “Do	  we	  take	  it	  up?	  Do	  we	  reject	  it?	  Do	  we	  reopen	  it?	  Do	  we	  let	  it	  drop	  through	  lack	  of	  
interest?	   Do	   we	   make	   it	   more	   solid	   by	   grasping	   it	   without	   any	   further	   discussion?	   Do	   we	  
transform	   it	   beyond	   recognition?”	   (pg.	   29).	   Buying	   a	   machine	   or	   believing	   a	   fact	  without	  
question	  strengthens	  its	  credibility,	  making	  it	  more	  of	  a	  black	  box.	  A	  weakening	  of	  the	  black	  
box	   only	   occurs	   during	   questioning	   of,	   or	   disbelief	   in	   the	   machine	   or	   fact,	   resulting	   in	   the	  
reopening	   of	   the	   black	   box	   to	   assess	   its	   internal	   components.	  Using	  Shwed	   and	   Bearman	  
(2010)’s	  computer	  example,	  it	  is	  only	  after	  malfunction	  or	  the	  results	  produced	  are	  questioned	  
when	  the	  computer	  is	  opened	  up	  and	  its	  internal	  processes	  are	  investigated;	  the	  opening	  of	  a	  
black	  box	  occurs	  when	  changes	  are	  required	  for	  the	  system.	  	  
Latour	  identifies	  scientific	  facts	  and	  technologies	  as	  black	  boxes.	  Latour	  describes	  how	  people	  
are	  more	  likely	  to	  accept	  scientific	  facts	  if	  they	  are	  deemed	  precise.	  Paradoxicaly,	  the	  more	  
precise	  and	  successful	  science	  and	  technology	  are,	  the	  more	  hidden	  their	  black	  boxes	  become	  
(Latour,	  1999).	  The	  more	  concealed	  a	  black	  box	  is,	  the	  more	  dificult	  it	  is	  to	  reopen.	  If	  the	  
science	  is	  stil	  being	  developed	  or	  highly	  contested	  (as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  high	  stake	  policy	  issues),	  
the	  interactions	  between	  the	  scientific	  statement’s	  internal	  features	  can	  be	  made	  visible	  when	  
the	  black	  box	  is	  reopened.	  	  
3.1.5	  Ambiguous	  numbers	  and	  science	  in	  policy	  
In	   the	  translation	  of	   numbers	  into	   policy,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	   numbers	  
themselves	  are	  representations	  of	  the	  real	  world,	  not	  a	  direct	  reflection	  of	  it.	  Examining	  the	  
process	   of	   creating	   numbers,	  Stone	   (2002)	  discusses	   the	   politics	   of	   counting,	   where	  
measurement	   does	   not	   always	   remain	   objective	   due	   to	   ambiguity	   in	   the	   interpretation	   of	  
numbers	  by	  diferent	  stakeholders.	  	  Stone	  maintains	  that	  the	  supremacy	  of	  numbers	  in	  policy	  
discussions	   is	   potentialy	   a	   temporary	   phenomenon	   in	   political	   history,	   rather	   than	   some	  
fundamental	  reality	  of	  numbers	  themselves	  (Stone,	  2002).	  While	  it	  is	  dificult	  to	  imagine	  public	  
policy	  without	  numbers,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  recognised	  that	  they	  render	  a	  particular	  view	  of	  the	  
world.	  	  
While	  numbers	  can	  define	  a	  problem,	  they	  must	  then	  be	  verified	  against	  the	  interpretation	  of	  
the	   problem.	  Citing	  Porter	   (1996),	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   consistent	   and	   transparent	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measurements,	  investigations	  into	  compliance	  with	  the	  numbers	  is	  a	  continual	  process	  which	  
requires	  increasing	  efort	  and	  resources	  to	  evidence	  the	  numbers	  as	  credible	  (Duncan,	  2014).	  
Along	  with	  the	  potential	  of	  undermining	  the	  trustworthiness	  of	  numbers	  by	  not	  increasing	  
resources	   into	   verifying	   compliance,	   “risks	   lie	   in	   assuming	   that	   numbers	   can	   speak	   for	  
themselves	   to	   resolve	   conflict”	  (Duncan,	   2014,	   p.	   380).	  Maintaining	   consistency	   and	  
transparency	   of	   numbers	   in	   public	   policy	   requires	   increasing	   efort	   and	   resources,	   which	  
potentialy	  undermine	  their	  primary	  characteristic	  of	  clarity	  and	  certainty	  for	  which	  they	  are	  
deployed	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  As	  the	  interpretations	  of	  numbers	  change,	  this	  can	  “lead	  to	  the	  
loss	   of	   trust	   in	   policy	   frameworks	   and	   regulatory	   agencies	   thus	   creating	   chalenges	   for	  
implementation”	  (Duncan,	  2014,	  p.	  380).	  
Jasanof	  (1990)	  believes	  that	  science	  has	  succeeded	  “in	  acquiring	  and	  maintaining	  cognitive	  
authority	  in	  a	  distrustful	  world”	  (p.	  14),	  however	  this	  is	  coupled	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  scientific	  
knowledge	  is	  provisional	  and	  contextual.	  While	  science	  operates	  on	  the	  basis	  of,	  and	  is	  driven	  
by,	  questioning	  and	  uncertainty,	  in	  the	  political	  arena	  the	  level	  of	  (scientificaly	  acceptable)	  
uncertainty	   is	   inappropriate	   for	   policy.	   Problems	   arise	   when	   science	   is	   produced	   to	   steer	  
uncertain	   and	   inherently	   political	   topics:	   “how	   can	   [scientists]	   maintain	   their	   authority	   as	  
neutral	  experts,	  especialy	  when	  chalenged	  in	  the	  media	  or	  the	  courts?”	  (Jasanof,	  1990,	  pp.	  
8-­‐9).	  As	  a	  solution,	  Jasanof	  (1990)	  suggests	  to	  increase	  the	  dependence	  on	  scientific	  advice,	  
and	  investment	  in	  more	  power	  to	  scientists	  alongside	  political	  neutrality,	  balanced	  peer-­‐
review	  systems	  and	  standardisation	  of	  scientific	  methods.	  Since	  “there	  can	  be	  no	  perfect,	  
objectively	  verifiable	  truth,”	  what	  we	  can	  “hope	  for	  is	  a	  serviceable	  truth:	  a	  state	  of	  knowledge	  
that	  satisfies	  tests	  of	  scientific	  acceptability	  and	  supports	  reasoned	  decision	  making,	  but	  also	  
assures	  those	  exposed	  to	  risk	  that	  their	  interests	  have	  not	  been	  sacrificed	  on	  the	  altar	  of	  an	  
impossible	   scientific	   certainty”	  (Jasanof,	   1990,	   p.	   250).	   Scientific	   knowledge	  needs	   to	   hold	  
authority	   and	   persuasion	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   reasonable	   solutions	   to	   society:	   “by	   drawing	  
seemingly	  sharp	  boundaries	  between	  science	  and	  policy,	  scientists	  in	  efect	  post	  ‘keep	  out’	  
signs	  to	  prevent	  non-­‐scientists	  from	  chalenging	  or	  reinterpreting	  claims	  labeled	  as	  ‘science’”	  
(Jasanof,	  1990,	  p.	  236).	  	  	  
3.1.6	  Authority	  across	  boundaries	  
Stone	  (2002,	  p.	  197)	  states	  that	  numbers	  are	  able	  to	  “reduce	  conflicts	  to	  the	  single	  dimension	  
of	   size”.	  Using	   the	   phrase	   ‘doubt	   strategy’	   with	   reference	   to	   politics,	  Stone	   (2002)	  states:	  
“when	  the	  stakes	  are	  money	  rather	  than	  morals,	  the	  misuse	  of	  science	  takes	  a	  …	  politicaly	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efective	  form.	  If	  scientific	  research	  shows	  a	  product	  to	  be	  dangerous	  or	  unsafe,	  the	  afected	  
industry	  can	  create	  doubt	  about	  the	  research	  as	  a	  tactic	  to	  delay	  of	  stop	  regulation”	  (p.	  319).	  
Stone	  (2002)	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  the	  tobacco	  industry,	  where	  expert	  consultants	  were	  paid	  
to	  question	  every	  study,	  method	  and	  conclusion	  using	  science.	  The	  industry	  is	  able	  to	  publish	  
reports	   from	   their	   hired	  consultants	   and	   push	   people	   to	   doubt	   the	   original	   science,	  
undermining	  the	  ideal	  of	  scientific	  objectivity.	  In	  policy,	  “science	  can	  be	  and	  is	  increasingly	  
used	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  influence	  in	  political	  conflict”	  (Stone,	  2002,	  pp.	  319-­‐320).	  The	  doubt	  
strategy	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  regulation	  policy	  as	  there	  are	  high	  stakes	  involved.	  People	  
are	  likely	  to	  subscribe	  to	  opposing	  arguments	  and	  contest	  regulation,	  through	  the	  exploitation	  
of	  its	  scientific	  uncertainties,	  if	  it	  means	  the	  regulations	  imposed	  on	  them	  could	  be	  changed.	  
A	  problem	  with	  numbers	  is	  that	  they	  can	  be	  used	  to	  serve	  more	  than	  one	  interest.	  Even	  so,	  
numbers	   are	   assumed	   to	   be	   neutral,	   accurately	   describing	  a	   particular	   aspect	   of	  the	  
environment	  without	  serving	  any	  interests,	  promoting	  any	  agendas	  or	  persuading	  individuals.	  
It	  is	  when	  numbers	  are	  linked	  back	  to	  their	  contexts,	  that	  they	  may	  become	  deconstructed	  
and	  questioned.	  In	  a	  context	  of	  political	  conflict	  where,	  for	  example,	  the	  financial	  stakes	  are	  
high,	   claims	   of	   objectivity	   can	   be	   chalenged	   and	   undermined	   in	   courts	   of	   law	   or	   through	  
political	  processes	  of	  policymaking	  (Jasanof,	  1987).	  Boundary	  work	  (also	  see	  (Gieryn,	  1983)	  
alows	  scientists	  to	  enhance	  their	  authority:	  “when	  an	  area	  of	  intelectual	  activity	  is	  tagged	  
with	  the	  label	  “science”,	  people	  who	  are	  not	  scientists	  are	  de	  facto	  barred	  from	  having	  any	  
say	  about	  its	  substance;	  correspondingly,	  to	  label	  something	  “not	  science”	  is	  to	  denude	  it	  of	  
cognitive	  authority”	  (Jasanof,	  1990,	  p.	  14).	  In	  order	  to	  gain	  control	  of	  regulation	  processes,	  if	  
participants	   are	   able	   to	  represent	   their	   contributions	   as	   scientific,	  they	   have	   standing	   and	  
authority.	  
3.1.7	  Acceptance	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  
Examining	   public	   responses	   towards	   risk	   and	   risk	  information	   from	   persons	   of	   authority,	  
Wynne	  (1980,	  2013)	  explains	  that	  responses	  are	  largely	  based	  on	  social	  perceptions,	  or	  “are	  
rationaly	  based	  upon	  their	  experience	  and	  judgment	  of	  the	  credibility	  and	  trustworthiness	  of	  
the	  institutions,	  which	  claim	  to	  be	  in	  charge”	  (Wynne,	  2013,	  p.	  283).	  Attention	  to	  this	  topic	  
stems	   from	   concern	   among	   scientists	   and	   policy	   makers	   to	   the	   significance	   of	   public	  
unwilingness	   to	   accept	   scientific	   information	   provided	   by	   experts.	   People	   experience	  
knowledge	   as	   part	   of	   a	   “social	   package”	  (Wynne,	   2013,	   p.	   284)	  which	   includes	   the	   social	  
relationships,	   interactions,	   and	   interests	   that	   identify	   with	   the	   individual.	   Looking	   closer,	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Wynne	  (2013)	  clarifies	  that	  “trust	  …	  and	  credibility	  are	  relational	  terms,	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  
the	  social	  relationships	  between	  the	  actors	  concerned.	  They	  are	  not	  intrinsic	  to	  either	  actor	  
nor	  to	  the	  information	  said	  to	  be	  transmitted	  between	  them”	  (Wynne,	  2013,	  p.	  284).	  In	  other	  
words,	  public	  understanding	  of	  science	  information	  is	  exposed	  to	  individual	  perceptions	  and	  
context	   depending	   on	   the	   on-­‐going	   experiences	   of	   the	   person.	  Wynne	   (2013)	  furthers	   the	  
significance	  of	  on-­‐going	  experience	  by	  describing	  trust	  and	  credibility	  has	  being	  contingent	  
variables,	   influencing	   the	   uptake	   of	   new	   information	   through	   dependence	   on	   relationships	  
and	  identities	  between	  knowledge	  providers	  or	  producers	  and	  knowledge	  receivers	  or	  users.	  
Distance	  from	  the	  data:	  the	  certainty	  trough	  
Examining	  the	  acceptance	  of	  science,	  Jasanof	  (1990)	  states	  that	  “scientific	  uncertainty	  and	  
the	  pressures	  of	  decision-­‐making	  lead	  to	  a	  forced	  marriage	  between	  science	  and	  politics”	  (p.	  
8).	  Science	  in	  policy	  usualy	  encounters	  either	  an	  under-­‐critical	  or	  over-­‐critical	  environment.	  
While	  science	  may	  be	  under-­‐criticised	  when	  policy	  consensus	  exists	  prior	  to	  research,	  over-­‐
critical	  analysis	  wil	  occur	  in	  an	  environment	  with	  divided	  opinions	  and	  heightened	  scrutiny	  by	  
experts	  in	  rival	  camps.	  	  
The	  certainty	  trough	  is	  a	  useful	  heuristic	  developed	  by	  MacKenzie	  (1990)	  (and	  also	  in	  (Duncan,	  
2008))	  to	  explain	  how	  perceptions	  of	  uncertainty	  change	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  distance	  from	  the	  
site	  of	  knowledge	  production.	  The	  site	  of	  knowledge	  production	  can	  refer	  to	  a	  theory,	  a	  model,	  
a	   research	   agenda	   or	  a	   piece	   of	   technology.	   Figure	   3.1	   ilustrates	   the	   varying	   levels	  of	  
uncertainty	  from	  the	  site	  of	  knowledge	  production.	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Figure	  3.1	   The	  certainty	  trough	  (source:	  (MacKenzie,	  1990,	  as	  cited	  in	  Duncan,	  2008,	  
p.	  56))	  
Figure	  3.1	   describes	   how	   those	   closest	   to	   the	   site	   of	   knowledge	   production	   (far	   left)	   have	  
moderate	   levels	   of	   uncertainty,	   owing	   to	   their	   close	   proximity	   and	   involvement	   in	   the	  
production	  of	  that	  technology.	  These	  are	  usualy	  the	  scientists	  or	  model	  makers.	  	  They	  are	  
close	  enough	  to	  understand	  the	  uncertainties	  inherent	  in	  their	  conclusions	  or	  their	  model.	  
Those	  persons	  represented	  by	  the	  middle	  area	  of	  the	  trough,	  usualy	  the	  users	  of	  the	  model	  
or	   technology	   (e.g.	   policy-­‐makers	   and	   decision-­‐makers),	   perceive	   low	   uncertainty.	  In	   other	  
words,	  this	  where	  high	  levels	  of	  certainty	  are	  perceived	  and	  hence	  the	  term	  ‘certainty	  trough’.	  
These	  relatively	  high	  levels	  of	  certainty	  are	  due	  to	  the	  commitment	  actors	  in	  this	  zone	  have	  to	  
the	  idea	  or	  technology.	  Those	  on	  the	  right	  of	  the	  graph	  are	  described	  as	  a	  group	  of	  persons	  
who	  are	  so	  removed	  from	  or	  resistant	  to	  the	  technology	  or	  programme	  that	  they	  perceive	  a	  
very	   high	   level	  of	   uncertainty.	   Their	   distrust	   of	   the	   technology	   may	   be	   brought	   about	   by	   a	  
commitment	   to	   alternative	   technologies	   or	   a	   lack	   of	   understanding	   or	   alienation	   from	   the	  
technology.	  Duncan	   (2008),	   quoting	  MacKenzie	   (1990),	   explains	   that	   the	   certainty	  trough	  
shows	  how	  a	  “disconnection	  occurs	  as	  knowledge	  claims	  move	  from	  the	  hands	  of	  knowledge	  
‘producers’	  to	  knowledge	  ‘users”	  (p.	  57).	  This	  idea	  of	  disconnection	  plays	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  
the	  acceptance	  of	  technology	  by	  users,	  especialy	  as	  users	  move	  further	  away	  from	  the	  site	  of	  
production.	  
Farmers’	  acceptance	  of	  science	  
Wynne	   (2013)	  employed	   a	   qualitative	   case	   study	   investigating	   the	   acceptance	   of	   scientific	  
information	   by	   sheep	   farmers	   from	   scientists	   and	   political	   leaders	   in	   Northern	   England	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folowing	  a	  nuclear	  accident	  at	  the	  Chernobyl	  nuclear	  reactor	  in	  1986.	  The	  study	  revealed	  that	  
trust	  and	  credibility	  were	  central	  factors	  in	  the	  farmer’s	  acceptance	  of	  scientific	  advice	  from	  
scientists,	  identifying	  the	  folowing	  seven	  factors	  as	  measures	  for	  social	  credibility	  of	  science	  
which	  Wynne	  terms	  as	  “lay	  criteria	  for	  judgement	  of	  science”	  	  (Wynne,	  2013,	  p.	  302).	  
1.	  Does	  the	  scientific	  knowledge	  work?	  (e.g.	  theories	  and	  predictions	  can	  fail	  in	  real	  life)	  
2.	  Do	   scientific	   claims	   pay	   attention	   to	   other	   available	   knowledge?	   (e.g.	   significant	  
simplifications	  in	  scientific	  theories	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  local	  knowledge)	  
3.	  Does	  scientific	  practice	  pay	  attention	  to	  other	  available	  knowledge?	  (e.g.	  unrealistic	  
environment	  field	  experiments	  by	  scientists)	  
4.	  Is	   the	   form	   of	   the	   knowledge	   as	   wel	   as	   the	   content	   recognizable?	   (e.g.	  degrees	   of	  
certainty	  and	  standardisation	  by	  scientific	  theory)	  
5.	  Are	   scientists	   open	   to	   criticism?	   (recognition	   of	   other	   knowledge,	   acknowledging	  
errors)	  
6.	  What	   are	   the	   social/institutional	   afiliations	   of	   experts?	   (e.g.	   agendas,	   bias	   and	  
openness)	  
7.	  What	   issue	  “overspil”	   exists	   in	   lay	   experience?	   (scientists	   aware	   of	   lay	   past	   social	  
experiences)	  
Wynne	  maintains	  that	  it	  is	  through	  these	  criteria	  laypeople	  perceive	  the	  credibility	  of	  science	  
and	  the	  authority	  of	  expert	  knowledge.	  Wynne	  argues	  that	  the	  “credibility	  [of	  science]	  was	  
influenced	   not	   so	   much	   by	   what	   it	   said	   directly	   and	   explicitly,	  [rather]	   in	   the	   way	   it	   was	  
institutionaly	  and	  intelectualy	  organized,	  including	  lack	  of	  recognition	  of	  its	  own	  cultural	  and	  
institutional	   biases”	  (Wynne,	   2013,	   p.	   301).	  These	   biases	   describe	   the	  aggregation	   and	  
standardization	  influences	  surrounding	  the	  specific	  presentation	  of	  scientific	  data	  The	  criteria	  
above	  highlight	  how	  science	  requires	  “reflexive	  recognition	  of	  its	  own	  conditionality”	  (Wynne,	  
2013,	  p.	  302),	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  public	  acceptance	  of	  science	  knowledge.	  Wynne’s	  case	  study	  
found	  that	  farmers	  were	  able	  to	  self-­‐reflect	  and	  develop	  their	  social	  position	  towards	  science	  
acceptance	  depending	  on	  the	  seven	  criteria	  listed	  above.	  This	  was	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  members	  
of	   the	   science	   community,	  who	   were	  less	   reflexive	  on	   their	   scientific	   practices	   and	  
understanding	   of	   the	  limitations	  of	   their	   methodologies	   that	   assumed	   the	   straightforward	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translation	  of	  conclusions	  about	  soils	  and	  their	  response	  to	  public	  query.	  Trust	  and	  credibility	  
are	  described	  as	  products	  of	  social	  identity,	  in	  which	  the	  understanding	  and	  acceptance	  of	  
new	  information	  is	  dependent	  on	  individual	  beliefs	  and	  experiences	  (Wynne,	  2013).	  	  Wynne’s	  
case	  study	  showed	  that	  a	  reform	  of	  the	  organisation,	  control	  and	  social	  relations	  that	  influence	  
the	   production	   of	   science	   can	   be	   achieved	   through	   the	   inclusion	   of	   reflexivity,	  which	  as	   a	  
derivative	  of	  social	  identity	  can	  improve	  public	  knowledge	  perception	  and	  acceptance.	  
3.2	  The	  incentive	  to	  standardise	  
3.2.1	  Standards	  	  
The	   term	   ‘standard’	   has	   multiple	   definitions,	   this	   research	   utilises	   that	   which	   describes	   a	  
required	  level	  of	  attainment;	  also	  caled	  norms,	  rules,	  or	  criterion.	  Standards	  are	  important	  
because	   they	   facilitate	   order	   and	   stability	  in	   a	   complex	   world.	  Busch	   (2011)	  explains	   that	  
reality	   is	   imperfect	   and	   sometimes	   disconnected,	   where	   choices	   are	   often	   irrational,	   and	  
accurate	  information	  is	  not	  readily	  available	  for	  everyone	  to	  use.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  standards	  
fil	  gaps	  and	  smooth	  over	  reality,	  employing	  the	  ability	  to	  organise	  ourselves,	  other	  people,	  
things,	  processes,	  and	  language.	  In	  the	  realm	  of	  politics,	  the	  rules	  governing	  the	  formation	  of	  
standards	   should	   be	   agreed	   upon	   by	   groups	   of	   professionals	  (Bowker	   &	   Star,	   1999;	   Busch,	  
2011);	   ensuring	  scientific	  consensus	   is	   a	   characteristic	   of	   objectivity.	  Standards	  rely	   on	  
quantification,	   in	   which	   an	   object	   or	   phenomenon	   can	   be	   represented	   by	   the	   level	   of	  
attainment	  of	  a	  particular	  condition	  or	  benchmark.	  	  
Busch	   (2011)	  states	   that	   standards	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   empower	   and	   disempower	   people.	  
Empowerment	  can	  arise	  by	  the	  eficiency	  of	  standards	  to	  categorise	  and	  streamline	  processes,	  
whereas	  disempowerment	   may	   occur	   due	  the	  tight	   control	   over	   folowing	   designated	  
processes.	  Busch	  also	  argues	  that	  folowing	  a	  standard	  could	  result	  in	  missed	  opportunities	  to	  
be	  creative	  and	  potentialy	  gain	  diferent	  benefits.	  Whether	  or	  not	  an	  individual	  is	  likely	  to	  
folow	  a	  standard	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  perceived	  utility	  of	  the	  standard.	  Lampland	  and	  Star	  
(2009)	  describe	  how	  standards	  often	  deploy	  uneven	  levels	  of	  power	  across	  diferent	  social	  
landscapes,	  where	  individuals	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  attempt	  to	  meet	  a	  standard	  if	  they	  deem	  it	  
consequential.	  For	  example	  failure	  to	  meet	  a	  standard,	  otherwise	  known	  as	  failure	  to	  meet	  
compliance,	  could	  result	  in	  a	  financial	  penalty	  or	  restriction	  of	  the	  activity	  (Busch,	  2000,	  2011).	  
Standards	  are	  a	  key	  tool	  in	  environmental	  regulation.	  If	  a	  standard	  is	  enforced	  from	  a	  place	  of	  
power,	  i.e.	  a	  regulatory	  authority,	  it	  wil	  more	  likely	  be	  attempted	  to	  be	  met.	  	  
	   31	  
An	  example	  which	  explains	  how	  the	  power	  of	  standards	  shapes	  the	  choices	  of	  an	  individual	  
can	   be	   described	   by	  the	  current	   and	   intended	  use	   of	   Overseer	  for	   compliance	  by	   regional	  
councils.	  Farmers	   may	   not	   wish	   to	   create	   farm	   nutrient	   plans	   and	   alter	   their	   management	  
practices,	   but	   not	   completing	   this	   may	   result	   in	   a	   breach	   of	   their	   farm	   consent,	   ensuing	  
financial	  penalties	  or	   business	   termination.	  Put	   simply,	   the	   standard	   in	   this	   example	   is	   the	  
requirement	  of	  calculating	  and	  managing	  their	  farm	  nutrient	  plan	  to	  meet	  compliance	  and	  the	  
power	  of	  this	  standard	  is	  the	  financial	  penalty	  and	  business	  termination	  if	  failure	  to	  meet	  this	  
standard	   occurs.	   Depending	   on	   the	   perceived	   power,	   standards	   can	   guide	   an	   individual	   or	  
group	  towards	  certain	  pathways	  and	  constrain	  them	  from	  choosing	  alternative	  options.	  	  
3.2.2	  Types	  of	  standards	  
Busch	  (2011)	  describes	  four	  types	  of	  standards,	  each	  of	  which	  can	  relate	  to	  people	  and	  things.	  
Olympic	  standards	  are	  those	  for	  which	  a	  singular	  or	  smal	  number	  of	  winners	  can	  be	  found.	  
The	   standards	   are	   designed	   in	   a	   way	   to	   produce	   single	   winners,	   with	   many	   losers.	   Filter	  
standards	   describe	   a	   process	   in	   which	   a	   group	   of	   people	   or	   things	   pass	   through	   the	   filter,	  
eliminating	  any	  unsuitable	  actors	  resulting	  in	  generalised	  improvements	  to	  the	  remaining	  pool	  
of	  people	  or	  things.	  Rank	  standards	  form	  a	  process	  of	  categorising	  a	  selection	  of	  people	  or	  
things	  in	  order	  of	  preference	  in	  adherence	  to	  the	  standard.	  The	  standards	  for	  attaining	  the	  
higher	  positions	  are,	  in	  principle,	  harder	  to	  reach	  than	  lower	  ranks.	  Al	  people	  or	  things	  within	  
the	  group	  receive	  a	  rank.	  Rank	  standards	  often	  result	  in	  rewards	  for	  higher	  ranks	  and	  penalties	  
for	  lower	  ranks,	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  ranks	  are	  frequently	  chalenged.	  Division	  standards	  are	  
categories	   which	   are	   unranked.	   While	   individuals	   may	   prefer	   one	   category	   over	   the	   other,	  
there	  is	  no	  defining	  ranking	  for	  the	  categories.	  Often,	  standards	  do	  not	  exist	  by	  themselves,	  
but	  rather	  a	  complex	  system	  of	  interlocking	  and	  interrelated	  categories.	  	  
Table	  3.1	  Examples	  of	  objects	  and	  people	  for	  the	  diferent	  standard	  types	  
Standard	  type	  Example	  for	  objects	   Example	  for	  people	  
Olympic	   Car	  of	  the	  year	   Time	  Magazines'	  person	  of	  the	  year	  
Filter	   Foods	  suitable	  for	  gluten	  intolerance	   Persons	  above	  legal	  drinking	  age	  
Ranks	   Grading	  of	  appliance	  energy	  eficiency	  Positions	  within	  the	  military	  
Division	   Varieties	  of	  potatoes	   Religious	  alegiance	  
Overseer	  represents	  a	  filter	  type	  of	  standard.	  Filter	  standards	  are	  designed	  to	  separate	  the	  
acceptable	  from	  the	  unacceptable.	  At	  least	  initialy,	  regional	  councils	  were	  expecting	  Overseer	  
to	  produce	  results	  for	  management	  on	  a	  wide	  scale,	  providing	  a	  quantitative	  ‘limit	  met’	  or	  
‘limit	  not	  met’	  answer	  for	  nutrient	  output	  compliance.	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3.2.3	  Standardisation	  
Standardisation	  is	  a	  central,	  but	  mostly	  invisible,	  process	  of	  ordering	  our	  lives	  and	  shaping	  the	  
modern	   world.	  Timmermans	   and	   Epstein	   (2010)	  state	   that	   while	   standardisation	   ceases	   to	  
exist	  without	  standards,	  standards	  do	  not	  hold	  any	  power	  without	  being	  imposed	  across	  social	  
domains	   (this	   domain	   was	   seen	   in	   the	   medication	   example	   previously).	   In	   other	   words,	  
individualy,	   standards	   are	   inconsequential.	   The	   process	   of	   standardisation	   is	   where	  power	  
and	  authority	  arises,	  where	  objects	  and	  phenomena	  are	  ordered	  and	  categorised	  in	  the	  real	  
world.	  Standardisation	  is	  the	  process	  of	  forming	  consistency	  across	  boundaries	  of	  time	  and	  
space,	  using	  pre-­‐determined	  rules	  or	  categories.	  For	  example,	  students	  take	  identical	  exams	  
to	  measure	  learning	  ability;	  the	  exam	  is	  the	  standard	  and	  the	  requirement	  to	  take	  the	  exam	  
to	  achieve	  a	  grade	  is	  the	  process	  of	  standardisation.	  	  As	  a	  process	  of	  ordering,	  standardisation	  
brings	   legibility	   and	   simplification	   to	   the	   real	   world	  (Scott,	   1998a),	  for	   example,	   through	  
examination	   processes	   where	  the	   vast	   array	   of	   capabilities	   of	  students	   can	   be	   ranked	   by	  
relative	  learning	  ability.	  Timmermans	  and	  Epstein	  (2010)	  describe	  examples	  of	  standardisation	  
as	  including	  quantitative	  technologies	  and	  information	  systems	  that	  aim	  to	  ofer	  legibility	  to	  
society	   through	   governance.	   Standardisation	   is	   the	   process	   of	   creating,	   imposing,	   and	  
enforcing	  compliance	  using	  standards.	  	  	  
3.2.4	  Standardising	  people	  
Individuals	  and	  groups	  are	  subjected	  to	  standardisation	  as	  governments	  attempt	  to	  fit	  society	  
into	  categories	  in	  order	  to	  exercise	  control	  over	  large	  populations	  for	  the	  greater	  good.	  Scott	  
(1998a)	  examines	   the	   urge	   of	   political	   leaders	   to	   standardise	   people	   by	   discussing	   how	  
creating	  populations	  with	  pre-­‐determined	  standardised	  characteristics	  are	  easier	  to	  manage.	  
Common	   standardisations	   of	   people	   include	   population	   census,	   taxation,	   and	   testing	   in	  
education.	  Issues	  with	  standardising	  people	  are	  described	  by	  Porter	  (1995)	  using	  the	  context	  
of	  objectivity	  where:	  “an	  excess	  of	  [objectivity]	  crushes	  individual	  subjects,	  demeans	  minority	  
cultures,	  devalues	  artistic	  creativity,	  and	  discredits	  genuine	  democratic	  political	  participation”	  
(p.1).	  According	  to	  Porter,	  people	  often	  resist	  government	  and	  social	  standardisation	  due	  to	  
these	  reasons.	  Scott	  (1998a)	  argues	  similarly,	  using	  an	  example	  of	  the	  Spanish	  government	  
attempting	   to	  introduce	  surnames	  to	   the	   entire	   population	   of	   the	   Philippines	  in	   the	  mid	  
1800’s,	  which	  aimed	  to	  categorise	  people	  for	  censuses,	  land	  ownership	  and	  taxation	  purposes.	  
Within	  vilages	  around	  the	  country,	  everyone	  knew	  who	  everyone	  was	  already	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  
receiving	  an	  additional	  name	  was	  resisted	  by	  many	  as	  it	  took	  away	  the	  personal,	  descriptive	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names	   people	   already	   had	   for	   themselves.	   The	   problem	   arose	   as	   the	   state	   sought	   to	  
standardise	  people	  across	  the	  region,	  not	  considering	  the	  smal-­‐scale	  communities	  the	  public	  
lived	   in	  and	   existing	   social	   relations.	  This	  was	   the	   ‘top	   down’	   approach	   of	   the	   state	   that	  
enforced	   surname	   compliance	   by	   insisting	   on	   rule	   folowing,	   punishing	   those	   without	   a	  
surname	   by	   withdrawing	   certain	   human	   rights	  (e.g.	   the	   ability	   to	   legaly	   own	   land).	  Scott	  
(1998a)	  argues	   that	   people	   respond	   negatively	   to	   being	   standardised	   and	   quantified	   as	  
assigning	  numbers	  to	  values	  and	  processes	  suggests	  simplification,	  taking	  away	  individualism	  
and	  variability.	  	  
When	   governments	   create	   standards	   to	   address	   significant	   issues,	   it	   is	   beneficial	   that	  
individuals	   and	   wider	   colectives	   are	   in	   agreement	   on	   any	   regulations	   introduced,	   as	  
behaviours	   and	   activities	   may	  need	   to	   be	   altered	   for	   compliance	   with	   any	   new	   standards.	  
Stone	  (2002)	  maintains	  that	  the	  acceptance	  of	  a	  rule	  or	  standard,	  in	  part,	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  
fairness	  of	  the	  process	  used	  to	  produce	  the	  rule	  or	  standard.	  In	  a	  process	  which	  is	  already	  
standardised,	   both	   the	   results	   and	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   need	   to	   portray	   fairness.	  
Stone	  (2002)	  highlights	  this	  issue	  of	  equity	  where	  “for	  many	  things	  in	  life	  …	  we	  are	  quite	  wiling	  
to	  accept	  unequal	  results	  so	  long	  as	  we	  know	  the	  process	  is	  fair”	  (p.	  55).	  When	  governments	  
establish	  standards	  and	  alocate	  resources,	  often	  they	  seek	  to	  maintain	  objectivity,	  equating	  
objectivity	  with	  fairness.	  In	  reality,	  this	  focus	  on	  demonstrating	  objectivity	  is	  undermined	  by	  
the	  public’s	  need	  for	  clearly	  portraying	  fairness	  in	  the	  process	  of	  producing	  standards.	  The	  
public	  respond	  to	  perceptions	  of	  fairness	  within	  the	  government	  process	  itself,	  rather	  than	  
seeking	  objectivity.	  
Alongside	   perceived	   fairness,	   the	   shifting	   of	   power	   and	   control	   between	   the	   public	   and	  
government	   agencies	  influences	   the	   acceptability	   of	   standardisation.	  Myles	   et	   al.	   (2015)	  
examined	  a	  positive	  response	  of	  people	  being	  standardised,	  where	  the	  power	  relations	  and	  
identities	  of	  water	  users	  were	  reconfigured	  as	  a	  result	  of	  standardisation.	  Myles	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  
explored	   how	  standards	   and	   technologies	   were	   introduced	   in	   Canterbury	   to	   better	  
understand	  and	  manage	  water	  use	  and	  resource	  users,	  finding	  that	  water	  users	  responded	  
positively	  to	  the	  standards	  as	  they	  were	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  to	  the	  state	  (the	  regional	  council)	  
their	  compliance.	  The	  implementation	  of	  measurement	  practices	  aided	  in	  the	  transformation	  
of	   power	   relations	   of	   water	   users	   and	   the	   state,	   where	   water	   users	   were	   able	   to	   contest	  
dominant	  cultural	  narratives	  of	  resource	  exploitation	  by	  proving	  compliance	  with	  the	  rules	  
(i.e.	  water	  take	  meters).	  By	  having	  measured	  data,	  the	  water	  users	  were	  able	  to	  confidently	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deploy	  their	  narrative	  as	  a	  resource	  protector,	  reducing	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state’s	  authority	  on	  
water	  management	  in	  the	  region.	  	  
Meeting	  compliance	  can	  be	  subjected	  to	  conscious	  and	  unconscious	  manipulation	  from	  those	  
being	   measured.	   While	  Porter	   (1995)	  explains	   that	   governments	  use	  standards	  (through	  
regulations)	  to	  influence	  the	   behaviours	   of	   individuals	  in	   order	  to	   meet	   compliance,	  Stone	  
(2002)	  states:	   “people	   react	   to	   being	   counted	   or	   measured,	   and	   try	   to	   ‘look	   good’	   on	   the	  
measure”	   (p.	   203).	   The	   incentive	   to	   manipulate	   can	   occur	   when	   people	   perceive	   their	  
performances	  are	  being	  evaluated,	  and	  their	  performance	  wil	  be	  used	  to	  determine	  a	  range	  
of	  outcomes.	  This	  is	  applicable	  when	  associated	  with	  high-­‐stake	  issues	  like	  resource	  alocation	  
and	  compliance,	  where	  there	  is	  motivation	  to	  deceive	  (Duncan,	  2014;	  Porter,	  1996).	  Rather	  
than	   falsifying	   the	   numbers,	   people	   often	   alter	   their	   behaviour	   as	   a	   response	   of	   being	  
measured.	  Stone	  (2002)	  described	  an	  example	  where	  in	  2002	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  federal	  aid,	  
schools	  in	  The	  United	  States	  had	  to	  prove	  their	  students	  met	  minimum	  proficiency	  standards.	  
Due	  to	  the	  financial	  incentive	  to	  perform	  wel,	  many	  states	  lowered	  their	  cut-­‐of	  scores	  for	  
‘proficiency’	  and	  were	  able	  to	  maintain	  federal	  assistance.	  Feeling	  threatened	  by	  authoritative	  
measurement	  and	  standardisation,	  especialy	  concerning	  performance	  scores,	  schools	  were	  
motivated	  to	  manipulate	  their	  categories	  and	  their	  data	  to	  achieve	  the	  appropriate	  standard	  
that	  resulted	  in	  a	  financial	  gain.	  This	  example	  ilustrates	  how	  compliance	  can	  be	  subjected	  to	  
conscious	   and	   unconscious	   influence,	   whereas	   a	   response	   of	   being	   measured,	   people	   wil	  
often	  alter	  their	  behaviour	  when	  interacting	  with	  a	  high	  stake	  issue.	  
3.3	  Summary	  
The	   ability	   to	   quantify	   an	   attribute	   with	   a	   number	   creates	   a	   sense	   of	   power	   and	   control.	  
Assigning	   numbers	   ofers	   confidence	   in	   the	   authoritative	   understanding	   of	   the	   attribute,	  
where	  once	  it	  has	  been	  quantified,	  it	  may	  be	  measured	  against	  other	  related	  attributes.	  In	  
policy,	   the	   numbers	   are	   seen	   as	   impartial	   and	   trustworthy,	   free	   from	   the	   subjectivity	   of	  
policymakers.	   Policy	   which	   utilises	   quantitative	   estimates	  is	  sometimes	   given	   reasonable	  
backing	  without	  compeling	  legitimacy	  due	  to	  the	  fairness	  and	  objectiveness	  numbers	  impose.	  	  
Trust	  and	  credibility	  are	  described	  as	  products	  of	  social	  identity,	  in	  which	  the	  understanding	  
and	  acceptance	  of	  new	  information	  is	  dependent	  on	  individual	  beliefs	  and	  experiences.	  People	  
experience	   knowledge	   as	   part	   of	   a	   social	   package	   which	   includes	   the	   social	   relationships,	  
interactions,	   and	   interests	   that	   identify	   with	   the	   individual.	   In	   other	   words,	   public	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understanding	   of	   science	   information	   is	   exposed	   to	   individual	   perceptions	   and	   context	  
depending	   on	   the	   on-­‐going	   experiences	   of	   the	   person.	   Trust	   and	   credibility	   are	   contingent	  
variables,	   influencing	   the	   uptake	   of	   new	   information	   through	   dependence	   on	   relationships	  
and	  identities	  between	  knowledge	  providers	  or	  producers	  and	  knowledge	  receivers	  or	  users.	  	  
There	  is	  a	  need	  for	  clearly	  showing	  fairness	  during	  the	  process	  of	  producing	  standards.	  In	  the	  
production	   of	   standards,	   governments	   often	   focus	   on	   maintaining	   objectivity,	   equating	  
objectivity	  with	  fairness.	  In	  reality,	  the	  public	  respond	  to	  perceptions	  of	  fairness	  within	  the	  
government	  itself,	  rather	  than	  seeking	  objectivity.	  As	  a	  response	  of	  being	  measured,	  people	  
wil	   often	   alter	   their	   behaviour	   when	   interacting	   with	   a	   high	   stake	   issue.	  This	   is	   applicable	  
when	  associated	  with	  high-­‐stake	  issues	  like	  resource	  alocation	  and	  compliance.	  Rather	  than	  
falsifying	  the	  numbers,	  people	  wil	  often	  consciously	  and	  unconscious	  alter	  their	  behaviour.	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Chapter	  4	  
Methodology	  
This	   chapter	   provides	   an	   account	   of	   the	   methods	   used	  to	   conduct	   this	   research.	   Firstly,	   it	  
revisits	   the	   research	   aim,	   question	   and	   objectives	   of	   the	   study.	   This	   is	   folowed	   by	   an	  
introduction	  to	  the	  research	  theory,	  justification	  of	  the	  case	  studies,	  and	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  
data	  colection	  and	  analysis	  processes	  applied	  during	  the	  course	  of	  this	  study.	  
4.1	  Research	  aim,	  questions	  and	  objectives	  
As	  stated	  in	  chapter	  1,	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  research	  wil	  be	  to	  investigate	  the	  perceptions	  of	  
dairy	   farmers	   and	   farm	   consultants	   with	   Overseer’s	   change	   from	   a	   decision-­‐support	   to	  
compliance	  tool.	  To	  achieve	  this,	  the	  research	  question	  is:	  
•	  How	  has	  Overseer’s	  shift	  from	  decision-­‐support	  to	  compliance	  tool	  altered	  perceptions	  
of	  regulation	  and	  sustainable	  nutrient	  management?	  
In	  order	  to	  answer	  this	  question,	  the	  research	  objectives	  are:	  
a)	  Assess	  the	  diferences	  in	  perception	  of	  Overseer	  between	  farmers	  using	  Overseer	  for	  
decision-­‐support	  verses	  farmers	  using	  Overseer	  for	  compliance	  purposes.	  
b)	  Evaluate	   how	   standardisation	   afects	   perceptions	   of	   the	   on-­‐farm	   applicability	   of	  
Overseer	  and	  its	  credibility	  as	  a	  regulatory	  tool.	  
c)	  Identify	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   use	   of	   Overseer	   as	   a	   compliance	   tool	   for	   nutrient	  
management	   and	   the	   chalenges	   these	   present	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	   water	  
quality	  limits.	  
4.2	  Qualitative	  social	  research	  theory	  
This	   study	   required	   a	   research	   methodology	   which	   would	   provide	   rich,	   descriptive	   data	  
portraying	  the	  opinions	  and	  experiences	  of	  farmers	  and	  farm	  consultants,	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  
about	   the	   perceptions	   of	   Overseer	   for	   decision-­‐support	   and	   compliance	   use.	   Qualitative	  
research	   approaches	   aim	   to	   investigate	   individuals’	   experiences	   and	   perceptions.	   The	  
approach	  adds	  value	  and	  depth	  to	  inquiries,	  and	  is	  able	  to	  highlight	  the	  unique	  contribution	  
of	  social	  knowledge	  to	  policy	  research.	  Koutiva	  et	  al.	  (2016)	  examines	  the	  benefits	  of	  semi-­‐
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structured	   interviews,	   explaining	   how	   this	   technique	   encourages	   a	   more	   detailed	   analysis	  
regarding	   the	   shaping	   of	   attitudes,	   perceptions,	   cognitions	   and	   their	   link	   to	   behaviour	   and	  
decision-­‐making.	  Popay	   and	   Malinson	   (2010)	  also	   discuss	   the	   usefulness	   of	   qualitative	  
approaches	   to	   policy	   research	   by	   being	   able	   to	   answer	   questions	   relating	   to	   people’s	  
behaviour,	   the	   relationships	   between	   policies	  and	   practices,	   and	   understanding	   social	  
structures.	  
The	  empirical	  resources	  used	  in	  this	  study	  provide	  context	  and	  identify	  gaps	  and	  questions	  in	  
the	   literature.	   These	   resources	   include	   key	   policy	   documents,	   government	   reports,	  
government	   legislation	   and	  other	   academic	   material	   relating	   to	   nutrient	   management	   and	  
modeling	  in	  New	  Zealand’s	  dairy	  industry	  and	  the	  use	  of	  Overseer	  as	  a	  compliance	  tool	  by	  
regional	  councils.	  Reviewing	  empirical	  resources	  directed	  the	  development	  of	  the	  research	  
aim,	  question	  and	  objectives.	  A	  theoretical	  framework,	  chapter	  3,	  has	  been	  used	  to	  guide	  data	  
colection	  and	  analysis	  -­‐	  it	  is	  the	  lens	  through	  which	  to	  view	  the	  colected	  data	  (Eliot	  &	  Higgins,	  
2012).	  The	  theoretical	  framework	  guiding	  this	  research	  focuses	  on	  the	  role	  of	  quantification,	  
and	   more	   specificaly	   standardisation,	   in	   shaping	   perceptions	   of	   Overseer	   and	   how	   these	  
perceptions	  compare	  when	  the	  model	  is	  used	  for	  decision-­‐support	  versus	  compliance	  with	  
land	  use	  rules.	  
Based	  on	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  research	  aims	  and	  questions	  regarding	  perceptions	  relating	  
to	  Overseer,	  a	  qualitative	  research	  approach	  was	  selected	  as	  the	  most	  appropriate	  method	  
for	   guiding	   this	   research.	   The	   research	   design	   is	   a	   comparative	   case	   study	   using	  semi-­‐
structured	  interviews,	  and	  a	  thematic	  analysis.	  
4.3	  Comparative	  case	  study:	  The	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  and	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  
Research	  which	  utilises	  a	  case	  study	  methodology	  alows	  the	  exploration	  of	  an	  experience	  or	  
event	   from	   a	   variety	   of	   perspectives,	   resulting	   in	   an	   in-­‐depth,	   balanced	   picture	   of	   the	  
experience	  (Taylor	   &	   Thomas-­‐Gregory,	   2015).	  Woodside	   (2010)	  explains	   that	   case	   study	  
research	   (CSR)	   is	   appropriate	   for	   four	   objectives:	   description,	   explanation,	   prediction,	   and	  
control	  of	  the	  attribute	  being	  studied.	  With	  a	  ‘description’	  objective,	  CSR	  addresses	  the	  who,	  
what,	  where,	  and	  how	  questions.	  ‘Explanation’	  objectives	  address	  why	  questions.	  ‘Prediction’	  
includes	   the	   estimation	  of	   future	   behavioural	   states	   of	   the	   individuals.	   ‘Control’	   aims	   to	  
influence	  cognitions	  held	  by	  an	  individual.	  Considering	  the	  four	  objectives	  together,	  Woodside	  
(2010,	  p.	  6)	  proposes	  that	  the	  main	  objective	  of	  CSR	  is	  realy	  to	  gain	  “deep	  understanding	  of	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the	  actors,	  interactions,	  sentiments,	  and	  behaviours	  occurring	  for	  a	  specific	  process	  through	  
time”.	   Deep	   understanding	   refers	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   an	   individual’s	   (person,	   group,	  
organisation)	   perceptions	   and	   interpretation	   on	   their	   actions	   and	   thinking	   processes	   as	   a	  
result	  of	  their	  perceptions.	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  question	  for	  this	  study,	  a	  deep	  
understanding	  of	  the	  perceptions	  of	  dairy	  farmers	  and	  farm	  consultant	  regarding	  Overseer	  is	  
required.	   It	   is	   essential	   to	   examine	   the	   ‘description’,	   i.e.	   who,	   what,	   where,	   how,	   and	  
‘explanation’,	   i.e.	   why	   questions	   relating	   to	   farmer/consultant	   perception	   of	   Overseer,	  
alongside	  the	  ‘prediction’	  evaluative	  analysis	  of	  likely	  future	  behaviours	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  
current	  perceptions.	  The	  investigation	  of	  these	  three	  objectives	  directly	  relate	  to	  the	  fourth	  
‘control’	  objective	  which	  begins	  to	  influence	  the	  perceptions	  held	  by	  farmers	  and	  consultants	  
concerning	  Overseer.	  
Colier	  (1993)	  describes	  three	  situations	  in	  which	  diferent	  types	  of	  comparative	  case	  study	  is	  
appropriate,	   examining	   covariation	   for	   casual	   analysis,	   portraying	   a	   analogous	   concept	  
applicable	  among	  cases,	  and	  examining	  diferences	  between	  cases.	  The	  case	  for	  this	  research	  
is	  defined	  as	  the	  comparison	  between	  the	  introduction	  of	  Overseer	  for	  regulatory	  purposes	  in	  
the	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  area,	  and	  Overseer	  for	  decision-­‐support	  on	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains.	  Both	  areas	  
are	   located	   in	   the	   Bay	   of	   Plenty.	  Overseer	   was	   introduced	   into	  the	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   area	  
throughout	   2005,	   but	   the	   temporal	   boundary	   for	   this	   research	   was	   confined	   to	   the	   use	   of	  
Overseer	  in	  more	  recent	  years,	  leading	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  data	  collection	  period	  (November	  
2016).	  With	  the	  case	  studies,	  Overseer	  has	  been	  used	  to	  portray	  how	  the	  use	  of	  a	  model	  for	  
either	  decision-­‐support	  or	  compliance	  purposes	  results	  in	  diferent	  perceptions	  of	  the	  model.	  
Although	   Overseer	   for	   compliance	   and	   decision-­‐support	   purposes	   is	   employed	   for	   a	   wide	  
range	  of	  agricultural	  practices,	  this	  case	  concentrates	  solely	  on	  the	  dairy	  farming	  sector.	  While	  
the	   socio-­‐economic	   consequences	   of	   the	   use	   of	   Overseer	   for	   compliance	   purposes	   are	  
expected	  to	  be	  most	  significant	  for	  individuals	  involved	  in	  the	  dairy	  industry,	  other	  parties	  are	  
afected	   such	   as	  mining	   and	   paper	   mil	   companies,	   sheep	   and	   beef	   farmers,	   lifestyle	   block	  
owners,	  and	  the	  general	  public	  who	  are	  mentioned	  throughout	  the	  study.	  	  
4.3.1	  Case	  study:	  The	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  –	  using	  Overseer	  for	  compliance	  
The	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  are	  situated	  in	  the	  Bay	  of	  Plenty	  of	  the	  North	  Island	  of	  New	  Zealand,	  known	  
for	  the	  system	  of	  ancient	  volcanic	  caldera	  lakes	  in	  the	  area	  (see	  Rotorua	  below	  in	  figure	  4.1).	  
Lake	  Rotorua	  is	  the	  largest	  lake	  in	  the	  district,	  with	  a	  surface	  area	  of	  8,060ha	  and	  a	  catchment	  
area	  of	  50,060ha	  (RTALP,	  2017b).	  With	  the	  city	  of	  Rotorua	  right	  on	  its	  shores	  and	  its	  close	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association	   with	   popular	   Māori	   legends,	   Lake	   Rotorua	   is	   highly	   valued	   for	   its	   cultural	  
significance,	   recreation	   and	   tourism	   opportunities,	   and	   containing	   the	   country’s	   most	  
productive	  trout	  fishery	  (RTALP,	  2017b).	  
	  
Figure	  4.1	   Rotorua	  Lakes	  surface	  water	  catchment	  area	  (green	  colour)	  (source:	  Bay	  of	  
Plenty	  Regional	  Council	  (BOPRC)	  (2016))	  
Due	  to	  the	  areas	  fertile	  soils	  and	  wet	  climate,	  dairy	  farming	  has	  had	  success	  and	  become	  a	  
significant	   industry	   in	   the	   area	  (Environment	   Bay	   of	   Plenty	   et	  al.,	   2009).	   Rotorua’s	   most	  
significant	  environmental	  issue	  has	  been	  the	  decline	  in	  water	  quality	  of	  several	  lakes	  in	  the	  
area,	   associated	   with	  high	   levels	   of	  nitrogen	   and	   phosphorus.	  As	   a	   short	   term	   measure	   of	  
increasing	  the	  water	  quality	  of	  the	  lake,	  BOPRC	  has	  been	  dosing	  aluminium	  sulphate	  into	  two	  
streams	  which	  flow	  into	  the	  lake	  (RTALP,	  2017b).	  Aluminium	  sulphate	  locks	  phosphorus	  onto	  
sediment,	  removing	  it	  from	  the	  water	  column	  and	  resulting	  in	  less	  phosphorus	  available	  for	  
algal	  growth.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  contributors	  to	  the	  levels	  of	  nitrogen	  and	  phosphorus	  
in	   Lake	   Rotorua	   is	   dairy	   farming;	   reducing	   nutrients	  lost	   from	   land-­‐use	   is	   key	   to	   improving	  
water	  quality	  in	  the	  area.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   develop	   a	   long	   term	   solution	   for	   water	   quality	   in	   Lake	   Rotorua,	   a	   Stakeholder	  
Advisory	  Group	  was	  formed	  with	  representatives	  from	  pastoral,	  water	  quality,	  forestry	  and	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īwi	  sectors	  (RTALP,	  2017b).	  This	  co-­‐operative	  forum	  has	  developed	  an	  integrated	  framework	  
for	  the	  reduction	  of	  nitrogen	  entering	  Lake	  Rotorua,	  most	  significantly	  the	  development	  of	  
Plan	  Change	  10.	  
Policy	  in	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  area	  
The	   Rotorua	   Te	   Arawa	   Lakes	   Programme	  (RTALP)	  was	   developed	   to	   reduce	   nitrogen	   loads	  
from	   entering	  Lake	  Rotorua	  (Rotorua	   Lakes,	   2016b).	  Policy	   change	   began	   in	   2005	   with	   the	  
introduction	   of	   Rule	   11,	   which	   aimed	   to	   ensure	   there	   was	   no	   increase	   to	   the	   amount	   of	  
nutrients	  entering	  the	  lakes	  in	  Rotorua.	  Rule	  11	  placed	  a	  limit	  on	  nitrogen	  and	  phosphorus	  
entering	  the	  areas	  lakes	  from	  properties	  within	  the	  catchments	  by	  benchmarking	  properties	  
based	  on	  their	  land	  use	  from	  2001	  to	  2004	  (RTALP,	  2017c).	  Rule	  11	  did	  not	  improve	  water	  
quality	   in	   the	   area,	   rather	   the	   objective	   was	   to	   prevent	   further	   environmental	   damage	  by	  
capping	  nutrient	  losses.	  For	  addressing	  water	  quality,	  Plan	  Change	  10	  (Lake	  Rotorua	  Nutrient	  
Management)	  was	  developed	  as	  a	  change	  to	  the	  Regional	  Water	  and	  Land	  Plan	  (RWLP)	  that	  
the	  BOPRC	  with	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  Council	  and	  Te	  Arawa	  Lakes	  Trust	  have	  established.	  Plan	  
Change	  10	  aims	  to	  meet	  the	  objectives	  set	  by	  the	  Operative	  Regional	  Policy	  Statement	  and	  
Operative	  RWLP,	  which	  are:	  
Regional	  Policy	  Statement	  Objective	  28:	  Enhance	  the	  water	  quality	  in	  
the	  lakes	  of	  the	  Rotorua	  District	  and	  other	  catchments	  at	  risk	  (BOPRC,	  
2014b,	  p.	  98).	  
Regional	  Water	  and	  Land	  Plan	  Objective	  11:	  The	  water	  quality	  in	  the	  
Rotorua	  lake	  is	  maintained	  or	  improved	  to	  meet	  the	  Trophic	  Index	  of	  
4.2	  for	  Lake	  Rotorua	  (BOPRC,	  2008,	  p.	  34).	  
To	  meet	  these	  objectives,	  Plan	  Change	  10	  introduces	  rules	  to	  limit	  the	  amount	  of	  nutrients	  
entering	  Lake	  Rotorua.	  The	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  Programme	  has	  set	  a	  target	  of	  a	  sustainable	  annual	  
nitrogen	   limit	   of	   435	   tonnes,	   using	   nitrogen	   benchmark	   levels	   from	   a	   historical	   report	   by	  
Rutherford	  et	  al.	  (1989).	  Rutherford	  et	  al.’s	  report	  concluded	  that	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  suitable	  
water	  quality	  levels,	  a	  target	  of	  pre-­‐1960	  lake	  conditions	  should	  be	  met.	  The	  sustainable	  lake	  
load	   must	   be	   met	   by	   2032,	   with	   70%	   met	   by	   2022	  (Rotorua	   Lakes,	   2016b).There	   is	   also	   a	  
required	   reduction	   of	   10	   tonnes	   of	   phosphorus	   in	   the	   lake.	  Park	   (2014)	  explained	   that	   the	  
removal	  of	  270	  tonnes	  of	  nitrogen	  from	  the	  system	  is	  required	  from	  the	  pastoral	  sector,	  which	  
includes	  dairy,	  sheep	  and	  beef,	  and	  other	  livestock	  farms	  as	  wel	  as	  lifestyle	  blocks.	  In	  order	  
to	  implement	  this	  reduction	  by	  the	  pastoral	  sector,	  a	  Nitrogen	  Discharge	  Alowance	  (NDA)	  has	  
been	  alocated	  to	  each	  property	  owner,	  which	  states	  the	  maximum	  amount	  of	  nitrogen	  loss	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to	  occur	  from	  the	  property	  after	  2032	  (Rotorua	  Lakes,	  2016a).	  Al	  dairy	  farmers	  wil	  be	  given	  
a	  NDA,	  which	  wil	  be	  enforced	  from	  July	  1,	  2017,	  and	  must	  be	  met	  by	  2032	  (RTALP,	  2016).	  The	  
NDA,	  and	  al	  corresponding	  calculations	  are	  calculated	  by	  a	  land	  use	  advisor	  from	  the	  Bay	  of	  
Plenty	   Regional	   Council	   using	  the	   latest	   version	   of	  Overseer	  (updated	   with	   each	   version	  
change)	  based	  on	  each	  property’s	  2001-­‐2004	  nutrient	  discharges	  as	  the	  benchmark.	  
A	  report	  by	  Park	  (2014)	  summarises	  the	  regulatory	  and	  practical	  chalenges	  of	  using	  Overseer	  
in	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  area,	  and	  concluded	  with	  “the	  Overseer	  nutrient	  budget	  model	  is	  fit	  for	  
the	  purpose	  of	  regulating	  N	  loss	  in	  the	  Lake	  Rotorua	  catchment”	  (Park,	  2014,	  p.	  3).	  Along	  with	  
this	  endorsement,	  Park	  (2014)’s	  report	  outlines	  the	  chalenges	  BOPRC	  may	  come	  across	  during	  
implementation.	  Some	  of	  the	  recommendations	  include:	  
•	  The	  latest	  Overseer	  version	  should	  be	  used	  
•	  Compliance	  should	  be	  assessed	  against	  a	  roling	  three-­‐year	  average	  of	  the	  outputs	  
•	  Enhance	  farm	  nutrient	  plan	  eficiency	  (through	  suitable	  farm	  plans)	  
•	  Latest	  Overseer	  Best	  Practice	  Data	  Input	  Standards	  are	  to	  be	  complied	  with	  
•	  Create	   a	   secure	   and	   eficient	   national	   database	   for	   accessing	   Overseer	   input	   and	  
output	  data.	  
Plan	  Change	  10	  was	  publicaly	  notified	  in	  February	  2016,	  submissions	  were	  closed	  late	  April	  
2016	  and	  the	  hearings	  were	  held	  from	  the	  13th	  of	  March	  to	  the	  4th	  of	  May,	  2017,	  and	  wil	  
formaly	   close	   once	   al	   requests	   for	   additional	   information	   are	   received.	   The	   hearing	   panel	  
now	  has	  the	  responsibility	  to	  consider	  al	  information	  submitted	  and	  make	  a	  recommendation	  
on	  Plan	  Change	  10	  to	  the	  BOPRC.	  BOPRC	  wil	  then	  consider	  the	  recommendation	  and	  make	  a	  
decision	  on	  releasing	  the	  Plan	  Change	  (BOPRC,	  2017a;	  BOPRC,	  2017b).	  	  	  
Alongside	   Plan	   Change	   10,	   there	   are	   several	   other	   initiatives	   to	   achieve	   long	   term	  
improvements	   to	   water	   quality.	   The	   Gorse	   Conversion	   Programme	   contains	   a	   $2.5	   milion	  
fund	  to	  remove	  30	  tonnes	  of	  nitrogen	  from	  entering	  the	  lake	  as	  gorse	  absorbs	  nitrogen	  from	  
the	  atmosphere	  and	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  leach	  excess	  nitrogen	  into	  the	  soil	  (RTALP,	  2017a).	  The	  
programme	  aims	  to	  convert	  mature	  gorse	  into	  production	  forestry,	  native	  bush	  or	  any	  other	  
low	  nitrogen	  leaching	  activities.	  Another	  initiative	  is	  the	  Lake	  Rotorua	  Incentives	  Programme,	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where	   a	   $40	   milion	   fund	   wil	   be	   used	   to	   remove	   100	   tonnes	   of	   nitrogen	   from	   the	   system	  
through	  voluntary	  land	  use	  and	  management	  changes	  (RTALP,	  2017b).	  The	  incentive	  scheme	  
wil	  alow	  land	  owners	  to	  sel	  nitrogen	  (as	  represented	  by	  their	  current	  NDA	  figure),	  as	  long	  as	  
they	  permanently	  alter	  a	  portion	  of	  their	  property	  to	  a	  low	  nitrogen	  loss	  land	  use.	  The	  BOPRC	  
wil	  also	  employ	  engineering	  solutions	  to	  remove	  50	  tonnes	  of	  nitrogen	  from	  reaching	  Lake	  
Rotorua,	   these	   wil	   include	   weed	   harvesting,	   establishing	   floating	   wetlands,	   instaling	  
detainment	  bunds	  and	  upgrading	  the	  waste	  water	  treatment	  plant	  (RTALP,	  2017b).	  	  
The	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  wil	  also	  be	  afected	  by	  the	  Regional	  Water	  and	  Land	  Plan	  Change	  9,	  which	  
improves	  the	  eficiency	  of	  water	  alocation	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  improvements	  are	  sought	  by	  
strengthening	  existing	  limits	  for	  water	  alocation	  and	  requirements	  for	  water	  users	  to	  meter	  
and	  report	  water	  use,	  and	  introduce	  further	  policy	  that	  reflects	  tāngata	  whenua	  values	  when	  
processing	  consents	  (BOPRC,	  2017a).	  Plan	  Change	  9	  is	  stil	  receiving	  submissions	  and	  a	  final	  
decision	  is	  aimed	  for	  release	  in	  March	  2018.	  
4.3.2	  Case	  study:	  The	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  –	  using	  Overseer	  as	  decision-­‐support	  
The	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  is	  a	  smal	  flood	  plain,	  about	  30,000ha	  in	  area,	  situated	  at	  the	  northern	  
end	  of	  the	  Rangitāiki	  catchment	  (see	  shaded	  grey/green	  area	  circled	  in	  Figure	  4.2	  below),	  in	  
the	  Eastern	  Bay	  of	  Plenty	  of	  the	  North	  Island	  of	  New	  Zealand	  (BOPRC,	  2013).	  The	  Rangitāiki	  
Plains	  are	  located	  south-­‐east	  from	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  area.	  The	  Rangitāiki	  plains	  contain	  the	  
Rangitāiki	  River,	  which	  begins	  in	  the	  northern	  Hawkes	  Bay	  to	  the	  east	  of	  the	  Kaingaroa	  Forest,	  
flowing	  northeast	  into	  the	  Pacific	  Ocean.	  As	  in	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes,	  the	  Bay	  of	  Plenty	  Regional	  
Council	  (BOPRC)	  governs	  this	  area.	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Figure	  4.2	   Map	  of	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Catchment,	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  located	  at	  the	  
northernmost	  section	  of	  the	  river	  (light	  grey/green	  colour)	  (source:	  Bay	  of	  
Plenty	  Regional	  Council	  (BOPRC)	  (2014a))	  
The	  Rangitāiki	  River	  is	  considered	  of	  great	  importance	  to	  past,	  present	  and	  future	  generations	  
(BOPRC,	  2015).	  Over	  the	  past	  century,	  the	  Rangitāiki	  River	  has	  benefitted	  the	  local	  economy	  
by	   generating	   hydro-­‐electricity,	   providing	   water	   for	   agriculture	   and	   horticulture,	   and	  
supported	  forestry,	  tourism	  and	  recreation.	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At	  present,	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  in	  the	  lower	  catchment	  is	  used	  extensively	  for	  agriculture,	  
predominantly	   dairy	   farming,	   which	   represents	   80%	   of	   the	   land	   area,	   while	   horticulture	  
represents	  3%	  (BOPRC,	  2013).	  As	  of	  2013,	  10%	  of	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  was	  irrigated,	  with	  7%	  
of	  that	  being	  dairy	  farm	  land.	  There	  has	  been	  significant	  interest	  for	  increasing	  irrigation	  in	  
the	  area,	  in	  particular	  for	  dairy	  farms,	  which	  has	  resulted	  in	  investigations	  into	  a	  community	  
irrigation	  scheme	  on	  parts	  of	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  (BOPRC,	  2013).	  The	  unsuitable	  condition	  of	  
the	  Rangitāiki	  River	  has	  recently	  come	  under	  the	  spotlight,	  with	  those	  in	  the	  area	  requesting	  
water	  quality	  that	  meets	  drinking	  water	  and	  food	  source	  safety	  levels,	  alongside	  being	  suitable	  
for	  swimming	  and	  ceremonies	  (BOPRC,	  2015).	  	  
Policy	  on	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  
The	   Rangitāiki	   River	   Forum	  was	   founded	   in	   2012,	   and	  is	   a	   joint	   committee	   made	   up	   of	  
representatives	  from	  the	  BOPRC,	  the	  Whakatāne	  District	  Council,	  the	  Taupō	  District	  Council,	  
and	  members	  from	  al	  relevant	  īwi	  within	  the	  Rangitāiki	  catchment.	  The	  forum	  was	  created	  in	  
order	  to	  fulfil	  the	  Regional	  Council’s	  responsibilities	  under	  the	  Ngāti	  Manawa	  and	  Ngāti	  Whare	  
Treaty	   Settlement	   Claims	   Acts	   2012,	   which	  states	   that	   the	  Bay	   of	   Plenty	   Regional	   Policy	  
Statement	  is	  obligated	  to	  recognise	  and	  provide	  for	  policy	  from	  the	  īwi	  in	  any	  future	  regional	  
and	  district	  plans	  (BOPRC,	  2015).	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  forum	  is	  to	  ensure:	  
The	  protection	  and	  enhancement	  of	  the	  environmental,	  cultural,	  and	  
spiritual	  health	  and	  welbeing	  of	  the	  Rangitāiki	  River	  and	  its	  resources	  
for	  the	  benefit	  of	  present	  and	  future	  generations	  (Rangitāiki	  River	  
Forum,	  2017,	  p.	  3).	  
The	  forum	  released	  the	  document	  ‘Te	  Ara	  Whānui	  o	  Rangitāiki	  –	  Pathways	  of	  the	  Rangitāiki’	  
in	  2014	  to	  guide	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  mauri	  (life	  supporting	  capacity)	  and	  wel-­‐being	  of	  
the	  Rangitāiki	  (Rangitāiki	  River	  Forum,	  2017).	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  BOPRC	  is	  amending	  the	  Bay	  of	  
Plenty	  Regional	  Policy	  Statement	  with	  Plan	  Change	  3	  (Rangitāiki	  River).	  The	  plan	  change	  aims	  
to	  introduce	  the	  new	  issues,	  objectives,	  policies	  and	  methods	  outlined	  by	  the	  ‘Te	  Ara	  Whānui	  
o	  Rangitāiki	  –	  Pathways	  of	  the	  Rangitāiki’	  document	  (BOPRC,	  2017a).	  At	  present	  Plan	  Change	  
3	   has	   completed	   receiving	   submissions	   and	   has	   hearings	   scheduled	   for	   June	   2017,	   with	   a	  
decision	  aimed	  for	  release	  in	  August	  2017.	  
In	  response	  to	  the	  NPS-­‐FM,	  the	  BOPRC	  is	  setting	  limits	  on	  water	  quality,	  minimum	  flows	  and	  
alocation	  limits	  across	  the	  entire	  region,	  with	  the	  Rangitāiki	  being	  one	  of	  the	  first	  catchments	  
to	   be	   focused	   on	  (BOPRC,	   2015).	   Plan	   Change	   12	   (Freshwater	   Futures)	   sets	   out	   intended	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freshwater	  environmental	  outcomes,	  or	  objectives,	  for	  the	  Rangitāiki,	  Kaituna	  (excluding	  Lake	  
Rotoiti	  and	  Rotorua	  catchments),	  Pongakawa,	  and	  Waitahanui	  catchments	  (BOPRC,	  2017a).	  In	  
order	  to	  meet	  the	  objectives,	  freshwater	  quality	  and	  quantity	  limits	  will	  be	  established,	  along	  
with	  rules	  and	  other	  management	  methods.	  Plan	  Change	  12	  wil	  give	  efect	  to	  the	  freshwater	  
quality	  and	  quantity	  aspects	  introduced	  by	  Plan	  Change	  3.	  Pre-­‐draft	  work	  and	  engagement	  is	  
scheduled	  for	  2017,	  with	  the	  draft	  plan	  change	  hoped	  for	  release	  in	  2018,	  and	  final	  council	  
decision	  in	  2019	  (BOPRC,	  2017a).	  The	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  wil	  also	  be	  afected	  by	  the	  Regional	  
Water	  and	  Land	  Plan	  Change	  9,	  explained	  above	  in	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  case	  study	  section.	  
The	  farmers	  on	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  use	  Overseer	  as	  a	  decision-­‐support	  tool.	  However,	  while	  
the	  BOPRC	  is	  not	  currently	  using	  Overseer	  to	  monitor	  nutrient	  limits	  for	  the	  Rangitāiki	  River,	  
it	   is	   a	   good	   case	  study	   location	   for	   this	   research	   due	   to	   its	   potential	   use	   in	   the	   future	  (in	  
particular	  with	  Plan	  Change	  12	  on	  the	  horizon).	  	  
4.4	  Data	  colection	  
The	  primary	  source	  of	  data	  for	  this	  research	  was	  colected	  during	  fifteen	  interviews	  with	  three	  
participant	  groups:	  
1.	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  dairy	  farmers	  (seven	  participants)	  
2.	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  dairy	  farmers	  (six	  participants)	  
3.	  Bay	  of	  Plenty	  farm	  consultants	  (two	  participants)	  
Accompanying	  these	  interviews	  is	  the	  examination	  of	  documents	  relating	  to	  the	  case	  study,	  
including	   policy	   legislation,	   scientific	   reports,	   opinion	   pieces	   in	   the	   media,	   and	   industry	  
information.	  
4.4.1	  Interviews	  
Kely	  (2010)	  described	  the	  term	  ‘qualitative	  interview’	  as	  an	  interview	  technique	  that	  provides	  
textualy	  rich	  data,	  unlike	  structured	  or	  standardised	  interviews	  which	  aim	  to	  create	  data	  that	  
fits	   to	   quantitative	   analysis.	   Interviews	   ofer	   the	   opportunity	   to	   fuly	   engage	   with	   the	  
individual	   persons	   and	   are	   able	   to	   increase	   the	   depth	   of	   responses	   by	   asking	   folow-­‐up	  
questions	   as	   needed	  (Opdenakker,	   2006).	   In	   order	   to	   address	   the	   research	   objectives,	   the	  
interviews	  were	  semi-­‐structured,	  with	  prompting	  exploratory	  questions	  and	  the	  opportunity	  
for	  the	  researcher	  to	  pursue	  diferent	  topics	  as	  necessary.	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Al	  interviews	  were	  held	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  at	  a	  location	  of	  the	  participants	  choosing,	  generaly	  at	  
the	  individual’s	  home	  with	  some	  in	  the	  farm	  shed.	  The	  interviews	  were	  recorded	  using	  a	  digital	  
voice	  recorder,	  with	  written	  permission	  from	  the	  participants,	  to	  alow	  the	  researcher	  to	  re-­‐
listen	  and	  transcribe	  the	  interviews	  at	  a	  later	  date.	  No	  written	  notes	  were	  taken	  during	  the	  
interview,	   but	   some	   notes	   were	   written	   immediately	   folowing	   the	   interviews	   by	   the	  
researcher	  to	  record	  key	  information	  or	  emerging	  themes.	  
4.4.2	  Participant	  selection	  
It	  is	  fortunate	  that	  one	  of	  the	  case	  study’s	  settings	  is	  one	  that	  the	  researcher	  is	  familiar	  with.	  
Having	   grown	   up	   on	   a	   dairy	   farm	   on	   the	   Rangitāiki	   Plains,	   al	   of	   the	   eventual	   interview	  
participants	   for	   this	   case	   study	   were	   familiar	   with	   the	   researcher’s	   family.	   For	   this	   reason,	  
obtaining	  access	  to	  informants	  was	  a	  simple	  process	  of	  telephoning	  known	  contacts	  and	  giving	  
them	  the	  research	  information	  for	  them	  to	  decide	  to	  participate.	  While	  this	  streamlined	  access	  
to	  participants	  was	  beneficial,	  there	  was	  also	  a	  risk	  of	  the	  participants	  feeling	  pressured	  to	  
participate	  in	  the	  interview,	  alongside	  the	  potential	  development	  of	  researcher	  bias	  due	  to	  
personal	  involvement	  with	  the	  informants	  
It	  is	  dificult	  to	  remain	  completely	  neutral	  regardless	  of	  familiarity	  with	  research	  participants.	  
Instead	  of	  seeking	  complete	  neutrality	  during	  interviews,	  Taylor	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  explains	  that	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  also	  be	  aware	  of	  personal	  perspectives	  and	  to	  take	  this	  into	  account	  during	  data	  
analysis.	  To	   address	   the	   issue	   of	   participants	   feeling	   compeled	   to	   have	   an	   interview,	  the	  
researcher	  made	  sure	  to	  confirm	  they	  were	  completely	  comfortable	  with	  their	  participation:	  
participants	  were	  given	  control	  over	  when	  the	  interview	  would	  be	  held	  (to	  ensure	  suficient	  
time	  to	  withdraw	  if	  necessary)	  and	  were	  verbaly	  told	  they	  could	  withdraw	  any	  time	  leading	  
up	  to,	  and	  folowing	  the	  interview	  until	  late	  December	  2016.	  In	  order	  to	  decrease	  the	  influence	  
of	  bias	  during	  the	  interviews	  for	  this	  research,	  the	  author	  made	  an	  efort	  to	  ask	  pre-­‐written	  
neutral	  questions	  (see	  Appendix	  A),	  attempted	  to	  give	  complete	  control	  of	  the	  responses	  to	  
the	   participants	   (in	   some	   cases	   further	   probing	   was	   required	   to	   gain	   a	   ful	   response),	   and	  
recognised	  the	  emergence	  of	  any	  personal	  perspectives	  during	  data	  analysis.	  To	  facilitate	  this	  
it	  was	  helpful	  to	  remember	  Taylor	  et	  al.	  (2015)’s	  explanation	  that	  one	  version	  of	  reality,	  or	  an	  
individual’s	   behaviour	   and	   perceptions,	   is	   only	   one	   out	   of	   many	   potential	   realities.	  By	  
recognising	   the	   importance	   of	   neutrality	   and	   attempting	   to	   remove	   bias	   due	   to	   the	  
researcher’s	  familiarity	  with	  participants	  in	  this	  research,	  the	  author	  feels	  confident	  that	  this	  
study	  has	  resulted	  in	  credible	  research.	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Interviewee	   selection	   was	   influenced	   by	   the	   participant’s	   availability	   and	   wilingness	   to	  
contribute	  to	  the	  study.	  Contacts	  were	  found	  through	  the	  area’s	  community	  network,	  with	  
seven	   Rangitāiki	   Plains	   dairy	   farmers,	   six	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   dairy	   farmers	   and	   two	   farm	  
consultants	  interviewed	  (see	  table	  4.1	  below).	  Participants	  in	  the	  diferent	  groups	  received	  a	  
mixture	  of	  questions,	  some	  given	  to	  al	  groups,	  and	  some	  specific	  to	  their	  group	  (interview	  
questions	  are	  provided	  in	  Appendix	  A).	  Due	  to	  the	  size	  and	  time	  constraints	  of	  this	  study,	  the	  
informants	   do	   not	   represent	   al	   the	   potential	  perspectives	  of	   the	   study	   area.	   It	   should	  
however,	  deliver	  an	  insight	  into	  a	  number	  of	  perceptions	  relating	  to	  the	  research	  question,	  
which	  contributes	  to	  the	  wider	  research	  on	  social	  environmental	  science.	  	  
The	   interviews	   were	   completed	   in	   the	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   area	   and	   on	   the	   Rangitāiki	   Plains	  
between	   late	   September	   and	   mid-­‐December	   2016.	   In	   total,	   fifteen	   participants	   were	  
interviewed	  in	  person	  and	  recorded	  electronicaly.	  Table	  4.1	  below	  tabulates	  the	  participants	  
and	   to	   which	   of	   the	   three	   participant	   groups	   they	   belong.	   To	   ensure	   anonymity,	   each	  
participant	   has	   been	   designated	   a	   code.	   These	   codes	   have	   been	   used	   in	   the	   results	   and	  
discussion	  chapters	  to	  refer	  to	  each	  participant.	  











	   Description	   Assigned	  code	  in	  text*	  
Participant	  1	   Dairy	  farmer,	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	   1(D,P)	  
Participant	  2	   Dairy	  farmer,	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	   2(D,P)	  
Participant	  3	   Dairy	  farmer,	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	   3(D,P)	  
Participant	  4	   Dairy	  farmer,	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	   4(D,P)	  
Participant	  5	   Dairy	  farmer,	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	   5(D,P)	  
Participant	  6	   Dairy	  farmer,	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	   6(D,P)	  
Participant	  7	   Dairy	  farmer,	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	   7(D,P)	  
Participant	  8	   Dairy	  farmer,	  Rotorua	  Lakes	   8(D,L)	  
Participant	  9	   Dairy	  farmer,	  Rotorua	  Lakes	   9(D,L)	  
Participant	  10	   Dairy	  farmer,	  Rotorua	  Lakes	   10(D,L)	  
Participant	  11	   Dairy	  farmer,	  Rotorua	  Lakes	   11(D,L)	  
Participant	  12	   Dairy	  farmer,	  Rotorua	  Lakes	   12(D,L)	  
Participant	  13	   Dairy	  farmer,	  Rotorua	  Lakes	   13(D,L)	  
Participant	  14	   Farm	  consultant	   14(C)	  
Participant	  15	   Farm	  consultant	   15(C)	  
*	  Where	  D	  =	  Dairy	  farmer,	  P	  =	  Plains	  (of	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains),	  L	  =	  Lakes	  (of	  the	  
Rotorua	  Lakes),	  C	  =	  Farm	  Consultant 
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4.4.3	  Human	  ethics	  
Data	  colection	  in	  this	  case	  study	  involved	  the	  interviewing	  of	  fifteen	  human	  participants.	  Even	  
though	  the	  risk	  of	  harm	  to	  participants	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  low,	  it	  was	  important	  that	  each	  
participant	  was	  treated	  ethicaly,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Lincoln	  University	  Human	  Ethics	  Committee	  
guidelines.	   For	   this	   reason,	   approval	   was	   sought,	   and	   gained,	   from	   the	   Lincoln	   University	  
Human	  Ethics	  Committee	  prior	  to	  the	  initiation	  of	  data	  colection.	  The	  folowing	  steps	  were	  
taken	  to	  ensure	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  study	  participants	  were	  respected:	  
•	  Participants	  were	  given	  a	  research	  summary	  prior	  to	  engaging	  in	  an	  interview,	  ensuring	  
they	  fuly	  understood	  the	  research	  intentions	  and	  their	  involvement	  
•	  Al	   participants	   were	   given	   the	   option	   to	   withdraw	   from	   the	   study	   up	   until	   31st	  
December	  2016	  
•	  Participant	  identity	  has	  been	  kept	  anonymous	  by	  the	  use	  of	  code	  names	  within	  the	  
results	  and	  discussion	  chapters.	  	  
No	  summaries	   of	   the	   interviews	   were	   forwarded	   to	   the	   participants,	   but	   the	   researcher’s	  
phone	  number	  was	  provided	  for	  any	  queries	  or	  requests	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  research.	  Al	  
private	  information	  related	  to	  participants	  was	  kept	  confidential,	  with	  access	  restricted	  to	  the	  
researcher	  and	  the	  supervision	  team.	  
4.5	  Data	  analysis	  
Thematic	  analysis	  was	  used	  to	  examine	  the	  interview	  data.	  Thematic	  analysis	  is	  a	  process	  of	  
coding	  data,	  resulting	  in	  organised	  and	  descriptive	  information	  about	  a	  research	  topic	  through	  
the	  identification	  and	  analysis	  of	  themes	  within	  the	  data	  (Braun	  &	  Clarke,	  2006).	  Due	  to	  the	  
thematic	  analysis	  potentialy	  facilitating	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  themes	  within	  research	  data,	  it	  was	  
important	   to	   be	   consistent	   with	   defining	   the	   occurrences	   of	   themes	   during	   analysis.	   The	  
analytical	  structure	  used	  in	  this	  research	  project	  was	  as	  folows:	  
•	  Data	  familiarisation:	  a	  post-­‐interview	  written	  summary	  and	  transcription	  process	  with	  
repeated	  reading	  to	  alow	  immersion	  of	  the	  data.	  Notes	  were	  taken	  for	  future	  coding	  
as	  initial	  themes	  began	  to	  emerge,	  aided	  by	  the	  theoretical	  framework.	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•	  Initial	  coding:	  coding	  for	  as	  many	  potential	  themes	  as	  possible,	  organising	  data	  into	  
meaningful	  groups.	  
•	  Searching	  for	  themes:	  once	  a	  long	  list	  of	  al	  the	  diferent	  codes	  had	  been	  created	  they	  
were	  colated	  into	  potential	  themes.	  Tables,	  mind-­‐maps	  and	  codes	  written	  on	  pieces	  
of	  card	  were	  sorted	  and	  re-­‐sorted	  into	  theme-­‐piles.	  
•	  Reviewing	  themes:	  this	  step	  refined	  the	  potential	  theme	  groups,	  removing,	  merging	  or	  
splitting	  groups	  as	  appropriate.	  	  
•	  Defining/naming	  themes:	  each	  theme	  was	  refined	  in	  terms	  of	  identifying	  the	  essence	  
of	  what	  it	  represented.	  This	  phase	  resulted	  in	  clear	  definitions	  of	  the	  themes.	  
•	  Writing:	  to	  tel	  the	  complicated	  story	  of	  the	  data	  in	  a	  convincing	  way.	  
Coding	  was	  kept	  within	  the	  research	  scope	  with	  frequent	  referral	  to	  the	  research	  question,	  
aim,	  objectives	  and	  theoretical	  framework.	  
4.6	  Summary	  
A	  qualitative	  research	  approach	  was	  employed	  for	  this	  study,	  alowing	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  into	  
farmers’	   perceptions	   on	   Overseer.	   The	   case	   study	   is	   in	   the	   Bay	   of	   Plenty	   and	   includes	   two	  
groups	  of	  dairy	  farmers.	  One	  area	  uses	  Overseer	  for	  compliance	  and	  one	  that	  uses	  Overseer	  
for	   decision-­‐support.	   These	   dairy	   farmer	   interviews	   were	   accompanied	   by	   interviews	   with	  
farm	  consultants	  from	  both	  areas.	  This	  research	  design	  means	  that	  diferent	  perceptions	  of	  
Overseer’s	   use	   were	   investigated.	   Data	   was	   colected	   by	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   and	  
examined	  using	  thematic	  analysis	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  research	  questions,	  aim,	  objectives	  
and	  theoretical	  framework.	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Chapter	  5	  
Results	  
This	  chapter	  presents	  the	  results	  of	  the	  research.	  To	  begin	  with,	  the	  context	  of	  the	  results	  is	  
explained,	  providing	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  key	  events	  which	  occurred	  prior	  to	  the	  interviews.	  The	  
experiences	   and	   perceptions	   of	   the	   research	   participants	   are	   then	   described,	   outlining	   the	  
farmers’	   perceptions	   of	   the	   implementation	   chalenges	   of	   using	   Overseer	   for	   regulation,	  
folowed	   by	   questions	   of	   the	   model’s	   accuracy.	   Farmer	   relationships	  with	  council	   staf,	  
industry	  professionals,	  and	  members	  of	  the	  public	  are	  then	  described,	  folowed	  by	  a	  summary	  
of	  the	  outlook	  participants	  have	  for	  their	  farming	  future.	  
5.1	  Results	  context	  
5.1.1	  Nutrient	  management	  prior	  to	  Overseer	  
Before	   the	   introduction	   of	   Overseer	  into	   the	   Bay	   of	   Plenty	   area,	   nutrient	   management	   for	  
dairy	   farming	   had	   not	   been	   commonly	   related	   to	   environmental	   issues.	   Participant	   8(D,L)	  
described	   how	   they	   had	   never	   heard	   of	   nutrient	   issues	   prior	   to	   Overseer	   and	   the	  
announcement	  that	  nutrient	  losses	  from	  dairy	  farming	  were	  having	  a	  detrimental	  efect	  on	  
the	  environment	  came	  as	  a	  surprise.	  Participant	  14(C)	  referred	  to	  how	  in	  the	  past	  it	  had	  been	  
industry	  practice	  to	  design	  waste	  water	  systems	  that	  would	  get	  rid	  of	  as	  much	  waste	  water	  as	  
possible	  within	  consent	  conditions,	  rather	  than	  paying	  any	  attention	  to	  environmental	  efects.	  
Until	  recently,	  farmers	  were	  unaware,	  to	  an	  extent,	  of	  any	  of	  the	  detrimental	  efects	  these	  
waste	  water	  systems	  had	  to	  waterways.	  But	  this	  has	  changed	  and	  local	  industries	  are	  more	  
aware	  of	  issues	  now	  (participant	  14(C).	  Al	  13	  of	  the	  dairy	  farmer	  participants	  have	  used,	  and	  
stil	   do	   use,	   soil	   tests	   to	   determine	   appropriate	   nutrient	   applications	   for	   the	   season.	  Their	  
reasons	   behind	   using	   soil	   tests	   ranged	   from	   just	   folowing	   industry	   practice,	   to	   feeling	  
confident	  in	  scientific	  analysis	  of	  soil	  deficiencies.	  Participant	  6(D,P)	  described	  how	  the	  dairy	  
industry	   message	  for	  nutrient	   management	   was	  entirely	   focused	   on	   point-­‐source	   efluent	  
polution:	  “the	  industry	  just	  took	  an	  overal	  view	  that	  if	  you	  just	  took	  500	  cows	  you’l	  produce	  
this	   much	   efluent,	   so	   there’s	   this	   much	   [nitrogen]	   and	   [phosphorus]”	   (participant	   6(D,P).	  
More	  recently,	  the	  industry	  message	  has	  changed:	  “DairyNZ	  has	  gone	  back	  to	  grass	  growing,	  
back	  to	  basics	  …	  being	  more	  self-­‐contained”	  (participant	  8(D,L).	  Participant	  8(D,L)	  went	  on	  to	  
	   51	  
state	   that	   the	   shift	   into	   using	   Overseer	   was	   a	   given,	   due	   to	   the	   previously	   limited	  
understanding	  of	  efluent	  treatment:	  	  
I	  suppose	  farming	  does	  need	  a	  ruler	  or	  barometer	  of	  environmental	  
issues,	  we’ve	  never	  had	  [much	  focus	  on	  environmental	  issues]	  since	  
2005,	  I’m	  not	  aware	  of	  there	  ever	  being	  [any	  attention	  to	  nutrient	  
losses],	  other	  than	  efluent	  management,	  you	  could	  not	  put	  efluent	  
into	  waterways	  (participant	  8(D,L).	  
5.1.2	  Introduction	  to	  Overseer	  
In	  2005	  the	  Bay	  of	  Plenty	  Regional	  Council	  (BOPRC)	  released	  Rule	  11,	  requiring	  every	  rural	  
property	  in	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  area	  over	  0.4ha	  to	  obtain	  a	  nutrient	  benchmark	  (participants	  
8(D,L),	  9(D,L),	  10(D,L),	  11(D,L),	  12(D,L),	  13(D,L).	  The	  dairy	  farmers	  in	  the	  catchment	  originaly	  
gave	  a	  catchment	  colective	  figure	  to	  the	  council	  as	  they	  “were	  not	  keen	  to	  be	  giving	  their	  
nutrient	  data	  to	  the	  regional	  council”	  (participant	  8(D,L),	  but	  folowing	  years	  of	  discussion,	  in	  
2013	  the	   farmers	  provided	  individual	   figures	  to	   the	   council	  for	   benchmarking.	  The	   council	  
contracted	   an	   independent	   to	   calculate	   benchmarks,	   using	   Overseer	   to	   model	   each	   farm.	  
Those	  who	  attended	  the	  public	  meetings	  about	  Rule	  11	  were	  able	  to	  learn	  about	  council’s	  
intended	  use	  of	  Overseer	  for	  compliance	  (participants	  8(D,L),	  10(D,L),	  where	  others	  in	  the	  area	  
first	  saw	  Overseer	  during	  the	  calculation	  of	  their	  benchmark.	  Fertiliser	  representatives	  were	  a	  
main	   source	   of	   introduction	   to	   Overseer	   for	   farmers	   in	   both	   locations	   (participants	   1(D,P),	  
2(D,P),	  4(D,P),	  9(D,L),	  11(D,L),	  12(D,L).	  Fertiliser	  representatives	  predominantly	  use	  Overseer	  
as	   a	   reporting	   tool,	   producing	   fertiliser	   requirements	   for	   blocks	   of	   land	   by	   calculating	   a	  
nutrient	  budget	  (participant	  15(C).	  Participant	  5(D,P)	  does	  not	  use	  Overseer	  with	  a	  fertiliser	  
rep	  and	  was	  only	  made	  aware	  of	  the	  program	  five	  years	  ago	  during	  data	  input	  into	  Fonterra’s	  
‘Nitrogen	  Recording	  Programme’.	  Federated	  Farmers	  has	  been	  a	  source	  for	  new	  information	  
to	  those	  who	  attend	  the	  meetings,	  where	  farmers	  learnt	  about	  Overseer	  as	  a	  new	  tool	  being	  
developed	  to	  model	  farms	  (participants	  3(D,P),	  6(D,P).	  
5.1.3	  Dairy	  farming	  efect	  on	  the	  environment	  
Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers	  have	  a	  varied	  understanding	  on	  the	  efects	  dairy	  farming	  have	  on	  the	  
environment.	  However,	   several	   farmers	   pointed	   out	   that	   al	   the	   water	   from	   the	   Rangitāiki	  
Plains	  itself	  did	  not	  enter	  back	  into	  the	  Rangitāiki	  or	  Tarawera	  rivers	  because	  al	  farm	  run-­‐of	  
flows	  through	  a	  man-­‐made	  canal	  system	  that	  empties	  at	  the	  coast	  (participants	  6(D,P),	  7(D,P).	  
For	  this	  reason,	  the	  farmers	  were	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  any	  farm	  nutrients	  originating	  on	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the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  itself	  would	  not	  enter	  back	  into	  the	  river	  systems.	  Participant	  2(D,P)	  made	  
it	  clear	  he	  did	  not	  know	  his	  farm’s	  efect	  on	  the	  waterways,	  with	  participant	  1(D,P)	  saying	  it	  
was	  dificult	  to	  know	  individual	  farm	  contributions	  of	  nutrients	  to	  water	  on	  the	  property	  due	  
to	   other	   industries	   in	   the	   area.	   Participant	   5(D,P)	   did	   not	   think	   his	   farm	   had	   detrimental	  
efects,	  stating:	  “we	  don’t	  adversely	  afect	  the	  water	  quality,	  I	  guess	  if	  you	  put	  it	  al	  in	  trees	  or	  
something	  it	  would	  be	  slightly	  better”.	  Participant	  3(D,P)	  explained	  he	  was	  unsure	  about	  his	  
farm’s	   efect	   on	   river	   water	   quality,	   but	   “my	   biggest	   impact	   wil	   be	   down	   into	   the	  
groundwater”.	  Participant	  4(D,P)	  pointed	  out	  a	  noticeable	  change	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  soil	  
since	  he’s	  been	  farming	  on	  the	  land,	  where	  the	  structure	  had	  degraded	  with,	  what	  he	  thought	  
was,	  an	  increase	  of	  phosphorus:	  “inevitably	  we’re	  going	  to	  be	  having	  an	  efect,	  we’ve	  got	  to	  
be	  with	  the	  sort	  of	  intensity	  of	  the	  farming	  here”	  (participant	  4(D,P).	  	  
Conversely,	  when	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  were	  asked	  whether	  their	  farm	  contributed	  nutrients	  
into	  the	  lake,	  they	  al	  agreed	  their	  farms	  did:	  “absolutely,	  we’re	  part	  of	  the	  catchment	  so	  it	  
has	  to	  be	  [afecting	  the	  lake]”	  (participant	  9(D,L).	  Many	  farmers	  believed	  that	  while	  there	  was	  
a	  farm	  contribution,	  the	  exact	  amount	  was	  uncertain	  (participants	  10(D,L),	  11(D,L):	  “I	  think	  
they’re	  making	  it	  a	  lot	  worse	  than	  what	  it	  is”.	  Participants	  8(D,L)	  and	  13(D,L)	  pointed	  out	  that	  
many	  farmers	  believe	  Lake	  Rotorua	  is	  phosphate	  limited	  rather	  than	  nitrogen	  limited,	  and	  that	  
the	  nitrogen	  leaching	  of	  farming	  properties	  is	  not	  as	  detrimental	  to	  the	  environment.	  Several	  
farmers	   spoke	   of	   the	  recent	   positive	  changes	   farmers	   have	   made	   on	   their	   properties,	   as	   a	  
result	   of	   Rule	   11	   and	   industry	   changes	   like	   fencing	   of	   waterways;	   compared	  to	   the	   past,	  
nutrient	  leaching	  from	  farming	  properties	  is	  “not	  as	  bad	  now”	  (participants	  11(D,L),	  12(D,L).	  	  
5.2	  Overseer	  implementation	  chalenges	  	  
5.2.1	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  reactions	  to	  the	  prospect	  of	  regulation	  
Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers	  see	  regulations	  as	  having	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  characteristics.	  
A	  benefit	  of	  regulation	  is	  the	  identification	  of	  poor	  performers	  and	  forcing	  them	  to	  improve	  
their	   farming	   practices	   (participants	   3(D,P),	   6(D,P),	   7(D,P).	   “You’re	   always	   going	   to	   have	  
farmers	  who	  don’t	  do	  things	  right	  and	  I’ve	  always	  said	  get	  rid	  of	  them,	  prosecute	  them	  out	  of	  
farming,	   we	   don’t	   want	   them”	   (participant	   3(D,P).	   Participant	   6(D,P)	   explained	  how	  
regulation	  can	  provide	  evidence	  against	  the	  public’s	  ‘dirty	  dairying’	  perception	  by	  providing	  
proof	   that	   the	   farmers	   are	   meeting	   compliance	   and	   making	   positive	   changes	   to	   the	  
environment.	  Regulations	  were	  important	  because	  the	  majority	  of	  farmer’s	  care	  about	  the	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environment	  and	  if	  regulations	  improve	  this,	  everyone	  benefits	  (participants	  7(D,P),	  2(D,P),	  
6(D,P).	  Conversely,	  participant	  5(D,P)	  explained	  that	  they	  felt	  nutrient	  regulations	  were	  going	  
to	  harm	  farming	  as	  it	  is	  dificult	  to	  decide	  who	  was	  the	  better	  farmer,	  and	  regulation	  could	  
result	  in	  farmers	  being	  “pushed	  down”	  to	  lower	  intensity	  (and	  less	  viable)	  farming	  systems	  to	  
comply	  with	  rules.	  This	  informant’s	  concerns	  were	  that	  the	  set	  of	  rules	  in	  regulation	  can	  be	  
too	  inflexible,	  and	  often	  do	  not	  alow	  for	  complex	  diferences	  between	  every	  farm	  (participant	  
5(D,P).	  	  
For	  participants	  2(D,P)	  and	  7(D,P),	  their	  major	  concern	  is	  holding	  onto	  their	  ‘licence	  to	  farm’.	  
Two	  of	  the	  farmer’s	  regard	  regulations	  as	  just	  “boxes	  to	  tick”	  (participants	  1(D,P),	  3(D,P).	  The	  
reaction	  of	  farmers	  to	  regulation	  depends	  on	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  regulation	  relating	  to	  high	  pay	  
out	   years	   (participant	   7(D,P),	   alongside	   how	   quickly	   the	   restrictions	   are	   imposed	   and	   how	  
severe	  the	  limitations	  are	  for	  farmers	  (participant	  4(D,P),	  7(D,P).	  An	  important	  influence	  in	  
making	  change	  is	  the	  driver	  of	  the	  change,	  where	  a	  farmer-­‐led	  approach	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  more	  
influential	  as	  they	  could	  use	  relevant	  science	  and	  take	  their	  time	  (participants	  7(D,P),	  6(D,P):	  
“We	   need	   to	   do	   it	   from	   our	   heart	   and	   not	   forced	   upon	   us”	   (participant	   7(D,P).	   However,	  
farmers	  knew	  regulation	  is	  inevitable,	  because	  there	  are	  people	  who	  wil	  never	  change	  unless	  
forced	   to	   (participants	   3(D,P),	   7(D,P),	   2(D,P).	   When	   discussing	   the	   lack	   of	   environmental	  
action	   from	  dairy	   farmers	   around	   New	   Zealand,	   participant	   7(D,P)	   argued	   that	   regulations	  
were	   necessary	   when	   farmers	   were	   refusing	   to	   voluntarily	   cut	   back	   on	   nutrient	   use:	   “if	  
[farmers	  are]	  not	  going	  to	  lead	  …	  for	  better	  outcomes,	  expect	  to	  get	  regulated.	  And	  if	  you	  get	  
regulated,	  expect	  it	  to	  hurt”	  (participant	  7(D,P).	  	  
5.2.2	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  reaction	  to	  Overseer	  regulation	  
Thus	   far	  on	   the	   Rangitāiki	   Plains,	   farmers	   have	   not	   been	   subject	   to	   any	   compliance	  
requirements	  using	  Overseer,	  whereas	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  are	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  this	  process	  
and	  thus	  are	  more	  familiar	  with	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  model	  (participant	  9(D,L).	  One	  of	  the	  
farming	  consultants	  explained	  that	  farmers	  using	  Overseer	  for	  compliance	  purposes	  are	  less	  
trusting	   of	   Overseer,	   as	   they	   are	   more	   aware	   of	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   model’s	   outputs	  
(participant	  (14(C).	  The	  farmers	  feel	  frustrated	  that	  they	  are	  being	  told	  how	  to	  farm	  by	  council	  
(participants	   8(D,L),	   12(D,L),	   9(D,L),	   where	   they	   do	  not	   feel	  suitably	   consulted	   about	   their	  
concerns	  of	  the	  impending	  regulations	  using	  Overseer.	  Farmers	  were	  also	  concerned	  Overseer	  
wil	  lock	  them	  into	  future	  farming	  consents,	  meaning	  they	  would	  be	  farming	  to	  Overseer	  with	  
impossible	  targets	  (participants	  14(C),	  8(D,L),	  9(D,L),	  13(D,L).	  “They	  are	  not	  going	  to	  give	  us	  a	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consent	  to	  farm.	  The	  longer	  they	  take	  to	  lock	  the	  rules	  in…	  the	  harder	  it	  wil	  be	  for	  people	  to	  
meet	   targets”	   (participant	   13(D,L).	   Being	   locked	   into	   farming	   to	   Overseer,	   farmers	   see	  
themselves	  at	  the	  whim	  of	  council	  staf	  and	  Overseer	  developers	  (participant	  8(D,L).	  Farmers	  
are	  reluctant	  to	  give	  information	  because	  for	  them	  it	  appears	  as	  a	  show	  of	  support	  for	  the	  
policy	  changes,	  reducing	  their	  ability	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  changes.	  Participant	  10(D,L),	  shared	  
that	  he	  felt	  forced	  by	  the	  council	  into	  providing	  information	  for	  his	  farm.	  This	  occurred	  during	  
the	  addition	  of	  a	  toilet	  to	  his	  property	  where	  he	  was	  asked	  to	  provide	  an	  updated	  whole	  farm	  
nutrient	  report:	  “having	  one	  toilet	  did	  not	  make	  any	  diference	  at	  al	  [to	  the	  nutrient	  losses],	  
it	  was	  a	  way	  of	  them	  making	  us	  do	  it”.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  farm	  consultants	  described	  how	  the	  regional	  council	  wanted	  to	  use	  Overseer	  as	  a	  
blanket	   rule	   across	   the	   area,	   as	   it	   is	   easier	   to	   implement,	   while	   saving	   time	   and	   money	  
(participant	   14(C).	   Rotorua	   farmers	   are	   concerned	   that	   the	   nitrogen	   regulations	   from	  
Overseer	  are	  causing	  inflexibility	  in	  the	  farming	  system	  due	  to	  a	  production	  cap	  (participants	  
14(C),	  13(D,L),	  9(D,L).	  Participant	  14(C)	  explained	  that,	  on	  average,	  farmers	  have	  been	  paid	  
the	  same	  price	  for	  their	  milk	  for	  decades,	  but	  cost	  of	  production	  is	  going	  up,	  so	  the	  easiest	  
thing	  to	  do	  is	  increase	  milk	  production.	  
A	  nitrogen	  cap	  is	  a	  production	  cap.	  Once	  they’ve	  achieved	  maximum	  
milk	  production	  eficiency,	  they’ve	  got	  nowhere	  to	  go.	  Even	  if	  they	  put	  
al	  the	  infrastructure	  in	  to	  maximise	  nitrogen	  loss	  reduction,	  at	  a	  
certain	  point	  they’l	  get	  to	  where	  they	  can	  produce	  no	  more	  milk,	  
without	  exceeding	  their	  cap	  …	  They’re	  trapped	  (participant	  14(C).	  
	  Participant	   13(D,L)	   stated	   that	   they	   are	   at	   the	   stage	   of	   requiring	   significant	   financial	  
investment	  to	  meet	  their	  NDA,	  as	  they’ve	  exhausted	  al	  alternative	  options:	  “we’ve	  got	  to	  a	  
stage	   where	   we	   can’t	   do	   any	   more	   simple	   changes,	   we	   have	   done	   al	   …	   we	   can	   to	   reduce	  
leaching”	  (participant	  13(D,L).	  	  
While	  farmers	  are	  unhappy	  with	  the	  use	  of	  Overseer	  modeling	  for	  nutrient	  regulation,	  they	  
acknowledge	  there	  is	  no	  current	  alternative	  (participants	  14(C),	  9(D,L).	  Farmers	  also	  do	  not	  
want	  to	  have	  nutrient	  input	  regulations,	  as	  this	  fuly	  restricts	  farmer’s	  options	  (participants	  
14(C),	  9(D,L),	  12(D,L):	  “If	  we	  got	  rid	  of	  Overseer	  the	  only	  way	  of	  controling	  this	  is	  input	  control,	  
totaly	  prescriptive	  farming.	  Totaly	  inflexible”	  (participant	  14(C).	  	  
Explaining	  a	  positive	  change	  in	  the	  area,	  participant	  14(C)	  told	  how	  the	  district	  council	  has	  had	  
a	  rule	  change,	  employing	  an	  incentive	  scheme	  alowing	  farmers	  to	  sub-­‐divide	  of	  pieces	  of	  land	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if	  they	  change	  land	  use	  on	  another	  part	  of	  their	  property.	  If	  a	  farmer	  changes	  10	  hectares	  of	  
land	  from	  dairy	  to	  dry	  stock,	  he	  can	  sub-­‐divide	  of	  one	  lifestyle	  block	  and	  if	  the	  farmer	  retires	  
10	  hectares	  from	  dairy	  to	  trees,	  he	  can	  sub-­‐divide	  of	  two	  blocks.	  This	  is	  expected	  to	  incentivise	  
farmers	  to	  retire	  unsuitable	  dairy	  land	  into	  natives,	  to	  benefit	  financialy	  from	  converting	  an	  
area	  into	  sub-­‐division	  and	  seling	  the	  land	  (participant	  14(C).	  
5.2.3	  Getting	  around	  the	  numbers	  
Three	  diferent	  ways	  of	  getting	  around	  the	  numbers	  in	  response	  to	  Overseer	  regulation	  were	  
discussed	   by	   the	   farmers,	   the	   first	   being	   altering	   a	   farm’s	   nitrogen	   alowance	   through	   the	  
purchasing	  of	  additional	  land	  with	  a	  high	  nitrogen	  alowance.	  If	  this	  land	  is	  then	  amalgamated	  
into	  the	  current	  dairy	  platform,	  the	  overal	  nitrogen	  alowance	  for	  the	  farm	  wil	  be	  increased	  
(participant	  9(D,L).	  The	  second	  method	  involves	  forward	  thinking	  to	  influence	  future	  nitrogen	  
alowances	  for	  a	  farmer’s	  property.	  Prior	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  any	  regulation,	  farmers	  are	  
able	   to	   manipulate	   their	   farming	   systems	   to	   influence	   grand-­‐parenting	   benchmarking	  
measurements.	  Participant	  5(D,P)	  explained	  how,	  currently,	  he	  sees	  farmers	  in	  non-­‐regulated	  
regions	   reducing	  their	   farm	   inputs	  in	   order	  to	   look	   more	   environmentally-­‐friendly	   during	  
benchmarking,	  but	  he	  has	  advised	  neighbours	  and	  friends	  to	  overstate	  their	  nutrient	  inputs.	  
Overstating	  nutrient	  inputs	  means	  that	  benchmarking	  data	  wil	  be	  higher	  than	  usual,	  with	  a	  
high	   baseline,	   providing	   more	   flexibility	   in	   the	   future	   if	   there	   are	   tighter	   restrictions	   for	  
nutrient	   management.	   The	   benchmarking	   process	   in	   the	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   used	   this	   grand-­‐
parenting	  technique	  for	  the	  years	  2001	  to	  2004.	  Because	  the	  farmers	  had	  not	  been	  introduced	  
to	  the	  idea	  of	  benchmarking	  prior	  to	  2005,	  they	  were	  not	  able	  to	  manipulate	  their	  figures	  to	  
achieve	  higher	  benchmarks	  (participant	  8(D,L).	  Similar	  to	  participant	  5(D,P)’s	  idea,	  those	  in	  
the	  Waikato	  have	  been	  aware	  of	  impending	  changes	  and	  have	  been	  able	  to	  increase	  nitrogen	  
inputs	   like	   fertiliser,	   feed,	   and	   stock	   numbers	   onto	   their	   farm	   (participants	   5(D,P),	   8(D,L).	  
There	  is	  an	  incentive	  to	  manipulate	  Overseer	  data	  to	  your	  advantage,	  where	  slight	  diferences	  
in	  monthly	  stock	  numbers	  and	  dates	  for	  fertiliser	  use	  can	  make	  a	  significant	  diference	  to	  the	  
farms	   nitrogen	   budget	   (participant	   3(D,P),	   11(D,L).	   For	   those	   using	   Overseer	   for	   decision	  
support,	  reasons	  for	  giving	  incorrect	  data	  include	  lack	  of	  time,	  lack	  of	  accurate	  record	  keeping,	  
and	   lack	   of	   perceived	   importance	   (participants	   1(D,P),	   2(D,P),	   3(D,P),	   5(D,P).	  Participant	  
3(D,P)	   described	   how	   fertiliser	  representatives	  sometimes	   alter	   Overseer	   to	   suit	   their	  
interests:	  “I	  know	  for	  a	  fact	  that	  fert[iliser]	  rep[resentatives]s	  do	  that,	  you	  know.	  Spits	  out	  a	  
figure	  at	  the	  end	  that	  they	  don’t	  like,	  so	  they	  go	  and	  tweak	  some	  of	  the	  inputs”.	  However,	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those	  in	  the	  fertiliser	  industry	  cannot	  assume	  their	  Overseer	  forecast	  report	  to	  be	  accurate	  
because	   while	   farmers	  may	   receive	   a	   volume	   of	  fertiliser	   for	   a	   certain	   period	  due	   to	   the	  
recommendation,	  the	  farmers	  can	  use	  the	  fertiliser	  at	  their	  own	  discretion	  (participant	  15(C).	  
5.2.4	  Future	  farm	  checks	  
A	   significant	   concern	   held	   by	   farmers	   was	   how	   the	   regional	   council	   is	   going	   to	   police	   farm	  
compliance.	  Not	  every	  farmer	  is	  honest	  (participants	  1(D,P),	  5(D,P),	  15(C)	  and	  these	  farmers	  
believe	  that	  every	  farmer	  needs	  to	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  their	  individual	  actions.	  On	  the	  
Rangitāiki	  Plains,	  farmers	  are	  aware	  they	  are	  not	  being	  held	  accountable	  by	  regional	  council	  
for	   nutrient	   losses	   and	   as	   a	   result,	   farmer	   nutrient	   management	   in	   the	   past	   has	   been	  
substandard	  (participants	  1(D,P),	  3(D,P):	  	  
I	  just	  think	  what’s	  the	  value	  of	  it	  …	  because	  we’re	  not	  being	  held	  to	  
task	  on	  it.	  If	  that	  day	  ever	  comes	  that	  we	  were	  held	  to	  task,	  [farmer	  
nutrient	  management]	  wil	  change	  (participant	  3(D,P).	  	  
In	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  area,	  farmers	  feel	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  equal	  supervision	  from	  the	  council	  
to	   make	   sure	   al	   farmers	   are	   meeting	   their	   nutrient	   obligations,	   not	   just	   dairy	   farmers	  
(participants	  15(C),	  12(D,L),	  13(D,L).	  Farmers	  question	  how	  compliance	  wil	  be	  measured	  in	  
the	  future	  if	  councils	  are	  failing	  to	  do	  so	  now	  for	  the	  farm	  plans:	  “they	  are	  not	  going	  to	  have	  
the	  man	  power	  …	  wil	  just	  check	  on	  you	  from	  time	  to	  time?”	  (participant	  12(D,L).	  Referring	  to	  
the	  level	  of	  policing	  Fonterra	  does	  for	  ‘best	  practice	  management’,	  farmers	  feel	  like	  there	  is	  
no	  incentive	  to	  make	  changes:	  “I	  find	  it	  a	  joke	  …	  they	  don’t	  come	  around	  and	  inspect,	  they	  
don’t	  do	  anything”	  (participant	  13(D,L).	  	  
5.3	  Farmer	  issues	  with	  Overseer	  
5.3.1	  Fairness	  
Unfair	  focus	  on	  dairy	  farming	  
Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers	  are	  concerned	  about	  the	  level	  of	  environmental	  focus	  on	  the	  dairy	  
industry	  and	  the	  resultant	  regulatory	  implications.	  When	  asked	  about	  their	  thoughts	  on	  their	  
farm’s	  contribution	  to	  declining	  freshwater	  quality,	  most	  farmers	  also	  brought	  up	  questions	  
surrounding	  the	  role	  other	  industries	  play	  in	  this	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  regulation	  those	  industries	  
are	   currently	   facing	   (participants	   1(D,P),	   2(D,P),	   3(D,P),	   4(D,P),	   5(D,P),	   7(D,P).	   Farmers	  
identified	   timber	   treatment	   plants,	   car	   yards,	   forestry	   projects,	   urban	   areas,	   dams	   and	  
quarries	  as	  industries	  contributing	  to	  environmental	  degradation:	  “look	  at	  the	  Rangitāiki	  River,	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we’ve	  got	  three	  hydro	  schemes	  on	  it.	  You	  can’t	  tel	  me	  as	  a	  dairy	  farmer	  I	  have	  to	  worry,	  I	  think	  
there’s	  bigger	  fish	  to	  fry”	  (participant	  3(D,P).	  Participant	  6(D,P)	  explained	  it	  was	  unfair	  (and	  
incorrect)	  to	  assume	  that	  dairy	  farmers	  do	  not	  care	  for	  the	  environment,	  because	  in	  reality,	  it	  
is	  also	  in	  a	  farmer’s	  best	  interest	  financialy	  to	  care	  for	  their	  land:	  “most	  farmers	  …	  don’t	  want	  
to	  be	  putting	  nutrients	  down	  the	  drain.	  There’s	  a	  cost	  to	  it”	  (Participant	  6(D,P).	  Farmers	  also	  
mentioned	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains,	  where	  it	  has	  been	  drained	  from	  a	  swamp	  in	  the	  
early	   20th	  century	   (participants	   6(D,P),	   7(D,P).	   In	   the	  farmer’s	  opinion,	   green,	   productive	  
farmland	   is	   a	   better	   alternative	   to	   “swampy	   water”	   (participant	   7(D,P).	   Building	   on	   this,	  
participant	   5(D,P)	   explained	   that	   regulatory	   bodies	   have	   to	   balance	   the	   practicalities	   of	  
restricting	   the	   agriculture	   industry,	   as	   the	   benefits	   of	   the	   industry	   to	   the	   country	   are	  
significant.	  
Rotorua	  Lake	  farmers	  believe	  the	  expectations	  on	  increasing	  the	  water	  quality	  of	  the	  lake	  are	  
unfair.	  When	  asked	  whether	  he	  thought	  the	  lake	  needed	  improving,	  participant	  9(D,L)	  replied	  
that	  the	  lake	  had	  never	  been	  a	  scenic,	  clear	  lake:	  	  
I’m	  old	  enough	  to	  have	  swum	  in	  it	  in	  the	  1960’s	  and	  it’s	  always	  been	  a	  
muddy	  lake	  …	  but	  people	  don’t	  swim	  in	  muddy	  water	  anymore	  …	  
expectations	  of	  swimming	  water	  have	  changed	  (participant	  9(D,L).	  
Farmers	   stated	   that	   they	   agreed	   with	   improving	   the	   water	   quality	   of	   the	   lake,	   but	   the	  
confidence	   that	   regulating	   dairy	   farmers	   would	   achieve	   this	   was	   flawed	   and	   unfair	  
(participants	  9(D,L),	  10(D,L).	  
Similar	  to	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers,	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  voiced	  concerns	  over,	  what	  
they	  felt	  was,	  an	  assumption	  that	  dairy	  farmers	  are	  to	  blame	  for	  the	  degradation	  of	  the	  lakes	  
in	  the	  area.	  Participants	  10(D,L),	  11(D,L),	  12(D,L),	  13(D,L)	  al	  mentioned	  the	  inadequacies	  of	  
public	  sewerage	  systems	   in	   the	   area,	   where	  until	   recently,	  for	   60	  years’	  raw	   sewage	   from	  
Rotorua	   city	   had	   been	   pumped	   into	   the	   lake	   (participants	   10(D,L),	   13(D,L).	   Participants	  
10(D,L),	  12(D,L)	  explained	  that	  the	  city’s	  sewage	  was	  now	  transported	  into	  a	  designated	  area	  
in	  the	  hils,	  which	  has	  quickly	  become	  saturated	  and	  farmers	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  possibility	  that	  
this	   sewage	   could	   leach	   back	   into	   the	   lake.	   Farmers	   also	   discussed	   how	   urban	   settlements	  
immediately	   surrounding	   Lake	   Rotorua	   have	   recently	   had	  sewerage	  system	   upgrades	   from	  
septic	  tanks	  (participants	  10(D,L),	  11(D,L),	  12(D,L),	  13(D,L).	  Participant	  12(D,L)	  questioned	  the	  
fairness	  of	  the	  upgrade	  as	  they	  had	  been	  asking	  the	  council	  for	  “20	  years	  on	  and	  of	  …	  about	  
doing	  something	  about	  [farmer’s	  septic	  tanks]”,	  to	  no	  avail.	  When	  participant	  12(D,L)	  went	  to	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council	  about	  connecting	  their	  private	  sewerage	  system	  to	  the	  new	  system	  they	  were	  told	  
“the	  treatment	  plant	  only	  has	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  capacity”,	  raising	  questions	  of	  fairness	  when	  
the	   councils	   were	   also	   encouraging	   the	   growth	   of	   “new	   subdivisions	   and	   hotels,	   600	   bed	  
hotels”	   in	   the	   areas	   surrounding	   the	   lake,	   which	   would	   al	   require	   space	   at	   the	   sewage	  
treatment	  plant.	  Participant	  12(D,L)	  felt	  that	  the	  priority	  given	  to	  other	  industries	  in	  utilising	  
new	   sewerage	   infrastructure	   was	   unfair	   because	   farmers	   are	   being	   focused	   on	   to	   reduce	  
nutrient	   losses	   from	   their	   properties	   while	  other	   industries	   are	   benefitting	   from	   tax	   payer	  
developed	   infrastructure.	   Building	   on	   this,	   participant	   10(D,L)	   vented	   his	   frustrations	   that	  
folowing	   the	   recent	   upgraded	   sewerage	   system,	   the	   water	   quality	   of	   Lake	   Rotorua	   has	  
significantly	  increased,	  but	  the	  blame	  remains	  on	  dairy	  farming	  in	  the	  area.	  He	  believes	  that	  it	  
has	   been	   contributions	   from	   urban	   areas	   that	   have	  considerably	   diminished	   water	   quality.	  
Questioning	  the	  fairness	  of	  targeting	  dairy	  farmer’s	  participant	  10(D,L)	  stated:	  	  
I	  don’t	  know	  how	  farmers	  have	  done	  it	  in	  the	  last	  10	  years,	  because	  
they	  say	  what	  happens	  on	  my	  farm	  takes	  50	  years	  to	  get	  to	  the	  lake.	  
Why	  is	  the	  lake	  so	  clear	  now?	  …	  They’ve	  always	  said	  that	  the	  way	  
dairy	  farmers	  were	  in	  the	  area	  it	  was	  going	  to	  be	  an	  eighty-­‐year	  
process	  before	  it	  came	  right	  (participant	  10(D,L).	  	  
Farmers	  feel	  like	  they	  are	  not	  wanted	  in	  the	  area	  where	  urbanisation	  is	  growing	  in	  previously	  
rural	  areas	  (participants	  10(D,L),	  12(D,L),	  13(D,L),	  highlighted	  by	  the	  event	  where	  a	  councilor	  
(since	   departed)	   “stood	   up	   in	   a	   meeting	   and	   said	   "	   I’m	   going	   to	   get	   rid	   of	   you	   bastards"”	  
(participant	   13(D,L).	   Participant	   8(D,L)	   gave	   another	   example	   of	   council	   wanting	   to	   reduce	  
dairy	  farming	  in	  the	  area	  by	  promoting	  conversions	  into	  Manuka	  bee,	  nuts,	  goats,	  and	  sheep	  
farming.	  “They’re	  al	  viable	  to	  some	  degree,	  but	  they’re	  not	  as	  economic	  as	  dairying.	  They’re	  
asking	  the	  current	  generation	  of	  dairy	  farmers	  to	  take	  that	  economic	  loss”	  (participant	  8(D,L).	  	  
Unfair	  use	  of	  Overseer	  
The	  farmers	  in	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  voiced	  concern	  over	  the	  fairness	  of	  using	  Overseer	  in	  the	  
area	   for	   compliance	   purposes,	   due	   to	   the	   model’s	   uncertainty.	   Beginning	   with	   the	  
benchmarking	   years,	   farmers	   felt	   that	   bad	   farmers	   were	   rewarded,	   while	   environmentaly	  
conscious	  farmers	  were	  unfairly	  punished	  (participants	  10(D,L),	  12(D,L).	  	  
They	  measured	  what	  you	  were	  doing	  between	  2001-­‐2004	  …	  the	  end	  
result	  was	  that	  the	  very	  careful	  farmer	  had	  a	  much	  lower	  NDA	  than	  
the	  guy	  who	  is	  putting	  on	  fertiliser	  [more	  often]	  …	  [a	  neighbour]	  did	  
al	  the	  right	  things,	  he	  had	  low	  fertiliser	  to	  begin	  with	  and	  so	  now	  has	  
a	  low	  NDA,	  he	  won’t	  survive	  on	  that	  NDA	  (participant	  12(D,L).	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Looking	  ahead,	  farmers	  pointed	  out	  it	  was	  unfair	  to	  rely	  solely	  on	  Overseer	  for	  compliance,	  
where	  farmers	  would	  be	  taken	  to	  court	  and	  fined	  using	  Overseer,	  because	  the	  model	  contains	  
significant	  inaccuracies	  (participant	  11(D,L).	  “The	  council	  are	  stil	  using	  [Overseer]	  as	  a	  tool	  
for	  compliance.	  That's	  where	  it's	  so	  unfair	  because	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  it	  isn't	  accurate.	  So	  
they're	   making	   rules	   that	   we	   have	   to	   farm	   by,	   based	   on	   inaccuracies	   and	   it	   afects	   our	  
livelihood,	   it	   afects	   our	   work,	   not	   only	   the	   worst	   thing,	   it	   afects	   the	   value	   of	   our	   farm”	  
(participant	  13(D,L).	  Farmers	  felt	  that	  Overseer	  simplified	  their	  farming	  practice,	  not	  alowing	  
for	  the	  complexities	  of	  trying	  to	  measure	  a	  biological	  system	  (participant	  12(D,L).	  Farmers	  
also	  believe	  it	  is	  unfair	  that	  councils	  do	  not	  consider	  the	  financial	  strain	  of	  altering	  farm	  plans	  
as	  Overseer	  updates	  between	  versions,	  changing	  NDA	  targets	  (participants	  10(D,L),	  12(D,L).	  
There	  are	  financial	  consequences	  of	  farming	  to	  a	  changing	  model:	  “we’re	  having	  to	  make	  a	  lot	  
of	  financial	  decisions	  to	  something	  that	  may	  work	  and	  it	  may	  not	  work”	  (participant	  10(D,L).	  	  
Participant	   9(D,L)	   discussed	   the	   unfairness	   of	   Overseer	   facilitating	  council’s	  reliance	   on	  
nutrient	  figures	  for	  compliance.	  Using	  the	  term	  “anchoring”,	  participant	  9(D,L)	  described	  the	  
tendency	  of	  council	  to	  rely	  heavily	  on	  each	  farmers’	  NDA	  figure,	  where	  Overseer	  is	  assumed	  
to	  be	  precise	  enough	  to	  calculate	  a	  single	  number	  which	  represents	  each	  farm.	  	  
When	  you	  put	  somebodies	  [NDA	  figure]	  and	  say	  “OK	  that’s	  what	  you	  
have	  to	  meet”,	  when	  the	  reality	  is	  the	  range	  around	  [the	  number]	  
represents	  the	  reality	  of	  what’s	  going	  on	  within	  a	  biological	  system,	  
where	  [for	  example,]	  it	  rains	  more	  one	  year	  than	  the	  next,	  doesn’t	  
justify	  you	  looking	  at	  a	  figure	  as	  precise	  as	  that	  (participant	  9(D,L).	  
The	   farmer	   continues	   to	   describe	   the	   unfairness	   of	   potentialy	   being	   measured	   and	  
prosecuted	   using	   the	   numbers:	   “it’s	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   beast,	   it’s	   come	   down	   to	   figures”	  
(participant	  9(D,L).	  Building	  on	  this	  idea,	  participant	  9(D,L)	  explained	  the	  same	  tendency	  to	  
regulate	   with	   figures	   was	   seen	   in	   the	   sustainable	   nitrogen	   load	   calculations	  for	   the	   lake,	  
finding	  435	  tonnes	  as	  the	  target:	  “actualy	  It	  could	  be	  anywhere	  from	  400	  to	  700	  as	  being	  a	  
quite	  reasonable	  sort	  of	  figure,	  [but	  council	  says]	  “we’ve	  divided	  that	  435	  and	  that’s	  your	  part	  
of	  it,	  that’s	  al	  you’re	  alowed”	  (participant	  9(D,L).	  	  
5.3.2	  Data	  and	  science	  credibility	  
The	  accuracy	  of	  the	  numbers	  and	  processes	  which	  are	  embedded	  in	  Overseer	  are	  an	  area	  of	  
concern	  for	  both	  case	  study	  sites.	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers	  had	  queries	  about	  how	  Overseer	  
came	  up	  with	  the	  numbers	  for	  complex	  processes	  (participants	  1(D,P),	  6(D,P),	  and	  whether	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they	  were	  applicable	  to	  their	  farm	  in	  particular	  (participants	  3(D,P),	  5(D,P).	  Participant	  5(D,P)	  
also	  explained	  that	  while	  they	  thought	  Overseer	  was	  representative	  of	  their	  farm,	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  
was	  required	  to	  gain	  this	  accuracy,	  which	  farmers	  did	  not	  have.	  “I	  think	  there’l	  be	  less	  than	  
50%	  of	  farms	  who	  put	  in	  accurate	  information”	  (participant	  5(D,L).	  When	  asked	  to	  share	  their	  
opinion	   on	   what	   most	   Rangitāiki	   Plains	   farmers	   thought	   of	   the	   future	   with	   Overseer,	   one	  
farmer	  concluded	  that	  accurate	  science	  is	  the	  most	  important	  aspect	  of	  Overseer’s	  success:	  
“science	  is	  the	  answer,	  we	  have	  to	  have	  the	  science	  …	  the	  farm	  is	  the	  lab,	  I	  do	  trust	  scientists”	  
(participant	   7(D,P).	  While	   farmers	   voiced	   general	   concerns	   over	   Overseer’s	   uncertainties,	  
digging	  into	  the	  minute	  details	  of	  Overseer	  is	  not	  “high	  on	  the	  priority	  list	  …	  not	  on	  the	  radar”	  
(participant	  3(D,P),	  as	  they	  were	  not	  needing	  to	  meet	  regulations.	  
Farmers	  in	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  have	  a	  negative	  reaction	  to	  using	  Overseer	  because	  they	  do	  not	  
think	  it	  is	  accurate	  enough	  to	  be	  used	  for	  compliance.	  One	  farmer	  spoke	  of	  an	  example	  where	  
three	  diferent	  certified	  Overseer	  users	  produced	  reports	  for	  the	  same	  properties	  containing	  
vastly	  diferent	  results:	  
I	  went	  to	  three	  diferent	  consultants	  and	  a	  fertiliser	  representative	  
and	  …	  the	  lowest	  [nutrient	  calculation]	  was	  20	  kg/ha	  lower	  than	  the	  
highest	  one.	  I	  gave	  him	  the	  same	  folder	  of	  information”	  (participant	  
11(D,L).	  
Farmers	  were	  very	  concerned	  over	  the	  accuracy	  of	  both	  Overseer’s	  figures	  and	  the	  science	  
behind	   the	   sustainable	   load	   of	   Lake	   Rotorua,	   which	   is	   used	   as	   the	   backbone	   to	   calculate	  
nutrient	   regulation	   for	   land	   owners	   and	  alocate	   their	   Nutrient	   Discharge	   Alowance	   (NDA)	  
figure	  (participants	  8(D,L),	  9(D,L),	  13(D,L).	  Participant	  8D,L)	  pointed	  out:	  	  
We’ve	  always	  argued	  that	  Lake	  Rotorua	  is	  phosphate	  limited,	  not	  
nitrogen	  limited.	  The	  scientists	  have	  actualy	  now,	  in	  the	  last	  6	  
months	  come	  around	  to	  agree	  with	  us.	  It’s	  realy	  obvious	  in	  the	  fact	  
that	  [aluminium	  sulphate]	  is	  actualy	  controling	  the	  water	  quality	  of	  
the	  lake	  (participant	  8(D,L).	  
Many	   farmers	   were	   in	   support	   of	   Overseer’s	   value	   as	   a	   decision-­‐support	   tool	   (participants	  
14(C),	  8(D,L)	  as	  “Overseer	  is	  very	  good	  for	  measuring	  change”	  (participant	  9(D,L).	  However,	  
there	  are	  too	  many	  assumptions	  surrounding	  the	  data	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  accurate	  for	  compliance	  
requiring	  absolute	  figures	  (participants	  14(C),	  9(D,L).	  Farmer’s	  questioned	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  
science	  behind	  determining	  groundwater	  catchment	  boundaries	  (participants	  8(D,L),	  14(C),	  
13(D,L).	   The	   Lake	   Rotorua	   Primary	   Producers	   Colective	   (LRPPC),	   an	   organisation	   of	   local	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farmers	  aiming	  to	  advance	  the	  interests	  of	  those	  in	  the	  catchment,	  had	  a	  meeting	  with	  council	  
scientists.	  “it	  was	  "I	  guess",	  "I	  think",	  "maybe",	  "we	  assume",	  those	  were	  the	  words	  used	  by	  
the	  scientists	  the	  whole	  time.	  There	  was	  actualy	  no	  hard	  evidence”	  (participant	  13(D,L).	  The	  
LRPPC	  brought	  in	  external	  scientists	  to	  review	  the	  council	  report	  in	  which	  they	  stated:	  “we	  
don't	  understand	  how	  [the	  council	  scientists]	  have	  come	  to	  these	  conclusions"	  (participant	  
13(D,L).	   The	   farmers	   are	   concerned	   about	   the	   accuracy	   of	   the	   science	   that	   underpins	   the	  
estimating	   of	   the	   groundwater	   catchment	   zone,	   because	   it	   would	   significantly	   afect	   their	  
Overseer	  figures,	  as	  they	  believe	  part	  of	  their	  land	  is	  outside	  the	  groundwater	  boundaries	  for	  
Lake	  Rotorua	  (participants	  8(D,L),	  13(D,L).	  Farmers	  also	  feel	  that	  council	  staf	  are	  unable	  to	  
clearly	  communicate	  diferent	  aspects	  of	  Overseer	  and	  answer	  the	  farmer’s	  queries	  about	  the	  
science	  behind	  it:	  “council	  have	  as	  much	  or	  more	  dificulty	  getting	  their	  head	  around	  it	  than	  
we	  do	  as	  farmers”	  (participant	  12(D,L).	  
Overseer’s	  use	  of	  S-­‐Map	  data	  was	  also	  seen	  as	  too	  inaccurate	  for	  regulation	  purposes:	  “Soils	  
maps	  that	  we	  use	  are	  done	  at	  a	  scale	  of	  1:50000,	  S-­‐maps	  online,	  we’re	  trying	  to	  …	  break	  farms	  
up	  on	  a	  1:50000	  scale,	  when	  the	  actual	  farm	  is	  on	  a	  1:5000	  scale”	  (participant	  14(C).	  Other	  
inaccuracy	  frustrations	  included	  assumptions	  with	  the	  pasture	  clover	  content	  variable	  within	  
Overseer,	   where	   users	   can	   choose	   between	   low,	   medium,	   high,	   or	   very	   high	  (participant	  
14(C).	   Farmers	   explained	   that	   clover	   content	   in	   pasture	   was	   important	   for	   influencing	  
nitrogen	   figures	   (participants	   8(D,L),	   9(D,L),	   but	   clover	   content	   was	   dificult	   to	   measure	  
accurately,	  leaving	  users	  to	  use	  the	  medium	  default	  level.	  This	  was	  an	  issue	  because:	  “it	  can	  
make	  a	  big	  diference…	  if	  you	  go	  to	  very	  high	  clover	  content	  you	  almost	  double	  your	  nitrogen	  
leaching”	   (participant	   14(C).	   Further	   accuracy	   issues	   are	   due	   to	   Overseer	   generalising	  
important	   inputs	   like	   rainfal	   and	   soils,	   where	   one	   block	   or	   property	   can	   vary	   significantly	  
(participants	  14(C),	  13(D,L).	  Participant	  13(D,L)	  explained	  on	  their	  property:	  “it's	  2.1	  metres	  
per	  year	  down	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  this	  farm,	  and	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  farm	  it's	  2.6	  meters.	  That's	  
half	   a	   metre	   diference.	   How	   do	   they	   take	   that	   into	   consideration?	   The	   accuracy	   is	   in	  
question”.	  Overseer	  uses	  rainfal	  data	  from	  the	  G.P.S.	  coordinates	  of	  the	  dairy	  shed,	  but	  the	  
shed	  could	  be	  located	  anywhere	  on	  the	  farm	  (participant	  14(C).	  Participant	  13(D,L)	  sums	  up	  
their	  frustration	  with	  having	  to	  go	  into	  detail	  with	  some	  of	  Overseers	  inputs,	  but	  stil	  end	  up	  
receiving	  a	  high	  level	  of	  uncertainty:	  	  
You're	  calculating	  everything	  to	  seven	  decimal	  points,	  and	  then	  al	  of	  
a	  sudden	  you're	  going	  plus	  or	  minus	  10%	  contingency.	  It	  just	  doesn't	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make	  sense.	  Yeah	  it	  is	  the	  accuracy	  of	  Overseer	  we	  are	  concerned	  
about	  (participant	  13(D,L).	  
Farmers	  are	  frustrated	  that	  they	  are	  having	  to	  make	  significant	  farm	  system	  changes	  using	  
inaccurate	   outdated	   science,	   and	   want	   the	   council	   to	   invest	   in	   more	   ground	   monitoring	  
(participants	  8(D,L),	  9(D,L),	  13(D,L).	  
5.3.3	  Overseer	  version	  changes	  
Concerns	   about	   the	   accuracy	   of	   Overseer	   arise	   from	   the	   model’s	   regular	   updates,	   where	  
farmers	  lose	  trust	  in	  the	  model’s	  ability	  to	  model	  their	  farm	  (participants	  3(D,P),	  7(D,P),	  8(D,L),	  
9(D,L),	  10(D,L),	  11(D,L),	  12(D,L),	  13(D,L).	  Even	  though	  there	  are	  no	  regulatory	  consequences	  
for	   farmers	   in	   the	   Rangitāiki	   Plains,	   they	   find	   it	   concerning	   that	   the	   model	   can	   alter	   their	  
figures	   overnight	   (participants	   3(D,L),	   7(D,L).	   While	   there	   is	   frustration,	   farmers	   also	  
acknowledge	   the	   importance	   of	   updating	   and	   improving	   the	   model	   to	   folow	   science	  
(participant	  6(D,P).	  Farmers	  in	  Rotorua	  echo	  that	  Overseer	  has	  become	  more	  accurate	  than	  
in	  the	  past	  (participants	  8(D,L),	  9(D,L),	  11(D,L),	  but	  because	  they	  are	  having	  to	  make	  farm	  
system	  decisions	  based	  on	  their	  Overseer	  figures,	  the	  version	  changes	  are	  costing	  them	  time	  
and	   efort	   (participants	   14(C),	   8(D,L),	   9(D,L),	   10(D,L),	   11(D,L),	   12(D,L),	   13(D,L).	   Participant	  
9(D,L)	  gave	  an	  example:	  	  
I	  got	  a	  phone	  cal	  [from	  the	  consultant]	  to	  say	  I’m	  looking	  at	  the	  
figures	  again	  and	  it	  looks	  like	  you’re	  not	  even	  compliant	  with	  your	  
benchmark	  …	  Another	  phone	  cal	  a	  couple	  of	  weeks	  later	  saying	  it's	  
okay,	  we’ve	  got	  a	  new	  version	  out,	  get	  back	  to	  [what	  you	  were	  
doing]’	  (participant	  9(D,L).	  
Farmers	  base	  their	  system	  decisions	  for	  the	  whole	  season	  on	  keeping	  within	  their	  nutrient	  
regulation	  limits.	  Participant	  8(D,L)	  described	  a	  similar	  scenario	  when	  the	  Overseer	  version	  
changed	  overnight:	  “Instead	  of	  being	  5	  points	  away	  from	  our	  NDA	  target,	  we	  were	  15	  away.	  
We	  just	  gave	  up,	  we	  thought	  what’s	  the	  point?”.	  Participant	  10(D,L)	  voiced	  the	  same	  opinion	  
stating	  their	  response	  to	  the	  version	  changes	  is:	  “It	  doesn’t	  matter	  what	  we	  do,	  they’re	  going	  
to	  keep	  changing	  it	  anyway”.	  Participant	  14(C)	  further	  explains	  that	  in	  the	  Rotorua	  area,	  due	  
to	  changes	  in	  the	  model,	  environmental	  farm	  consultants	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  required	  to	  re-­‐visit	  
al	   farms	   in	   the	   Rotorua	   area	   to	   re-­‐do	   nutrient	   management	   plans	   prior	   to	   applying	   for	   a	  
farming	  consent	  in	  2017,	  in	  accordance	  with	  plan	  change	  10.	  	  It	  takes	  over	  12	  months	  for	  many	  
of	  the	  nutrient	  mitigation	  plans	  to	  be	  created	  by	  farmers	  and	  consultants	  (participant	  10(D,L),	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the	   potential	   of	   redoing	   everything:	   “destroys	   al	   the	   model’s	   credibility	   and	   faith	   in	   the	  
regional	  council”	  (participant	  14(C).	  	  
5.3.4	  Distance	  from	  the	  data	  	  
With	  a	  few	  exceptions,	  most	  of	  the	  dairy	  farmers	  from	  both	  study	  sites	  do	  not	  have	  any	  hands-­‐
on	  experience	  with	  using	  Overseer	  to	  model	  their	  farm.	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers	  spoke	  of	  a	  
general	   lack	   of	   understanding	   how	   Overseer	   works	   among	   farmers	   in	   the	   area.	   Participant	  
2(D,P)	   explained	   that	   due	   to	   Overseer	   not	   being	   required	   for	   anything	   beyond	   decision-­‐
support	  currently,	  he	  hadn’t	  pursued	  researching	  the	  model	  “I	  haven’t	  had	  the	  desire	  to	  find	  
out.	  It’s	  such	  a	  science”.	  Building	  on	  this	  idea	  of	  Overseer	  being	  a	  ‘science’,	  participant	  7(D,P)	  
told	  of	  donating	  two	  ful	  days	  to	  gain	  a	  brief	  understanding	  of	  the	  model.	  Participant	  6(D,P)	  
has	  a	  working	  idea	  of	  Overseer,	  but	  spoke	  of	  spending	  “a	  hel	  of	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  in	  the	  ofice”,	  
where	   trying	   to	   suggest	   the	   same	   for	   most	   farmers	   is	   like	   “dragging	   a	   squealing	   pig	   to	  
slaughter”.	   When	   asked	   what	   happens	  to	   their	   Overseer	   reports,	   most	   Rangitāiki	   farmers	  
spoke	  of	  filing	  them	  out	  of	  sight	  unless:	  “Shelved	  …	  No	  one’s	  bothered	  to	  refer	  to	  it	  since,	  to	  
be	  honest	  and	  a	  shame	  to	  say.	  Nobodies	  got	  to	  the	  point	  of	  asking	  us	  to	  justify	  what	  we’re	  
doing”	   (participant	   4(D,P).	   Farmers	   on	   the	   Rangitāiki	   Plains	   are	   also	   concerned	   about	  
Overseer’s	  lack	  of	  incorporating	  real-­‐time	  data	  from	  their	  own	  recordings.	  Farmers	  would	  like	  
to	   see	   the	   many	   diferent	   farming	   programmes	   (fertiliser	   purchases,	   irrigation	   data	   etc.)	  
syncing	  to	  one	  another,	  resulting	  in	  more	  accurate	  figures	  and	  representation	  of	  their	  farm	  
(participants	   6(D,P),	   7(D,P),	   3(D,P).	   Farmers	   also	   acknowledged	   the	   dificulty	   of	   getting	  
information	   about	   the	   workings	   of	   Overseer,	   where	   there	   was	   a	   lack	   of	   communication	  
between	  the	  council,	  industry	  and	  farmers	  about	  current	  developments	  and	  future	  changes	  
(participants	  1(D,P),	  4(D,P),	  5(D,P).	  
Speaking	   about	   the	   level	   of	   understanding	   farmers	   have	   of	   Overseer,	   one	   of	   the	   farm	  
consultants	  stated	  that	  “for	  compliance	  purposes,	  for	  the	  individual	  farmer,	  99%	  of	  farmers	  
don’t	  know	  how	  to	  use	  Overseer.	  For	  the	  actual	  farmer,	  they’d	  need	  to	  get	  somebody	  in	  to	  do	  
the	  modeling	  themselves”	  (participant	  14(C). Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  feel	  that	  they	  need	  to	  
understand	  how	  Overseer	  works	  because	  their	  farming	  future	  depends	  on	  it:	  “Overseer	  from	  
my	  perspective	  was	  never	  a	  powerful	  tool,	  it's	  only	  since	  we’ve	  gone	  into	  the	  nutrient	  aspect	  
that	  it’s	  certainly	  increased	  in	  mana.	  And	  coupled	  with	  that,	  the	  frustration	  that	  we	  have	  is	  
that	  for	  us	  to	  be	  able	  to	  focus	  on	  nutrients	  on	  farm,	  we	  need	  to	  know	  how	  Overseer	  works”	  
(participant	   8(D,L).	   Participant	   9(D,L)	   described	   his	   lack	   of	   understanding	   when	   it	   came	   to	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working	  with	  council-­‐appointed	  consultants:	  “I’m	  not	  up	  to	  speed	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  use.	  [I	  have]	  
been	  alongside	  consultants	  as	  they	  put	  the	  data	  in,	  but	  then	  it	  becomes	  a	  black	  box”.	  Farmers	  
spoke	  of	  being	  so	  detached	  from	  Overseer	  due	  to	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  model,	  changing	  
regulations,	  and	  the	  frequent	  version	  changes	  (participants	  8(D,L),	  9(D,L),	  10(D,L),	  12(D,L):	  
“the	  rules	  have	  changed	  so	  many	  times	  that	  I’ve	  just	  lost	  interest	  in	  it,	  I	  don’t	  realy	  care	  now	  
how	   it	   al	   pans	   out	   because	   things	   have	   been	   changing	   so	   much”	   (participant	   10(D,L).	  
Participant	  10(D,L)	  went	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  he	  avoids	  trying	  to	  understand	  what	  his	  number	  
represents,	  leaving	  it	  to	  his	  farm	  advisor	  to	  understand	  the	  details:	  	  
I	  am	  not	  realy	  interested	  in	  the	  number;	  my	  farm	  advisor	  says	  we	  are	  
right	  now	  to	  farm	  [at	  the	  moment]	  and	  I’m	  just	  happy	  with	  that.	  He	  
said	  everything’s	  al	  right.	  If	  he’s	  happy	  with	  it,	  then	  I’m	  happy	  with	  it	  
(participant	  10(D,L).	  
Describing	  concern	  of	  using	  Overseer	  to	  justify	  actions	  worried	  participant	  12(D,L)	  as	  they	  are	  
not	  familiar	  enough	  with	  Overseer	  to	  defend	  their	  actions:	  	  
We	  are	  going	  to	  be	  spending	  half	  our	  time	  justifying,	  or	  worried	  that	  
someone	  is	  going	  to	  ask	  us	  to	  justify	  why	  we’re	  doing	  it,	  and	  if	  we’re	  
not	  realy	  cognizant	  with	  Overseer	  and	  how	  it	  works	  …	  how	  are	  they	  
going	  to	  understand?	  (participant	  12(D,L).	  	  	  
Farmers	  are	  frustrated	  that	  regional	  council	  is	  not	  giving	  them	  enough	  time	  to	  fuly	  understand	  
the	  changes	  to	  regulation	  or	  the	  Overseer	  model	  itself	  (participants	  8(D,L),	  9(D,L),	  10(D,L).	  
Talking	  about	  the	  diferences	  in	  farmer	  regulation	  acceptance	  relating	  to	  where	  the	  regulation	  
is	  coming	  from,	  councils	  were	  seen	  to	  be	  heavy	  handed	  and	  making	  quick	  changes:	  “we’re	  
doing	  what	  we’re	  asked	  of,	  it	  just	  takes	  a	  little	  bit	  of	  time,	  I	  don’t	  know	  what	  they	  want	  from	  
us”	  (participant	  8(D,L).	  	  When	  discussing	  the	  extent	  of	  farmers	  understanding	  the	  reason	  for	  
Overseer’s	  updates,	  farmers	  vented	  their	  frustration	  over	  the	  reasons	  behind	  the	  frequent	  
changes.	   While	   Overseer	   is	   continuously	   updating	   with	   science	   coming	   from	   diferent	  
industries,	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  perceive	  there	  may	  be	  more	  focus	  on	  improving	  the	  model	  
from	   a	   regulatory	   point	   of	   view,	   rather	   than	   a	   farming	   systems	   point	   of	   view	   (participant	  
8(D,L).	  	  Participant	  8(D,L)	  and	  13(D,L)	  both	  spoke	  of	  seeking	  independent	  training	  on	  using	  
Overseer,	   stating	   “we	   need	   help	   to	   play	   around	   with	   it,	   [we]	   need	   guidelines”	   (participant	  
13(D,L)	  and	  “we	  need	  to	  make	  on-­‐farm	  decisions	  and	  tweak	  the	  system,	  so	  that	  what	  comes	  
out	   the	   bottom	   end	   is	   more	  positive”(participant	   8(D,L).	   Participant	   8(D,L)	  also	   spoke	   of	  
“flying	  blind”	  where	  requests	  to	  council	  on	  farmer	  Overseer	  training	  days	  were	  never	  folowed	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through,	   potentialy	   to	   council’s	   advantage:	   “they	   felt	   that	   if	   we	   had	   that	   little	   bit	   of	  
knowledge,	  it	  might	  create	  more	  problems”.	  Looking	  forward,	  farmers	  acknowledge	  there’s	  
going	  to	  be	  a	  need	  for	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  Overseer	  works	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  people	  trying	  
to	  manage	  their	  NDA	  (participant	  9(D,L).	  
5.4	  Overseer	  and	  farmer	  working	  relationships	  
5.4.1	  Trust	  in	  authority	  	  
In	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains,	  dairy	  farmers	  spoke	  of	  having	  a	  mostly	  positive	  relationship	  with	  the	  
regional	  council	  (participants	  2(D,P),	  3(D,P),	  4(D,P),	  6(D,P),	  and	  being	  fortunate	  to	  live	  in	  an	  
area	   that	   has	   this.	   The	   council	   were	   not	   seen	   as	   heavy	   handed	   when	   authorising	   efluent,	  
irrigation	  and	  water	  takes,	  rather	  they	  were	  “only	  doing	  their	  jobs”	  (participant	  4(D,P)	  and	  
seemed	  “quite	  reasonable”	  (participant	  3(D,P)	  during	  interactions	  on	  these	  issues.	  
In	   comparison,	   farmers	   in	   the	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   revealed	   they	   feel	   distant	   from	   the	   regional	  
council	   (participants	   8(D,L),	   9(D,L),	   10(D,L),	   11(D,L),	   12(D,L),	   13(D,L),	   citing	   a	   lack	   of	  
understanding,	  distrust,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  communication.	  There	  is	  frustration	  at	  what	  has	  been	  
described	   as	   council	   pushing	   their	   weight	   around	   and	   blowing	  actions	   out	   of	   proportion	  
(participants	   9(D,L),	   10(D,L),	   12(D,L).	   For	   example,	   participant	   12(D,L)	   described	   ringing	  
council	  to	  inform	  them	  of	  minor	  farming	  changes	  that	  might’ve	  afected	  their	  efluent	  consent	  
conditions,	  which	  resulted	  in	  unnecessary	  alarm	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  farm	  systems	  knowledge:	  
“they	  may	  be	  inteligent	  people,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  farmers”	  (participant	  12(D,L).	  Concerns	  were	  
also	  raised	  that	  while	  the	  banking	  sector	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  al	  farmers’	  future	  planning	  
(participant	   12(D,L),	   council	   does	   not	   appear	   to	   consider	   farmer	   mortgages,	   and	   their	  
influence	  on	  making	  system	  changes	  in	  response	  to	  regulation	  (participant	  10(D,L).	  There	  is	  
also	  confusion	  among	  the	  Rotorua	  farmers	  about	  what	  the	  council	  does	  with	  any	  of	  the	  data	  
colected	  from	  farmers	  (participants	  9(D,L),	  10(D,L),	  12(D,L),	  13(D,L).	  It	  would	  appear	  that	  this	  
confusion	  is	  caused,	  in	  part,	  by	  frequent	  employment	  changes	  at	  the	  council	  where	  new	  staf	  
have	   diferent	   understandings	   of	   the	   regulations,	   resulting	   in	   diferent	   interpretations	   of	  
information	  relayed	  to	  farmers:	  “it	  says	  one	  thing	  in	  the	  proposed	  rules	  about	  compliance	  to	  
the	  actions,	  and	  they	  are	  actualy	  starting	  to	  say	  another	  thing	  on	  a	  query	  basis”	  (participant	  
9(D,L).	   Farmers	   also	   feel	   like	   council	   is	   too	   inflexible	   on	   adapting	   plans	   to	   new	   scientific	  
findings	  (participants	  14(C),	  8(D,L),	  9(D,L),	  13(D,L).	  This	  is	  coupled	  with	  many	  other	  examples	  
of	   council	   being	   unwiling	   to	   shift	   its	   views	   on	   past	   scientific	   findings:	   “council	   are	   so	   pig	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headed,	  the	  science	  is	  clearly	  wrong	  because	  it’s	  not	  stacking	  up	  with	  what	  the	  lake	  is	  actualy	  
doing	  …	  but	  they	  won’t	  accept	  it”	  (participant	  11(D,L).	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  hold	  a	  more	  
negative	   future	   outlook	  than	   those	   on	   the	   Rangitāiki	   Plains,	   where	   in	   their	   opinion,	   any	  
improvements	   to	   Overseer	   and	   science	   in	   general	   are	   unlikely	   to	   change	   the	   view	   of	   the	  
council,	  which	  is	  inflexible	  on	  the	  current	  plan	  (participants	  8(D,L),	  9(D,L),	  11(D,L):	  “politicians,	  
being	  the	  way	  they	  are,	  won’t	  change,	  and	  we’l	  have	  to	  meet	  it”	  (participant	  9(D,L).	  	  
5.4.2	  Private	  agendas	  
Fertiliser	  representatives	  are	  the	  main	  source	  of	  information	  for	  nutrient	  advice,	  through	  the	  
formation	   of	   fertiliser	   recommendations	   using	   Overseer,	   for	   many	   of	   the	   Rangitāiki	   Plains	  
farmers	   (participants	   1(D,P),	   2(D,P),	   4(D,P),	   7(D,P).	   It	   was	   noted	   by	   some	   farmers	   how	  
important	  it	  was	  to	  recognise	  that	  fertiliser	  representatives	  are	  not	  as	  invested	  in	  the	  farm	  as	  
a	  farmer	  would	  be;	  they	  had	  an	  agenda	  to	  sel	  fertiliser	  (participants	  2(D,P),	  3(D,P),	  6(D,P),	  
7(D,P).	  Participant	  3(D,P)	  has	  sought	  independent	  advice	  for	  fertiliser	  recommendations	  on	  
his	   farm:	   “there	   was	   just	   some	   doubt	   that	   we	   were	   getting	   totaly	  [un]biased	  
recommendations”.	   The	   result	   after	   a	   few	   years	   of	   obtaining	   independent	   advice	   was	   a	  
reduction	   in	   fertiliser	   use,	   but	   higher	   cost	   in	   management	   fees.	   It	   was	   important	   for	   some	  
farmers	   to	   get	   a	   second	   opinion	   of	   the	   farm’s	   fertiliser	   recommendation	   through	   a	   farm	  
advisor,	  who	  were	  seen	  to	  hold	  a	  balanced	  opinion	  on	  soil	  issues,	  grass	  growth	  and	  animal	  
health	   (participant	   2(D,P).	   Two	   farmers,	   participants	   1(D,P)	   and	   7(D,P),	   stated	   that	   it	   was	  
dificult	   to	   retrieve	   information	   about	   environmental	   and	   nutrient	   management	  
developments	  from	  their	  fertiliser	  rep.	  	  
Many	   farmers	  spoke	   of	  folowing	   the	   industry	   message	   and	   attempt	   to	  alter	   their	   farming	  
systems	   in	   response	   to	   changing	   messages	   from	   the	   industry.	   Farmers	   in	   both	   catchments	  
pointed	   out	   the	   swinging	   behaviour	   of	   the	   dairy	   industry’s	  message	   in	   the	   past	   decade	   in	  
response	  to	  environmental	  issues	  (participants	  7(D,P),	  8(D,L),	  9(D,L),	  where:	  	  
A	  decade	  ago	  it	  was	  al	  about	  …	  increase[ing]	  production:	  more	  
nitrogen,	  more	  pasture,	  more	  cows.	  The	  message	  changed	  very	  
quickly,	  al	  of	  a	  sudden	  there	  was	  a	  panic	  about	  the	  amount	  of	  
nitrogen	  being	  used	  (participant	  8(D,L).	  	  
Participant	  2(D,P)	  noted	  that	  there	  is	  often	  a	  backlash	  from	  farmers	  towards	  the	  Fonterra	  on	  
these	  matters	  as:	  “Fonterra	  is	  there	  to	  manufacture	  and	  market	  our	  milk	  and	  our	  milk	  products	  
and	  not	  there	  to	  tel	  us	  what	  to	  do”.	  However,	  he	  then	  explained	  it	  was	  beneficial	  for	  Fonterra	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to	   advise	   and	   develop	   sustainable	   farming	   practices,	   alongside	   information	   from	   fertiliser	  
representatives	  as:	  “if	  everyone’s	  working	  for	  the	  same	  goal,	  it’s	  got	  to	  be	  good”.	  It	  was	  noted	  
by	   other	   farmers	   in	   the	   Rangitāiki	   Plains	   area	   how	   Fonterra	   was	  continualy	  improving	  the	  
dairy	  farming	  image	  (participants	  3(D,P),	  5(D,P).	  
Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  value	  their	  fertiliser	  representatives	  for	  ofering	  advice	  from	  a	  farming	  
systems	   point	   of	   view,	   and	   have	   often	   worked	   with	   the	   same	   representatives	  for	   years	  
(participants	  8(D,L),	  10(D,L).	  Fertiliser	  representatives	  spend	  more	  time	  with	  the	  farmers	  and	  
due	  to	  their	  history	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  individual	  farm,	  are	  able	  to	  input	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  data	  
independently:	  “what	  we	  do	  with	  the	  fert[iliser]	  rep	  is	  simple”	  (participant	  8(D,L).	  Participant	  
13(D,L)	  described	  how	  fertiliser	  representatives	  in	  the	  area	  were	  inundated	  with	  work	  at	  the	  
moment	  and	  they	  were	  displeased	  having	  to	  work	  with	  a	  diferent	  consultant.	  That	  doesn’t	  
mean	  to	  say	  al	  farmers	  take	  what	  the	  fertiliser	  rep	  says	  at	  face	  value,	  participant	  10(D,L)	  noted	  
that	  while	  they	  are	  more	  involved	  with	  their	  fertiliser	  rep,	  this	  also	  meant	  they	  were	  able	  to	  
analyse	  their	  fertiliser	  recommendations	  more	  carefuly.	  	  
There	   are	   seven	   regional	   council-­‐approved	   farming	   consultants	   in	   the	   Bay	   of	   Plenty	   which	  
farmers	   can	   choose	   from	   to	   plan	   farm	   nutrient	   management	   reports	   (participant	   8(D,L),	  
11(D,L).	  These	  farming	  consultancies	  are	  able	  to	  receive	  grants	  from	  the	  regional	  council	  if	  
they	   promise	   to	   ofer	   relevant	   research	   using	   local	  farmer’s	  data	   and	   plans.	   There	   is	   a	  
perception	  from	  farmers	  of	  being	  trapped	  with	  certain	  consultancies,	  where	  al	  a	  farmer’s	  data	  
since	  2005	  is	  with	  a	  singular	  consultant.	  The	  farmer	  would	  be	  required	  to	  start	  from	  scratch	  
with	   another	   consultant	   if	   they	   wanted	   a	   change.	   Participant	   8(D,L)	   described	   this	   as:	   “a	  
blackmail	  situation”	  where	  they	  feel	  forced	  to	  provide	  information	  to	  their	  current	  consultant	  
on	  request,	  as	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  time	  to	  change	  consultancies.	  Farmers	  acknowledged	  how	  
important	  it	  was	  to	  choose	  who	  you	  used	  to	  work	  your	  farm	  figures	  with,	  where	  there’s	  a	  
feeling	   that	   consultants	   are	   influenced	   by	  monetary	   grants	  rather	   than	   the	   farmers’	   best	  
interests	   (participants	   8(D,L),	   9(D,L),	   11(D,L),	   12(D,L).	   “To	   be	   quite	   blunt,	   they	   don’t	   care	  
whether	  the	  farmers	  go	  bust	  or	  not”	  (participant	  9(D,L).	  	  
5.4.3	  Information-­‐sharing	  between	  neighbours	  
On	   the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains,	   farmers	   reported	   that	   knowledge-­‐sharing	   between	   farming	  
neighbours	   has	   been	   beneficial	   for	   improving	   their	   farming	   practices	   (participants	   6(D,P),	  
7(D,P),	  2(D,P).	  Participant	  2(D,P)	  explained	  how	  shared	  farmer	  knowledge	  was,	  in	  his	  mind,	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the	  cause	  of	  the	  dairy	  industry’s	  success:	  “we	  don’t	  compete	  with	  our	  neighbours	  in	  farming	  
…	   we	   freely	   tel	   people	   how	   much	   our	   accountants	   cost	   us,	   or	   how	   our	   tractors	   run,	   that	  
information	   is	   just	   so	   available,	   which	   is	   wonderful	   for	   our	   industry”.	   Alongside	   sharing	  
knowledge	  and	  advice	  among	  neighbours	  is	  the	  showcasing	  of	  management	  techniques	  and	  
new	  technologies.	  Participants	  (6(D,P)	  and	  7(D,P)	  reported	  that	  they,	  among	  many	  others	  in	  
the	   area,	   had	   hosted	   numerous	   field	   days	   on	   their	   properties	   to	  share	  information	   about	  
successful	  farming	  technologies.	  Building	  on	  this,	  participant	  7(D,P)	  described	  visiting	  farms	  
with	   alternative	   management	   strategies	   and	   witnessing	   positive	   changes	   to	   neighbouring	  
farms	  as	  a	  result	  of	  shared	  knowledge.	  Physicaly	  witnessing	  changes	  to	  surrounding	  farms	  or	  
hearing	  information	  about	  farming	  properties	  similar	  to	  theirs	  was	  influential	  for	  making	  farm	  
system	   changes	   (participants	   7(D,P),	   6(D,P),	   2(D,P).	   Another	   aspect	   of	   this	   influence	   was	  
revealed	  by	  participant	  6(D,P),	  who	  described	  how	  he	  recently	  made	  a	  point	  to	  seek	  advice	  
from	   other	   farmers,	   alongside	   agricultural	   scientists.	   The	   farmer	   wanted	  other	  farmers	  to	  
‘peer	  review’	  his	  investigations	  into	  a	  system	  change	  for	  his	  farm,	  resulting	  in	  the	  development	  
of	   a	  significant	   piece	   of	   farming	   infrastructure.	   In	   terms	   of	   sharing	   Overseer	   information	  
between	  neighbours,	  none	  of	  the	  farmers	  reported	  having	  shared	  their	  nutrient	  figures	  with	  
neighbours	   in	   the	   past,	   with	   participant	   3(D,P)	   explaining	   that	   doing	   so	   is	   not	  high	   on	  the	  
priority	   list	   compared	   to	   other	   farming	   matters.	   Most	   of	   the	  interviewed	   Rangitāiki	   Plans	  
farmers	   (participants	   (5(D,P),	   4(D,P),	   2(D,P),	   1(D,P)	   voiced	   interest	   in	   seeing	   how	   their	  
nutrient	  figures	  compared	  with	  their	  neighbours	  in	  the	  future.	  In	  particular,	  participant	  5(D,P)	  
commented	  that	  he	  would	  be	  interested	  in	  discussing	  Overseer	  among	  neighbours	  because	  
he	  was	  currently	  “sceptic	  that	  you	  could	  create	  a	  model	  that’s	  going	  to	  be	  of	  great	  benefit”.	  	  	  
Similar	  to	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains,	  information-­‐sharing	  between	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  neighbours	  for	  
some	   people	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   valuable	   tool	   for	   improving	   farming	   systems	   and	   technology	  
(participants	   8(D,L),	   9(D,L).	   Discussing	   the	   extent	   of	   information	   sharing	   between	   Rotorua	  
Lakes	  farmers,	  participant	  8(D,L)	  described	  how	  for	  many	  farmers	  in	  the	  catchment,	  the	  main	  
source	  of	  shared	  communication	  is	  the	  Lake	  Rotorua	  Primary	  Producers	  Colective	  (LRPPC).	  
The	   LRPPC	   aids	   information	   sharing	   and	   organises	   funding	   for	   projects	   that	   wil	   benefit	  
farmers	  (with	  the	  sustainable	  farming	  fund	  project	  recently	  sponsoring	  a	  phosphate	  mitigation	  
project	  on	  a	  local	  farmer’s	  property).	  Participant	  8(D,L)	  described	  how	  in	  the	  past,	  the	  LRPPC	  
analysed	  some	  of	  the	  member’s	  Overseer	  figures	  and	  discussed	  the	  mitigation	  options	  as	  a	  
group.	  The	  only	  example	  of	  farmers	  sharing	  their	  Overseer	  figures	  external	  to	  the	  LRPPC	  was	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the	   mention	   of	   a	   field	   day	   by	   participant	   9(D,L),	   where	   farmers	   gathered	   at	   a	   property	   to	  
discuss	   nutrient	   management	   strategies	   and	   individual	   figures	   were	  compared	   by	   some	  
participants.	  	  
While	  some	  farmers	  have	  been	  attending	  meetings	  about	  Overseer	  held	  by	  the	  LRPPC	  for	  over	  
a	   decade	   (participants	   8(D,L),	   10(D,L),	   13(D,L),	   the	   sharing	   of	   Overseer	   figures	   between	  
individual	   farmers	   outside	   of	   the	   LRPPC	   appears	   to	   have	  been	  limited	   so	   far	   (participants	  
9(D,L),	   10(D,L).	   Some	   farmers	   in	   the	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   were	   more	   hesitant	   to	   discuss	   their	  
Overseer	   information	   with	   neighbours	   (participants	   11(D,L),	   12(D,L).	   The	   reasons	   for	   this	  
varied,	  with	  participant	  11(D,L)	  suggesting	  that	  many	  farmers	  in	  the	  area	  held	  negative	  views	  
when	  discussing	  Overseer	  stating:	  “the	  problem	  with	  farmers	  is	  most	  people	  pick	  things	  apart,	  
[they	  have	  a]	  ‘that	  won’t	  work	  for	  me’	  negative	  vibe”.	  Participant	  11(D,L)	  explained	  that	  the	  
same	  negative	   opinions	   were	  evident	  during	   discussions	   and	   field	   days	   on	   mitigation	  
technologies	   and	   management	   systems	   from	   neighbouring	   farms.	  It	   would	   appear	   some	  
farmers	  in	  the	  Rotorua	  area	  prefer	  to	  avoid	  Overseer	  discussions	  with	  neighbours	  due	  to	  this	  
negativity,	  with	  one	  farmer	  explaining	  that	  it	  was	  easier	  to	  keep	  it	  to	  yourself	  and	  just	  prioritise	  
gaining	  individual	  compliance	  for	  your	  farm	  rather	  than	  investigate	  your	  neighbour’s	  issues.	  
Participant	   12(D,L)	   revealed	   that	   they	   were	   currently	   compliant	  but	   were	   withholding	   this	  
information	  from	  their	  neighbours.	  They	  explained	  that	  under	  the	  compliant	  farming	  system	  
they	  were	  currently	  running,	  but	  their	  farm	  was	  unprofitable.	  They	  were	  concerned	  how	  their	  
farm	   could	   move	   forward	   financialy.	   For	   this	   reason,	   they	   were	   reluctant	   to	   discuss	   their	  
concerns	  with	  neighbouring	  farmers,	  as	  these	  farmers	  were	  just	  concerned	  about	  getting	  their	  
farm	   compliant.	  Even	   though	   their	   farm	   was	   potentialy	   unviable,	   sharing	   their	   compliant	  
figures	   ran	   the	   risk	   of	   “sound[ing]	   cocky”	  where	   there	   would	   be	   no	   sympathy	   from	  
neighbouring	   farmers.	   Participant	   12(D,L)	   then	   described	   their	   situation	   as	   similar	   to	   an	  
experiment	  where	  their	  farming	  direction	  could	  be	  used	  as	  a	  warning	  to	  their	  neighbours:	  “if	  
it’s	  not	  going	  to	  work	  for	  us,	  it’s	  not	  going	  to	  work	  for	  them”.	  In	  contrast	  to	  this,	  participant	  
9(D,L)	  highlighted	  the	  need	  to	  share	  Overseer	  figures	  and	  relating	  farming	  systems	  to	  result	  in	  
“driling	  down	  and	  finding	  out	  what	  particularly	  has	  made	  that	  diference	  [between	  complaint	  
and	  non-­‐compliant	  farmers]”.	  He	  explained	  that	  it	  helps	  everybody	  to	  have	  a	  dialogue	  where	  
farmers	   pick	   out	   successful	   elements	   of	   diferent	   farming	   systems	   and	   move	   forward	   with	  
nutrient	  losses	  and	  positive	  economic	  outcomes.	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5.4.4	  The	  rural-­‐urban	  divide	  
The	  relationship	  between	  urban	  and	  rural	  dwelers	  was	  found	  to	  be	  an	  area	  of	  contention	  for	  
farmers	  in	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  and	  Rotorua	  Lakes.	  Farmers	  commented	  that	  those	  living	  in	  
urban	  areas	  do	  not	  appreciate	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  dairy	  industry	  to	  New	  Zealand’s	  economy	  
(participants	   14(C),	   6(D,P),	   7(D,P).	   In	   big	   cities	   like	   Auckland	   they	   perceive	   that	   there	   is	   a	  
detachment	  to	  rural	  areas	  and	  any	  understandings	  of	  rural	  issues;	  people	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  
have	  contact	  with	  those	  living	  ruraly	  and	  have	  opportunities	  to	  visit	  dairy	  farms	  (participants	  
4(D,P),	  6(D,P).	  This	  was	  summed	  this	  up	  as	  folows:	  	  
Urban	  people	  don’t	  give	  a	  toss	  about	  farmers,	  especialy	  Auckland	  
City.	  There’s	  a	  major	  lack	  of	  understanding	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  New	  
Zealand	  agriculture	  to	  the	  New	  Zealand	  economy.	  If	  we	  make	  al	  
these	  changes	  to	  farming	  and	  they	  no	  longer	  become	  profitable,	  what	  
do	  we	  do	  with	  al	  this	  land?	  (participant	  14(C)	  
Farmers	  felt	  like	  those	  who	  lived	  in	  urban	  environments	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  respond	  positively	  to	  
farming	  practices	  they	  do	  not	  understand	  (participants	  12(D,L),	  9(D,L).	  Farmers	  felt	  a	  lot	  of	  
the	  bad	  publicity	  comes	  from	  the	  media	  which	  groups	  al	  farmers	  together	  (participants	  14(C),	  
4(D,P),	  5(D,P),	  3(D,P),	  10(D,L),	  13(D,L)	  and	  alow	  out-­‐spoken	  environmentalists	  like	  Mike	  Joy	  
to	  present	  a	  persuasive	  view	  on	  the	  negative	  sides	  of	  the	  industry	  (participant	  6(D,P).	  It	  was	  
perceived	   that	   because	   urban	   populations	   are	   greater,	   their	   opinions	   are	   louder	   and	   hold	  
more	  influence	  over	  national	  policy	  decisions	  which	  in	  turn	  can	  negatively	  influence	  farming	  
futures	   (participants	   6(D,P),	   11(D,L),	   12(D,L).	  Farmers	   also	   discussed	   the	   perception	   of	  
successful	  and	  “rich	  dairy	  farmers”	  often	  portrayed	  in	  the	  media	  (participants	  14(C),	  3(D,P),	  
6(D,P),	  11(D,L),	  resulting	  in	  a	  lack	  of	  empathy	  from	  those	  living	  in	  urban	  areas.	  In	  order	  to	  
change	   public	   perceptions	   surrounding	   dairy	   farming,	   participants	   from	   both	   groups	  
suggested	  that	  better	  stories	  need	  to	  be	  told	  about	  the	  positive	  things	  farmers	  are	  doing	  for	  
the	  environment	  (participants	  3(D,L),	  5(D,P),	  6(D,P),	  9(D,L).	  In	  saying	  this,	  participant	  3(D,P)	  
thought	  that	  the	  rural-­‐urban	  divide	  was	  relatively	  smal	  in	  the	  Rangitāiki	  catchment,	  which	  
could	  be	  attributed	  to	  many	  of	  the	  farms	  being	  several	  generations	  old	  and	  always	  being	  an	  
important	  part	  of	  the	  community	  and	  local	  economy.	  	  
I	  think	  Whakatāne,	  Kawerau	  and	  Opotiki	  are	  wel	  aware	  their	  
fortunes	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  dairy	  farmers,	  they’re	  not	  going	  to	  bite	  the	  
hand	  that	  feeds	  them	  (participant	  3(D,P).	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A	   farmer	   from	   the	   Rotorua	   catchment	   (participant	   9(D,L)	   commented	   further	   on	   this,	  
describing	  the	  uncommon	  situation	  of	  the	  areas	  surrounding	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  remaining	  
relatively	  undeveloped,	  but	  felt	  it	  is	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  time	  until	  those	  from	  urban	  areas	  begin	  
making	  noise.	  
5.5	  Looking	  ahead:	  future	  fears	  
5.5.1	  Rangitāiki	  future	  
Most	  farmers	  on	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  believed	  Overseer	  regulations	  were	  in	  the	  near	  future	  
(participants	  1(D,P),	  3(D,P),	  4(D,P),	  5(D,P):	  “It’l	  get	  more	  regulated	  I’d	  imagine,	  we	  just	  want	  
to	  keep	  [our]	  licence	  to	  farm”	  (participant	  5(D,P).	  	  Participant	  4(D,P)	  described	  how	  farmers	  
in	  the	  area	  were	  “very	  concerned,	  you’d	  be	  nuts	  if	  you	  owned	  land	  and	  were	  not”	  but	  then	  
went	  on	  to	  explain	  how	  farmers	  often	  exaggerate	  the	  severity	  of	  policy	  changes	  due	  to	  the	  
speed	   at	   which	   they	   are	   introduced.	   He	   believed	   regulations	   wil	   have	   a	   limited	   efect	   on	  
farmers	  who	  are	  already	  environmentaly	  conscious:	  	  
Farmers	  protest	  al	  the	  time	  that	  they	  are	  guardians	  of	  the	  land	  and	  
supposedly	  water	  quality.	  I	  don’t	  think	  there’s	  too	  many	  guys	  actively	  
going	  out	  of	  their	  way	  to	  be	  of-­‐hand	  about	  this	  sort	  of	  thing,	  it	  just	  
depends	  on	  how	  quickly	  and	  how	  severe	  limitations	  are	  imposed	  
(participant	  4(D,P).	  	  
Participant	   5(D,P)	   spoke	   similarly	   to	   this,	   where	   it	   just	   took	   time	   for	   farmers	   to	   accept	   the	  
regulation	  “it	  did	  seem	  outrageous	  in	  other	  places	  around	  New	  Zealand,	  but	  eventualy	  the	  
farmers	   have	   started	   coming	   around”.	  Participant	   6(D,P)	   held	   the	   most	   optimistic	   view	   of	  
using	  Overseer,	  explaining	  that	  “if	  you	  can	  start	  using	  it	  to	  demonstrate	  what	  you’re	  doing,	  I	  
think	  that	  [the	  council	  wil]	  work	  with	  you,	  everyone	  wil	  work	  with	  you”.	  Participant	  6(D,P),	  
who	   is	   privy	   to	   what’s	   happening	   in	   areas	   already	   regulated	   in	   New	   Zealand	   describes	   the	  
Rangitāiki	  Plains	  as	  being	  “asleep	  …	  we	  think	  people	  are	  less	  aware	  environmentaly,	  but	  we’ve	  
got	   this	   big	   water	   issue	   now,	   working	   its	   way	   through	   the	   district”.	   “There’l	   be	   a	   day	   of	  
reckoning.	  Once	  they’ve	  sorted	  that	  Lake	  Rotorua	  out,	  look	  out.	  There’l	  be	  a	  league	  of	  people	  
coming	  this	  way”	  (participant	  4(D,P).	  	  
5.5.2	  Overseer:	  the	  wrong	  path?	  
There	  are	  two	  significant	  concerns	  for	  the	  future,	  the	  first	  being	  that	  after	  making	  irreversible	  
farm	  systems	  changes,	  it	  wil	  become	  apparent	  to	  regional	  council	  that	  Overseer	  is	  incorrect	  
and	  wil	  be	  thrown	  out.	  The	  second	  concern	  is	  that	  it	  wil	  be	  found	  that	  Overseer	  is	  inadequate	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and	  wil	  be	  replaced	  by	  an	  entirely	  new	  system	  for	  managing	  nutrients	  (participants	  14(C),	  
7(D,P),	  13(D,L).	  One	  of	  the	  farmer	  consultants,	  participant	  14(C),	  summed	  this	  concern	  with	  
the	  statement:	  	  
Overseer	  modeling	  may	  show	  that	  they’re	  compliant	  now,	  but	  down	  
the	  track	  they’re	  not.	  And	  they’ve	  possibly	  spent	  a	  lot	  of	  money	  on	  
something	  which	  wil	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  meet	  compliance.	  Or	  
conversely,	  that	  they	  find	  they	  never	  needed	  to	  spend	  that	  money	  [in	  
the	  first	  place]	  (participant	  14(C).	  	  
Alongside	   this	   is	   the	   potential	   that:	   “al	   these	   things	   are	   based	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	  
Overseer	  is	  correct.	  If	  it’s	  not,	  if	  there’s	  a	  flaw	  in	  the	  model,	  we	  can	  make	  al	  these	  changes	  
unnecessarily”	  (participant	  14(C).	  Both	  of	  these	  concerns	  worry	  farmers	  because	  they	  both	  
could	  result	  in	  unnecessary,	  expensive	  farm	  system	  changes.	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Chapter	  6	  
Discussion	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  study	  was	  to	  examine	  how	  perceptions	  of	  Overseer	  have	  changed	  with	  its	  shift	  
from	  a	  decision-­‐support	  tool	  to	  a	  regional	  council	  compliance	  tool	  and	  the	  implications	  for	  
farm	   nutrient	   management.	   The	   study’s	   objective	   has	   been	   to	   examine	   the	   role	  
standardisation	  through	  numbers	  plays	  in	  forming	  perceptions	  regarding	  Overseer.	  Overseer	  
was	   designed	   to	   be	   used	   as	   a	   qualitative	   decision-­‐support	   tool,	   analysing	   the	   benefits	   of	  
diferent	  fertiliser	  use,	  stock	  rates	  and	  farm	  management	  practices.	  With	  the	  shift	  to	  its	  use	  in	  
compliance	   by	   regional	   councils,	   Overseer	   has	   quickly	   switched	   to	   become	   a	   quantitative	  
regulatory	   tool,	   producing	   numbers	   which	   advise	   council	   staf	   whether	   farms	   have	   met	  
compliance	  according	  to	  set	  limits.	  With	  this	  switch	  has	  come	  higher	  stakes	  for	  dairy	  farmers.	  
This	  study	  found	  that	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  feel	  that	  they	  need	  to	  understand	  how	  Overseer	  
works	  because	  their	  farming	  future	  depends	  on	  it:	  “Overseer	  from	  my	  perspective	  was	  never	  
a	  powerful	  tool,	  it's	  only	  since	  we’ve	  gone	  into	  the	  nutrient	  aspect	  that	  it’s	  certainly	  increased	  
in	  mana.	  And	  coupled	  with	  that,	  the	  frustration	  that	  we	  have	  is	  that	  for	  us	  to	  be	  able	  to	  focus	  
on	  nutrients	  on	  farm,	  we	  need	  to	  know	  how	  Overseer	  works”	  (participant	  8(D,L).	  It	  has	  been	  
shown	   that	   when	   Overseer	   shifts	   from	   decision-­‐support	   to	   being	   used	   for	   compliance,	   the	  
numbers	   it	   produces	   change	   meaning,	   becoming	   a	   representation	   of	   the	   farmer’s	  
performance.	  Although	  the	  numbers	  might	  be	  the	  same	  in	  both	  contexts,	  Overseer’s	  shift	  to	  
be	   used	   as	   a	   compliance	   tool	   has	   gone	   from	   standardising	   the	   farm,	   to	  standardising	   the	  
farmer.	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  fieldwork	  in	  chapter	  4	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  
described	  in	  chapter	  2.	  To	  begin,	  the	  role	  of	  numbers,	  power	  and	  authority,	  perceived	  fairness,	  
and	   the	   relationship	   to	   data	   production	   are	   explored	   to	   analyse	   the	   issues	   farmers	   face	   in	  
accepting	  Overseer.	  This	  is	  folowed	  by	  revisiting	  the	  work	  of	  Wynne	  (2013,	  p.	  302)	  and	  his	  
“lay	  criteria	  for	  judgement	  of	  science”	  and	  relating	  the	  research	  case	  studies	  to	  his	  ideas	  about	  
public	   science	   acceptability.	   These	   criteria,	   along	   with	   other	   concepts,	   are	   used	   to	   bring	  
together	  the	  theory	  and	  case	  study,	  highlighting	  the	  significance	  of	  credibility	  by	  analysing	  the	  
social	   identity	   of	   farmers	   and	   their	   relationships	   to	   authority,	   and	   how	   this	   afects	   their	  
perceptions	   towards	   the	   regulators	   of	   Overseer.	  Addressing	   the	   aim	   of	   this	   research,	   the	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perception	   farmers	   have	   of	   Overseer	   is	   a	   key	   influence	   in	   their	   acceptance	   of	   nutrient	  
regulation	  and	  adoption	  of	  sustainable	  nutrient	  management	  practices.	  	  
6.1	  Acceptance	  of	  Overseer	  
6.1.1	  Trust	  in	  numbers:	  the	  incentive	  to	  standardise	  
Numbers	   by	   themselves	   are	   assumed	   to	   be	   neutral	   and	   objective,	   and	   able	   to	   accurately	  
describe	  the	  environment	  without	  serving	  any	  interests,	  promoting	  any	  agendas	  or	  persuading	  
individuals	  (Stone,	   2002).	   The	   use	   of	   Overseer	   to	   represent	   a	   farm	   system	   has	   the	   added	  
benefit	  of	  being	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  representation	  of	  nutrient	  outputs	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  number,	  
thus	   alowing	   the	   outputs	   of	   the	   Overseer	   model	   to	   be	   used	   for	  policy.	  Timmermans	   and	  
Epstein	  (2010)	  describe	  standardisation	  technologies	  as	  aiming	  to	  portray	  legibility	  through	  
governance,	  which	  is	  what	  Overseer	  seeks	  to	  do	  when	  it	  is	  used	  for	  compliance.	  Standards	  do	  
not	  exert	  any	  power	  unless	  they	  are	  used	  and	  enforced	  across	  social	  domains	  (Timmermans	  
&	   Epstein,	   2010).	  Achieving	   this	   power	   for	   regulation	   purposes	   over	   social	   domains	   and	  
distance	   requires	   methods	   that	   are	   easy	   to	   apply,	   thus	   the	   use	   of	   Overseer	   for	   nutrient	  
management.	  
Busch	  (2011)	  explains	  that	  standards	  are	  important	  because	  they	  facilitate	  order	  and	  stability	  
in	  a	  complex	  world.	  The	  complicated	  interactions	  and	  combination	  of	  multiple	  values	  ascribed	  
to	  the	  environment	  can	  be	  ordered	  and	  resolved	  by	  standards,	  bringing	  clarity	  and	  control.	  
Overseer	  embeds	  modules	  (which	  standardise	  climate,	  soils,	  farm	  practices	  etc.)	  resulting	  in	  
an	   ordering	   of	   complex	   farming	   processes	   and	   the	   creation	   of	   more	   parameters	   for	  
quantification.	  The	  use	  of	  Overseer	  by	  council	  in	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  area	  represents	  a	  filter	  
type	   of	   standard.	   Filter	   standards	   are	   designed	   to	   separate	   the	   acceptable	   from	   the	  
unacceptable,	   where	   farmers	   in	   this	   area	   are	   either	   compliant	   or	   not	   compliant	   with	   pre-­‐
determined	  nutrient	  alowance	  discharge	  numbers.	  The	  regional	  council	  is	  expecting	  Overseer	  
to	  produce	  numbers	  for	  nutrient	  management	  on	  a	  wide	  scale,	  providing	  a	  quantitative	  ‘limit	  
met’	  or	  ‘limit	  not	  met’	  answer	  for	  nutrient	  output	  compliance.	  This	  research	  found	  that	  those	  
being	   regulated	   by	  Overseer,	   i.e.	   dairy	   farmers,	   would	   prefer	  qualitative	   descriptions	   or	  
singular	   standards	  in	   order	   to	   alter	   management	   practices	   as	   necessary	   to	   meet	   overal	  
compliance.	   Singular	   standards	   describe	   the	   processes	   relating	   to	   why	   they	   fail	   to	   meet	  
compliance	  and	  what	  strategies	  can	  be	  used	  to	  fix	  them.	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6.1.2	  Power	  relations	  and	  authority	  
Lampland	  and	  Star	  (2009)	  describe	  how	  standards	  can	  exert	  uneven	  levels	  of	  power	  across	  
diferent	   social	   landscapes.	   Individuals	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   folow	   the	   requirements	   of	   a	  
standard	   if	   it	   is	   deemed	   important	   and	   has	   come	   from	   a	   place	   of	   authority.	   For	   example,	  
people	  are	  likely	  to	  folow	  options	  beneficial	  to	  their	  own	  interests,	  but	  if	  there	  are	  penalties	  
for	  going	  against	  a	  standard,	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  folow	  the	  rules	  and	  put	  their	  interests	  
aside.	  The	  incentive	  of	  avoiding	  penalty	  and	  folowing	  the	  standard	  can	  result	  in	  a	  reduction	  
in	   opportunities	   to	   be	   creative.	  Busch	   (2011)	  explains	   this	   characteristic	   of	   standards	   as	  
containing	  the	  ability	  to	  empower	  and	  disempower	  people.	  When	  conceptualizing	  Overseer	  
as	  a	  colective	  of	  standards	  which	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  control	  what	  farmers	  do,	  farmers	  in	  
both	  areas	  were	  concerned	  that	  Overseer	  was	  limiting	  innovation	  in	  their	  individual	  properties	  
and	  in	  the	  industry.	  Rotorua	  farmers	  spoke	  of	  being	  worried	  about	  ever	  reaching	  their	  NDA	  
targets,	  investing	  in	  new	  technology	  or	  making	  significant	  farm	  system	  changes	  could	  be	  seen	  
as	  too	  risky,	  because	  meeting	  NDA	  targets	  at	  any	  means	  necessary	  is	  a	  priority.	  This	  can	  also	  
be	  described	  as	  farming	  to	  Overseer.	  One	  of	  the	  greatest	  frustrations	  felt	  by	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  
farmers	  is	  the	  prospect	  of	  being	  locked	  in	  to	  the	  ostensibly	  arbitrary	  movements	  of	  Overseer	  
through	   their	   farm	   consents,	   resulting	   in	   farmers	   farming	   to	   Overseer.	   Participant	   14(C)	  
explained	  that,	  on	  average,	  farmers	  have	  been	  paid	  the	  same	  price	  for	  their	  milk	  for	  decades,	  
but	  the	  cost	  of	  production	  is	  going	  up,	  so	  the	  easiest	  thing	  to	  do	  is	  increase	  milk	  production.	  
However,	   when	   regulated	   by	   Overseer,	   a	   “nitrogen	   cap	   is	   a	   production	   cap.	   Once	   they’ve	  
achieved	  maximum	  milk	  production	  eficiency,	  they’ve	  got	  nowhere	  to	  go.	  Even	  if	  they	  put	  al	  
the	  infrastructure	  in	  to	  maximise	  nitrogen	  loss	  reduction,	  at	  a	  certain	  point	  they’l	  get	  to	  where	  
they	  can	  produce	  no	  more	  milk,	  without	  exceeding	  their	  cap	  …	  They’re	  trapped”	  (participant	  
14(C).	  The	  Rotorua	  farmers	  are	  aware	  of	  this	  possibility,	  because	  they	  are	  the	  ones	  living	  this	  
reality.	  They	  feel	  like	  decision-­‐makers	  are	  not	  taking	  this	  potentialy	  constrained	  future	  into	  
consideration	  and	  not	  realising	  that	  by	  farming	  to	  Overseer,	  farmers	  are	  feeling	  they	  wil	  soon	  
have	  nowhere	  to	  move.	  Because	  the	  penalties	  for	  not	  meeting	  NDA	  targets	  are	  potentialy	  
severe,	  farmers	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  numbers,	  regardless	  of	  their	  opinion;	  the	  
level	   of	   power	   Overseer	   and	   its	   associated	   NDA	   numbers	   now	   have	   in	   a	   regulatory	  
environment	  are	  deemed	  as	  controling	  and	  inflexible.	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6.1.3	  Keeping	  Overseer	  fair	  	  
Scott	   (date)	   argues	   that	   people	   do	   not	   react	   wel	   to	   being	   standardised	   in	   particular	   by	  
government-­‐led	  processes	  that	  assign	  numbers	  to	  people	  for	  purposes	  of	  imposing	  simplicity	  
which	  is	  perceived	  by	  those	  subject	  to	  standardisation	  as	  taking	  away	  their	  individualism.	  This	  
theme	  of	  social	  identity	  came	  through	  strongly	  in	  the	  research.	  	  It	  is	  described	  in	  more	  detail	  
in	   section	   1.2	   below,	   but	   to	   summarise:	  farmers	   feel	   as	   though	   their	   social	   identity	   as	  
specialists	   in	   their	   particular	   environment	   is	   under	   threat	   from	   the	   use	   of	   Overseer	   by	  
government.	  Stone	  (2002)	  describes	  that	  when	  the	  distribution	  of	  resources	  is	  perceived	  as	  
unequal,	  community	  spirit	  can	  diminish	  from	  the	  imbalance.	  Feeling	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  group	  or	  
community	   is	   essential	   to	   understanding	   social	   identity	   of	   individuals.	   The	   reduction	   in	  
community	   spirit	   is	   caused	   by	   individuals	   feeling	   like	   they	   have	   less	   in	   common	   with	   their	  
neighbours,	  or	  have	  been	  ‘picked-­‐on’	  unfairly	  by	  authorities	  (Stone,	  2002).	  The	  results	  are	  less	  
trust	  between	  neighbours,	  and	  community	  division.	  With	  policy	  that	  aims	  to	  alocate	  nutrient	  
output	  alowances,	  as	  Overseer	  is	  being	  used	  to	  do,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  individuals	  deem	  the	  
process	  of	  distribution	  as	  fair,	  with	  an	  equal	  share	  amongst	  resource	  users.	  If	  the	  process	  is	  
seen	  to	  be	  unfair,	  conflict	  between	  the	  community	  can	  result	  in	  a	  dismantling	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  
regional	  council.	  
Both	   groups	   talked	   about	   the	   unfairness	   of	   Overseer	   and	  an	   expanding	   rural-­‐urban	   divide	  
occurring	  in	  their	  area	  and	  around	  the	  country	  where	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  understanding	  between	  
urban	  and	  rural	  dwelers.	  Respondent	  14(C)	  summed	  this	  up	  as	  folows:	  “urban	  people	  don’t	  
give	  a	  toss	  about	  farmers”.	  The	  perception	  of	  farmers	  is	  that	  because	  urban	  populations	  are	  
large,	  their	  opinions	  are	  louder	  and	  hold	  more	  influence	  over	  national	  policy	  decisions	  which	  
in	  turn,	  can	  negatively	  influence	  farming	  futures.	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  are	  concerned	  that	  if	  
they	   folow	   the	  current	   scientific	   advice	  led	   by	   Overseer	  they	   may	   be	   being	   led	   towards	  
unnecessary	   farm-­‐systems	   changes	  which	   make	   their	   farm	   business	   unviable.	  Farmers	  
expressed	  the	  view	  that	  Plan	  Change	  10	  is	  trying	  to	  undermine	  farming	  in	  the	  Rotorua	  area.	  
The	  farmers	  mentioned	  how	  undesirable	  it	  was	  for	  the	  council	  to	  support	  the	  industry	  when	  
the	  land	  is	  more	  valuable	  for	  other	  uses.	  Wynne	  (2013)	  describes	  a	  case	  study	  where	  farmers	  
feel	  subjected	  to	  “socioeconomic	  threats	  such	  as	  subordination	  to	  tourism	  …	  and	  authorities	  
who	   appear	   to	   be	   more	   and	   more	   concerned	   with	   meeting	   environmental	   and	   urban	  
recreational	  demands	  on	  the	  country	  than	  with	  …	  farming”	  (p.	  286).	  This	  idea	  of	  ‘prioritizing	  
farming	   last’	   echoed	   through	   interviews	   with	   farmers	   in	   the	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   area.	   	   Farmers	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talked	   about	   the	   regional	   council’s	   focus	   on	   tourism	   and	   urban	   growth	   in	   the	   region,	  
highlighted	  by	  the	  event	  where	  a	  councilor	  (since	  departed)	  “stood	  up	  in	  a	  meeting	  and	  said	  
"I’m	  going	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  you	  bastards”	  (participant	  13(D,L).	  The	  farmers	  gave	  other	  examples	  
of	   the	   council	   trying	   to	   reduce	   dairying	   by	   discussing	   the	   promotion	   of	   conversions	   into	  
manuka	  honey	   farms,	   nuts,	   goats,	   and	   sheep	   farms,	   alongside	   nutrient-­‐limit	   reduction	  
incentives	  for	  farmers	  to	  sub-­‐divide	  their	  land	  for	  residential	  purposes.	  While	  these	  ideas	  for	  
regeneration	   may	   seem	   reasonable	   from	   the	   outside,	   farmers	   were	   less	   keen:	   “They’re	   al	  
viable	  to	  some	  degree,	  but	  they’re	  not	  as	  economic	  as	  dairying.	  They’re	  asking	  the	  current	  
generation	  of	  dairy	  farmers	  to	  take	  that	  economic	  loss”	  (participant	  8(D,L).	  These	  Rotorua	  
farmers	  feel	  like	  the	  process	  of	  mitigating	  nutrient	  loss	  is	  unfair,	  where	  council	  is	  prioritizing	  
other	   industries	   over	   dairying	   and	   encouraging	   land	   use	   change,	   rather	   than	   working	   with	  
dairy	  farmers	  to	  encourage	  better	  farm	  management	  practices.	  
Another	   area	   of	   concern	   discussed	   by	   farmers	   was	   the	   unfairness,	   and	   risk	   to	   council,	   of	  
completely	  relying	  on	  only	  Overseer	  to	  calculate	  and	  manage	  nutrient	  numbers.	  Wynne	  and	  
Shackley	  (1994,	  p.	  8)	  	  use	  the	  term	  “truth	  machines”	  to	  describe	  an	  over-­‐reliance	  on	  models	  
in	   decision-­‐making	   when	   their	   outputs	   are	   controled	   by	   their	   inputs	   (which	   could	   be	  
inaccurate)	   and	   assumptions	   (which	   could	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   wrong).	   This	   idea	   of	   the	   use	   of	  
models	   as	   truth	   machines	   is	   useful	   for	   understanding	   responses	   from	   both	   farmer	   groups.	  	  
They	  were	  concerned	  that	  council	  are	  intent	  on	  using	  Overseer	  as	  the	  only	  regulatory	  tool	  for	  
measuring	  nutrient	  losses.	  Rangitāiki	  farmers	  spoke	  of	  relying	  too	  heavily	  on	  Overseer	  being	  
one	  of	  their	  greatest	  concerns,	  articulated	  by	  participant	  3(D,P)	  who	  stated:	  “I	  just	  hope	  they	  
do	  not	  have	  their	  blinkers	  on	  and	  that	  they	  make	  Overseer	  the	  bible,	  because	  it	  isn’t”.	  Rotorua	  
Lakes	   farmers	   held	   similar	   concerns,	   using	   a	   diferent	   phrase	   “[council]	   have	   latched	   onto	  
[Overseer]	   and	   have	   said	   it’s	   our	   holy	   grail	   and	   it’s	   not”	   (participant	   11(D,L).	   Farmers	   are	  
concerned	  about	  the	  regional	  council	  using	  Overseer	  as	  a	  truth	  machine	  where	  the	  flexibility	  
of	  tailoring	  management	  plans	  to	  individual	  farms	  can	  become	  compromised,	  resulting	  in	  a	  
high	  level	  of	  trust	  being	  placed	  on	  a	  computer	  model	  rather	  than	  ‘real-­‐life’.	  Farmers	  require	  
flexibility	  in	  their	  farming	  practices	  due	  to	  the	  unpredictable	  behaviour	  of	  agri-­‐environmental	  
systems	  and	  potentialy	  very	  specific	  processes	  that	  afect	  their	  farm.	  For	  example,	  Overseer	  
uses	  a	  three	  year	  roling	  average	  to	  calculate	  nutrient	  figures,	  but	  farmers	  are	  concerned	  that	  
climate	   fluctuations,	   among	   other	   environmental	  and	   farm	  parameters,	   do	   not	   folow	   the	  
same	  scale	  and	  could	  negatively	  impact	  their	  NDA	  numbers	  and	  any	  resulting	  requirements	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for	  farming	  system	  changes.	  In	  another	  case	  on	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains,	  Overseer	  was	  found	  to	  
over-­‐estimate	   nutrient	   losses	   for	   a	   farm	   that	   utilises	   modern	   technology	   that	   is	   currently	  
beyond	  Overseer’s	  capabilities	  to	  calculate.	  This	  farmer	  used	  in-­‐situ	  metres	  and	  laboratory	  
tests	  to	  determine	  nutrient	  levels	  and	  was	  concerned	  with	  the	  discrepancies	  between	  the	  two.	  
This	  farmer,	  along	  with	  another	  on	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  hoped	  that	  the	  regional	  council	  would	  
be	  wiling	  to	  accept	  alternative	  measurements	  they	  had	  done	  and	  paid	  for	  themselves,	  but	  
were	  not	  optimistic.	  	  
The	  unfairness	  of	  using	  Overseer	  for	  compliance	  was	  discussed	  by	  farmers	  in	  Rotorua,	  using	  
the	  term	  ‘anchoring’.	  Participant	  9(D,L)	  described	  the	  tendency	  of	  council	  to	  rely	  heavily	  on	  
each	  farmers’	  NDA	  figure,	  where	  Overseer	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  precise	  enough	  to	  represent	  a	  
complicated	  process	  using	  a	  single	  numeric	  figure.	  In	  reality,	  a	  farmer’s	  NDA	  figure	  fluctuates	  
continuously	   due	   to	   processes	   out	   of	   a	   farmer’s	   control	   (i.e.	   rainfal)	   and	   farmers	   feel	   it	   is	  
unfair	  for	  council	  to	  focus	  entirely	  on	  Overseer’s	  nutrient	  figures.	  Regulatory	  bodies	  may	  find	  
it	  easier	  to	  think	  of	  Overseer	  as	  ‘al-­‐knowing’	  because	  of	  its	  extensive	  use	  and	  history	  as	  a	  
decision	  support	  tool.	  However,	  al	  aspects	  of	  standardisation	  can	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  disruption	  
from	   new	  variables	  (Porter,	   1995).	   This	   is	   where	   unmeasurable	   or	   dificult	   to	   measure	  
variables	   often	   become	   invalid	   or	   highly	   controversial	   as	   they	   fail	   to	   fit	   into	   the	   right,	  
prescribed	   standards.	  Farmers	   from	   both	   groups	   spoke	   of	   the	   regional	   council	   relying	   too	  
heavily	   on	   Overseer	   which	   they	   perceived	   to	   be	   unfair,	   where	   the	   ability	   of	   Overseer	   to	  
accurately	  represent	  their	  farm,	  by	  itself,	  was	  seen	  as	  impossible.	  	  
6.1.4	  The	  certainty	  trough	  
MacKenzie	   (1990)’s	   certainty	   trough	   is	   useful	   for	   understanding	   farmers’	   perceptions	   of	  
alienation,	  exclusion,	  and	  detachment	  in	  the	  process	  of	  creating	  the	  scientific	  knowledge	  that	  
sits	  behind	  Overseer.	  The	  certainty	  trough	  describes	  a	  transition	  of	  certainty	  about	  an	  idea	  or	  
technology	  from	  moderate	  uncertainty,	  to	  low	  uncertainty,	  to	  high	  uncertainty	  as	  you	  move	  
further	  away	  from	  the	  site	  of	  knowledge	  production.	  For	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers,	  for	  whom	  
the	  stakes	  are	  currently	  low,	  there	  is	  currently	  a	  lack	  of	  incentive	  to	  analyse	  the	  specifics	  of	  
Overseer	   and	   expend	   the	   time	   to	   dig	   into	   the	   detail.	   This	   has	   resulted	   in	   a	   feeling	   of	  
detachment	   from	   the	   model	   for	   many	   farmers,	   where	   they	   hold	   less	   concern	   for	   the	  
application	   of	   Overseer	   for	   regulation.	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   farmers	   also	   feel	   detached	   from	  
Overseer	  because	  they	  feel	  like	  they	  were	  not	  involved	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  regulations	  
that	  rely	  on	  it,	  have	  not	  had	  any	  input	  into	  what	  information	  goes	  into	  the	  model,	  and	  do	  not	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fuly	  understand	  how	  to	  use	  the	  model.	  Using	  MacKenzie	  (1990)’s	  certainty	  trough,	  diferent	  
perceptions	   of	   Overseer	   can	   be	   plotted	   to	   show	   their	   level	   of	   perception	   of	   uncertainty	   in	  
relation	  to	  their	  distance	  from	  the	  knowledge	  production	  of	  Overseer.	  Figure	  6.1	  identifies	  the	  
scientists	  at	  point	  (A),	  regional	  council	  staf	  at	  (B),	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers	  at	  (C)	  and	  Rotorua	  
Lakes	  farmers	  at	  (D),	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  perceptions	  of	  how	  uncertain	  Overseer	  is.	  	  It	  can	  be	  seen	  
that	   council	   staf	   (b)	   and	   RP	   farmers	   (c)	   are	   caught	   in	   what	   MacKenzie	   describes	   as	   the	  
certainty	  trough	  which	  is	  in	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  graphic	  where	  uncertainty	  is	  lowest.	  
	  
Figure	  6.1	   The	  certainty	  trough	  with	  research	  case	  study	  plots	  (source:	  (MacKenzie,	  
1990,	  as	  cited	  in	  Duncan,	  2008,	  p.	  56))	  
Those	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  production	  of	  the	  science	  for	  Overseer	  itself,	  shown	  as	  point	  (A)	  
in	  figure	  6.1,	  have	  not	  been	  analysed	  in	  depth	  for	  this	  research,	  but	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  
the	  uncertainties	   surrounding	  Overseer	  (Overseer,	   2016).	   This	   awareness	   is	   evident	   in	   the	  
regular	  model	  updates,	  where	  Overseer’s	  processes	  are	  restructured	  and	  new	  information	  is	  
added.	  These	  scientists	  and	  modelers	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  knowledge	  production	  process	  
are	  aware	  of	  inherent	  uncertainties	  and	  the	  assumptions	  required	  to	  attempt	  to	  characterise	  
a	  complex	  agri-­‐environmental	  system.	  
Regional	   council	   staf	   (B)	   include	   al	   those	   employed	   in	   the	   application	   of	   Overseer	   in	  
regulating	   nutrient	   outputs	   in	   the	   case	   study	   areas.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   council	  
scientists	   are	   not	   involved	   in	   the	   production	   of	   knowledge	   for	   Overseer.	   	   Rather,	   they	   are	  
focused	  on	  the	  application	  of	  the	  model	  to	  the	  specific	  conditions	  of	  the	  area	  being	  regulated.	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what	  nutrient	  limits	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  acceptable	  for	  farms,	  and	  the	  desired	  outcomes	  
for	   water	   quality	  (Arbuckle,	   2015).	   Alongside	   council	   scientists,	   other	  council	   staf	   interact	  
with	  farmers	  and	  include	  those	  working	  in	  compliance	  and	  regulation.	  The	  regional	  council	  
staf	  are	  committed	  to	  using	  Overseer	  to	  regulate	  nutrients	  in	  the	  area,	  as	  directed	  by	  central	  
government	   and	   included	   in	   their	   own	   regional	  plans	  (Arbuckle,	   2015).	   Rather	   than	   being	  
knowledge	   producers	   for	   Overseer,	   they	   are	   knowledge	   users	  –	  users	   of	   the	   model	   for	  
regulation.	   Situated	   in	   the	   middle	   of	   the	   figure,	   in	   the	   certainty	   trough,	   perceptions	   of	  
uncertainty	  related	  to	  Overseer	  are	  at	  their	  lowest	  (and	  certainty	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  highest)	  
compared	  to	  the	  diferent	  groups	  on	  either	  side.	  Council	  scientists	  are	  distant	  enough	  from	  
the	  site	  of	  knowledge	  production	  that	  they	  are	  unaware	  of	  or	  unconcerned	  about	  Overseer’s	  
limitations	   and	   assumptions.	   This	   positioning	   of	   council	   staf	   explains	   why	   Rotorua	   Lakes	  
farmers	  feel	  that	  council	  staf	  are	  unable	  to	  clearly	  communicate	  diferent	  aspects	  of	  Overseer	  
and	  answer	  the	  farmer’s	  queries	  about	  the	  science	  behind	  it:	  “council	  have	  as	  much	  or	  more	  
dificulty	  getting	  their	  head	  around	  it	  than	  we	  do	  as	  farmers”	  (participant	  12(D,L).	  Reiterating	  
Duncan	  (2008),	  in	  this	  case	  the	  council	  staf’s	  distance	  from	  the	  production	  site	  of	  the	  science	  
that	  sits	  behind	  Overseer	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  lack	  of	  intimate	  connection	  with	  the	  experiments	  
that	   inform	   the	   science	   and	   knowledge	   surrounding	   Overseer’s	   parameters	   and	   any	  
implications	  of	  the	  results.	  	  Hence,	  a	  relatively	  low	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  is	  perceived	  for	  these	  
actors	  situated	  in	  the	  certainty	  trough.	  
Fertiliser	  representatives	  are	  shown	  as	  point	  (C).	  	  Similar	  to	  the	  regional	  council,	  but	  further	  
away	   from	   the	   source	   of	   knowledge	   production,	   these	   actors	   are	   direct	   users	   of	   the	  
technology.	  Fertiliser	  representatives	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  fuly	  committed	  to	  using	  Overseer	  
and	  have	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  perceived	  certainty.	  	  For	  example,	  it	  was	  stated	  by	  participant	  
15(c)	  that	  “The	  benefits	  are	  huge	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  can	  measure	  what's	  going	  on	  and	  what's	  
coming	  out…	  if	  the	  information	  put	  in	  is	  correct,	  the	  science	  continues	  [to	  develop	  and	  be]	  
calibrated,	  it's	  a	  wonderful	  tool”.	  
Moving	  further	  to	  the	  right	  of	  the	  certainty	  trough	  reaches	  point	  (D),	  where	  I	  have	  plotted	  the	  
Rangitāiki	   Plains	   dairy	   farmers.	   Along	   with	   point	   (E),	   the	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   dairy	   farmers,	   this	  
section	   of	   the	   trough	   represents	   a	   range	   from	   high	   to	   very	   high	   levels	   of	   perceptions	   of	  
uncertainty	  (i.e.	  low	  levels	  of	  certainty)	  surrounding	  the	  science	  and	  application	  of	  Overseer.	  
The	   level	   of	   uncertainty	   perceived	   by	   Overseer’s	   producers	   (point	   (A)	   include	   numerous	  
scientific	  assumptions	  and	  as	  predicted	  by	  MacKenzie	  (1990),	  these	  uncertainties	  are	  used	  as	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opposition	  by	  the	  farmers	  (points	  (C)	  and	  (D)	  facing	  regulation	  by	  Overseer.	  Discontent	  about	  
the	  model’s	  certainty	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  repeated	  cal	  for	  more	  “good	  science”	  from	  farmers	  
(participants	  7(D,P),	  8(D,L),	  9(D,L),	  13(D,L)	  where	  they	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  model’s	  limitations	  
and	  assumptions.	  MacKenzie	  (1990)	  explains	  that	  those	  situated	  in	  this	  area	  wil	  feel	  alienated	  
from	  the	  proposal,	  technology	  or	  issue	  under	  investigation.	  These	  concerns	  were	  expressed	  
by	  both	  groups	  in	  this	  research	  in	  terms	  of	  authorities	  overstepping	  their	  boundaries.	  While	  
they	  do	  hold	  some	  concerns	  about	  the	  certainty	  of	  Overseer,	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers	  are	  
not	  placed	  very	  high	  on	  the	  right	  of	  the	  trough	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  regulation	  in	  the	  catchment,	  
resulting	  in	  lower	  stakes	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  incentive	  to	  understand	  Overseer.	  For	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  
farmers	  digging	  into	  the	  details	  of	  Overseer	  is	  not	  “high	  on	  the	  priority	  list	  …	  not	  on	  the	  radar”	  
(participant	  3(D,P).	  
Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  are	  placed	  much	  higher	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  perceptions	  
of	  uncertainty,	  which	  can	  be	  directly	  attributed	  to	  Overseer’s	  influence	  on	  farming	  practices	  
under	  regulation,	  resulting	  in	  higher	  stakes	  for	  farmers	  in	  this	  area	  and	  far	  more	  incentive	  to	  
dig	  into	  the	  detail.	  There	  is	  concern	  from	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  of	  not	  being	  able	  to	  justify	  
and	  defend	  their	  farming	  actions	  to	  regulators	  due	  to	  not	  understanding	  how	  Overseer	  works.	  
As	  explained	  by	  participant	  12(D,L):	  “we	  are	  going	  to	  be	  spending	  half	  our	  time	  justifying,	  or	  
worried	  that	  someone	  is	  going	  to	  ask	  us	  to	  justify	  why	  we’re	  doing	  it,	  and	  if	  we’re	  not	  realy	  
cognizant	   with	   Overseer	   and	   how	   it	   works	   …	   how	   are	   they	   going	   to	  understand?”	   These	  
farmers	  feel	  frustrated	  because	  they	  do	  not	  trust	  those	  in	  authority	  and	  do	  not	  understand	  
what	   information	   is	   being	   using	   to	   regulate	   their	   farming	   practices.	   Some	   Rotorua	   Lakes	  
farmers	  asked	  for	  Overseer	  training	  days	  but	  this	  was	  not	  ofered	  by	  council,	  leaving	  a	  sense	  
of	  detachment	  and	  distrust	  in	  council,	  questioning	  council	  motives	  for	  not	  encouraging	  farmer	  
training	  days.	  Ilustrating	  the	  level	  of	  distrust,	  one	  informant	  maintained	  “…	  if	  we	  had	  that	  
little	  bit	  of	  knowledge	  it	  might	  create	  more	  problems”	  (participant	  8(D,L).	  There	  are	  clearly	  
feelings	  of	  alienation.	  Plotting	  these	  perceptions	  across	  the	  certainty	  trough	  ilustrates	  how	  
perceptions	   of	   uncertainty	   vary	   with	   distance.	   While	   perceptions	   of	   certainty	   surrounding	  
Overseer	  is	  high	  among	  its	  producers	  and	  users,	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  model	  itself	  is	  low.	  
6.1.5	  Improving	  the	  science	  of	  Overseer	  
Jasanof	  (1990)	  explains	  that	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  unspoken	  presumption	  in	  policy	  science	  
that	  improving	  the	  scientific	  understanding	  of	  a	  problem	  wil	  lead	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  better	  
policy.	  However,	  it	  is	  unwise	  to	  assume	  that	  reducing	  scientific	  uncertainties	  automaticaly	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increases	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  science	  itself.	  Using	  an	  example	  of	  updating	  safety	  standards	  for	  
suspected	   carcinogens	   by	   the	   United	   States	   government,	  Jasanof	   (1990)	  described	   how	  
regulatory	  decision-­‐making	  “highlights	  uncertainty,	  polarizes	  scientific	  opinion,	  and	  prevents	  
eficient	   resolution	   of	   disputes	   about	   risk”	  (Jasanof,	   1990,	   p.	   8).	   Attempts	   to	   increase	  
scientific	  accuracy	  can	  lead	  to	  an	  emphasis	  of	  previous	  inaccuracies	  held	  to	  be	  true	  and	  a	  focus	  
on	  disputes	  among	  scientists	  relating	  to	  the	  scientific	  information	  and	  associated	  risks.	  While	  
farmers	   acknowledged	   the	   importance	   of	   updating	   the	   science	   in	   Overseer,	   from	   their	  
perspective	  there	  are	  financial	  consequences	  of	  farming	  to	  a	  changing	  model:	  “we’re	  having	  
to	   make	   a	   lot	   of	   financial	   decisions	   to	   something	   that	   may	   work	   and	   it	   may	   not	   work”	  
(participant	  10(D,L).	  Farmers	  feel	  like	  they	  are	  being	  directed	  by	  scientists	  down	  a	  blind	  aley	  
in	   which	   costly	   complications	   to	   their	   farm’s	   management	   practices	   may	   occur,	   using	  
inaccurate	  numbers	  which	  may	  change.	  Due	  to	  the	  continuous	  reopening	  of	  Overseer’s	  black	  
box,	  which	  efectively	  occurs	  when	  the	  model	  is	  updated,	  Rotorua	  farmers	  are	  frustrated	  with	  
the	   constant	  changes,	   feeling	   as	   though	   the	   model	   was	   working	   against	   their	   farming	  
practices.	   Alongside	   accuracy,	   farmers	   would	   prefer	   a	   degree	   of	   stability	   in	   order	   to	   make	  
seasonal	  farming	  decisions.	  
A	  ‘black	  box’	  describes	  a	  complex	  scientific	  or	  technical	  process	  for	  which	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  
may	  be	  known,	  but	  the	  internal	  mechanisms	  which	  drive	  the	  inner	  processes	  and	  derive	  the	  
outputs	   are	   not	   accessible	   and	   hence	   not	   fuly	   understood.	   In	   the	   pursuit	   of	   accuracy	   for	  
policymaking,	   the	   creators	   of	   Overseer	   are	   continualy	   revising	   and	   updating	   the	   science.	  
Overseer	  is	  a	  black	  box;	  Overseer’s	  inputs	  include	  the	  figures	  relating	  to	  stocking	  rate,	  average	  
rainfal,	   and	   soil	   types,	   and	   the	   outputs	   include	   various	   nutrient	   emissions,	   leaching,	   and	  
runof	   figures	   from	   a	   property.	   The	   internal	   workings	   which	   take	   the	   input	   figures	   and	  
calculate	  the	  output	  figures	  are	  hidden	  from	  the	  view	  of	  the	  user.	  Chapter	  2	  discussed	  a	  series	  
of	  decisions	  Latour	  (1987)	  described	  during	  confrontation	  with	  a	  black	  box:	  “Do	  we	  take	  it	  up?	  
Do	  we	  reject	  it?	  Do	  we	  reopen	  it?	  Do	  we	  let	  it	  drop	  through	  lack	  of	  interest?	  Do	  we	  make	  it	  
more	   solid	   by	   grasping	   it	   without	   any	   further	   discussion?	   Do	   we	   transform	   it	   beyond	  
recognition?”	  (pg.	  29).	  While	  the	  continued	  updating	  of	  technology	  aims	  to	  foster	  scientific	  
credibility,	   it	   can	   invalidate	   the	   old	   technology	   as	   it	   appears	   inaccurate	   when	   the	   new	   is	  
introduced.	  The	  interviews	  revealed	  that	  Rotorua	  farmers	  are	  choosing	  to	  reject	  Overseer’s	  
black	   box,	   frustrated	   by	   its	   continual	   updates,	   adding	   to	   their	   concerns	   surrounding	   the	  
accuracy	  and	  credibility	  of	  the	  model.	  Each	  model	  update	  highlights	  the	  inaccuracies	  of	  the	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previous	   version,	   potentialy	   disputing	   any	   farm-­‐system	   changes	   the	   farmers	   may	   have	  
initiated	  and	  caling	  into	  question	  potential	  future	  changes.	  decisions.	  
6.1.6	  Maintaining	  objectivity	  with	  Overseer	  
To	   reflect	   on	  Porter	   (1995)’s	   reference	   to	   objectivity,	   the	   use	   of	   numbers	   and	   rules	   in	  
regulation	   is	   expected	   by	   governments	   to	   foster	   a	   process	   removed	   from	   bias	   and	   self-­‐
interest.	  From	  these	  insights,	  objectivity	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  key	  goal	  of	  any	  environmental	  model	  
as	  high	  levels	  of	  precision	  and	  standardised	  measurement	  theoreticaly	  resolve	  trust	  issues	  
across	  distances	  as	  parties	  can	  be	  confident	  that	  decisions	  have	  not	  been	  made	  arbitrarily	  and	  
they	  can	  feel	  they	  are	  being	  treated	  fairly.	  In	  reality,	  farmers	  interviewed	  for	  this	  research	  
revealed	  low	  levels	  of	  trust	  in	  Overseer	  to	  fairly	  represent	  their	  farm	  in	  an	  objective	  manner,	  
mechanical	   or	   otherwise.	   The	   significance	   of	   farmers	   perceptions	   of	   objectivity	   relating	   to	  
distrust	   in	   Overseer	   can	   be	   explained	   using	  Busch	   (2011)’s	   notions	   of	   objectivity,	   where	  
objectivity	  is	  a	  product	  of:	  
•	  The	  ability	  to	  measure	  things	  precisely	  
•	  Avoiding	  human	  subjectivity	  by	  using	  non-­‐human	  measurement	  techniques	  
•	  The	  emergence	  of	  standards	  from	  a	  community	  of	  practitioners	  
•	  Respecting	  the	  outcomes	  of	  environmental	  processes.	  
When	  applied	  to	  Overseer,	  the	  first	  notion	  is	  not	  achieved	  and	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  numerous	  
controversies	  surrounding	  inaccuracies	  of	  the	  science	  and	  data	  systems	  that	  operationalise	  
Overseer.	  Speaking	  to	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  and	  a	  private	  consultant	  working	  alongside	  these	  
farmers	  revealed	  that	  the	  most	  significant	  concerns	  were	  related	  to	  Overseer’s	  use	  of	  S-­‐Map,	  
which	   they	   believe	   extrapolates	   important	   soil	   data	   from	   a	   limited	   pool	   of	   research.	  
Participant	  14(C)	  explained	  the	  issues	  with	  Overseer’s	  soil	  measurements:	  “Soils	  maps	  that	  we	  
use	   are	   done	   at	  a	   scale	   of	   1:50000,	   S-­‐maps	   online,	   we’re	   trying	   to	   …	   break	   farms	   up	   on	   a	  
1:50000	   scale,	   when	   the	   actual	   farm	   is	   on	   a	   1:5000	   scale”.	   Another	   one	   of	   the	   farmer’s	  
substantial	   concerns	   was	   connected	   to	   Overseer’s	   method	   of	   calculating	   rainfal	   for	   the	  
property,	  where	  Global	  Positioning	  System	  (G.P.S.)	  coordinates	  are	  taken	  from	  each	  farm’s	  
cowshed,	  but:	  “it's	  2.1	  metres	  per	  year	  down	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  this	  farm,	  and	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  
farm	  it's	  2.6	  metres.	  That's	  half	  a	  metre	  diference.	  How	  do	  they	  take	  that	  into	  consideration?	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The	   accuracy	   is	   in	   question”	   (participant	   13(D,L).	   Both	   of	   these	   examples	   describe	   the	  
application	  of	  generalising	  methods	  to	  calculate	  processes	  that	  highly	  influence	  the	  outcome	  
of	   Overseer’s	   numbers.	   This	   frustration	   is	   summarised	   by	   participant	   13(D,L)	   with:	   “you're	  
calculating	  everything	  to	  seven	  decimal	  points,	  and	  then	  al	  of	  a	  sudden	  you're	  going	  plus	  or	  
minus	  10%	  contingency.	  It	  just	  doesn't	  make	  sense.	  Yeah	  it	  is	  the	  accuracy	  of	  Overseer	  we	  are	  
concerned	  about”.	  Explained	  by	  the	  two	  examples	  above,	  farmers	  perceive	  that	  Overseer’s	  
ability	  to	  measure	  their	  farms	  precisely	  is	  impaired.	  The	  farmers	  are	  being	  standardised	  by	  
Overseer	  through	  being	  represented	  by	  a	  figure	  used	  for	  compliance.	  Overseer’s	  inability	  to	  
demonstrate	   precision	   weakens	   the	   farmer’s	   perception	   of	   the	   model’s	  suitability	   as	   a	  
regulatory	  tool.	  	  
Busch’s	  second	  notion	  that	  encourages	  objectivity	  is	  removing	  human	  subjectivity	  and	  bias	  
from	  measurement	  techniques	  by	  employing	  computers	  and	  models.	  In	  this	  case,	  Overseer	  
fulfils	  this	  criterion	  with	  its	  internal	  processes	  utilising	  the	  same	  calculations	  for	  every	  farmer.	  
What	  undermines	  this	  objectivity	  and	  what	  farmers	  focus	  on,	  is	  the	  subjectivity	  involved	  with	  
inputting	   the	   data	   into	   Overseer.	   Acknowledging	   the	   fact	  that	   Overseer	   owners	   have	  
attempted	  to	  overcome	  user	  subjectivity	  by	  releasing	  a	  ‘Best	  Practice	  Data	  Input	  Standards’,	  
and	  many	  regional	  councils	  only	  accept	  nutrient	  reports	  created	  by	  certified	  nutrient	  advisors.	  
Rotorua	   Lakes	   farmers	   spoke	   of	   diferent	  certified	   users	   producing	   reports	   for	   the	   same	  
properties	  containing	  vastly	  diferent	  results.	  	  
I	  went	  to	  three	  diferent	  consultants	  and	  a	  fertiliser	  representative	  
and	  …	  the	  lowest	  [nutrient	  calculation]	  was	  20	  kg/ha	  lower	  than	  the	  
highest	  one.	  I	  gave	  him	  the	  same	  folder	  of	  information”	  (participant	  
11(D,L).	  
In	   the	   area	   using	   Overseer	   for	   decision-­‐support,	   a	   Rangitāiki	   Plains	   farmer	   also	   spoke	   of	  
witnessing	   a	   fertiliser	   representative	   manipulate	   Overseer	   figures	   for	  the	   fertiliser	  
representatives’	  best	  interests	  (i.e.	  to	  sel	  more	  fertiliser).	  Here,	  farmers	  saw	  subjectivity	  in	  
the	  inputs	  of	  Overseer,	  rather	  than	  the	  internal	  processes	  of	  the	  model	  itself.	  	  Furthermore,	  
both	  groups	  of	  farmers	  witnessed	  subjectivity	  in	  the	  measurements	  of	  their	  properties	  from	  
the	   model	   outputs,	   resulting	   in	   a	   lowering	   of	   trust	   in	   Overseer	   to	   be	   used	   objectively	   for	  
compliance.	  
The	  third	  notion	  describes	  how	  objectivity	  is	  created	  through	  reaching	  consensus	  within	  the	  
relevant	  community	  of	  experts.	  Farmers	  consider	  themselves	  to	  be	  experts	  within	  their	  own	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realm	  (Wynne,	   2013),	   and	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   farmers	   feel	   as	   though	   they	   were	   left	   out	   of	   the	  
decision	  making	  process	  for	  the	  rules	  that	  rely	  on	  Overseer.	  From	  their	  perspective,	  the	  use	  
of	  Overseer	  cannot	  be	  objective	  as	  they	  perceive	  that	  farmer	  knowledge	  is	  lacking,	  where	  only	  
scientific	   information	   and	   opinions	   are	   represented	   in	   the	   knowledge	   that	   sits	   behind	  
Overseer.	  This	  idea	  of	  being	  ‘left	  out’	  was	  questioned	  further	  by	  participant	  8(D,L),	  who	  noted	  
that	   they	   believed	  Overseer	  version	   updates	   were	   initiated	   by	   council	   requests	   for	  
streamlining	  the	  regulatory	  processes.	  Farmers	  feel	  as	  though	  there	  is	  greater	  focus	  on	  model	  
improvements	  from	  a	  regulatory	  point	  of	  view,	  rather	  than	  a	  farming	  systems	  point	  of	  view.	  
Farmers	  are	  focusing	  on	  the	  contextual	  factors	  surrounding	  Overseer	  rather	  than	  the	  model	  
itself,	  where	   they	   feel	   that	   any	   improvements	   to	   the	   science	   overlook	   farmers	   and	   is	   for	  
intended	   for	   regulation	   not	   farming.	   This	  shows	   that	   a	   focus	  on	   improving	   the	   accuracy	   of	  
Overseer	  wil	  not	  resolve	  these	  issues	  of	  distrust.	  
Busch’s	   fourth	   notion	   of	   objectivity	   describes	   the	   conformity	   of	   theoretical	   concepts	   to	  
environmental	   processes.	   In	   other	   words,	   does	   the	   theory	   match	   reality?	   Rotorua	   Lakes	  
farmers	   feel	   that	   the	   use	   of	   Overseer	  portrays	   a	   simplified	   version	   of	  the	  real	  farming	  
environment.	   In	   reality,	   Overseer	   cannot	   reflect	   the	   real	   world.	   Overseer	   wil	   only	   ever	  
represent	  a	  world	  which	  folows	  the	  set	  of	  standards	  encoded	  into	  the	  model	  by	  its	  producers.	  
Porter	  (1995)	  describes	  how	  scientific	  data	  input	  from	  the	  scientific	  community,	  who	  influence	  
data	   based	   on	   scientific	   consensus,	   maintains	   a	   degree	   of	   objectivity	   due	   to	   the	  
institutionalised	  norms	  of	  science	  it	  must	  folow.	  For	  Overseer,	  measurers	  inputting	  data	  have	  
discretion	   in	   their	   choice	   of	   parameters.	   As	   long	   as	   there	   are	   government	  actors,	   who	   are	  
focused	   on	   policy	   rather	   than	   science	   and	   farming,	   directing	   the	   data	   Overseer	   uses	   to	  
represent	   farms,	   objectivity	   cannot	   be	   achieved.	   Rotorua	   farmers	   perceive	  government	  
bodies	  as	  interfering	  with	  the	  production	  of	  “good	  science”	  for	  Overseer	  (participants	  8(D,L),	  
9(D,L),	   13(D,L),	   14(D,L).	   As	   a	   result,	   farmers	   have	   a	   lack	   of	   trust	   in	   Overseer,	   where	   the	  
model’s	  science	  has	  been	  subjectively	  influenced	  to	  suit	  the	  authoritative	  bodies	  rather	  than	  
represent,	  what	  farmers	  perceive	  to	  be,	  real	  life.	  
6.2	  Regulation	  relationships:	  remaining	  credible	  with	  Overseer	  
Looking	   at	   the	   wider	   picture	   of	   perceptions	   relating	   to	   Overseer,	   the	   greatest	   diferences	  
between	   Rangitāiki	   Plains	   farmers	   using	   Overseer	   for	   decision-­‐support,	   and	   Rotorua	   Lakes	  
farmers	  using	  Overseer	  for	  compliance,	  is	  that	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  have	  a	  more	  negative	  
perception	   of	   Overseer	   and	   this	   appears	   to	   be	   because	   they	   stand	   to	   lose	   more	   from	   its	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outputs.	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  are	  one	  step	  ahead	  of	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers	  in	  that	  they	  
perceive	  the	  pressures	  of	  being	  standardised	  by	  the	  model,	  whereas	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers	  
are	  only	  aware	  of	  possible	  changes	  in	  the	  future	  and	  have	  not	  felt	  compeled	  to	  start	  digging	  
into	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  model.	  In	  this	  case,	  looking	  at	  the	  diferences	  in	  the	  social	  realm	  of	  
each	  farmer	  group	  provides	  more	  understanding	  of	  how	  farmers	  are	  likely	  to	  perceive	  the	  use	  
of	  Overseer,	  to	  which	  I	  now	  turn.	  	  
Taking	  Wynne	  (2013)’s	  conception	  of	  public	  responses	  to	  scientific	  knowledge,	  perceptions	  of	  
trustworthiness	  are	  closely	  linked	  to	  assessments	  of	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  knowledge	  or	  policy	  
regimes	  reliant	  on	  science.	  In	  other	  words,	  public	  understanding	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  is	  not	  
only	   dependent	   on	   the	   potential	   level	   of	   understanding	   of	   technical	   information,	   it	   is	   also	  
influenced	   by	   perceptions	   regarding	   the	  trustworthiness	   or	   credibility	   of	   the	   institution	  
providing	  the	  information.	  	  
As	  already	  discussed,	  the	  social	  identity	  of	  farmers	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  understanding	  
how	  farmers’	  encounter	  and	  engage	  with	  scientific	  knowledge.	  By	  taking	  the	  focus	  away	  from	  
individual’s	  technical	  understandings	  of	  scientific	  knowledge,	  this	  research	  has	  attempted	  to	  
explore	  the	  social	  identities	  that	  characterise	  public	  responses	  to	  the	  science	  that	  underpins	  
regulations.	  Trust	  and	  credibility	  emerged	  as	  key	  themes	  in	  the	  development	  of	  perceptions	  
to	  the	  use	  of	  Overseer	  by	  farmers,	  shaped	  by	  the	  working	  relationships	  between	  farmers	  and	  
council	   staf,	   council	   scientists,	   private	   consultants,	   members	   of	   the	   public,	   and	   industry	  
workers.	  Using	  Overseer	  as	  either	  a	  decision	  support	  or	  compliance	  tool	  was	  found	  to	  have	  an	  
efect	   on	   these	   working	   relationships,	   and	   vice	   versa,	   in	   which	   both	   the	   existing	   and	  
development	  of	  relationships	  have	  shaped	  the	  responses	  to	  Overseer.	  
6.2.1	  Social	  trust	  relating	  to	  model	  acceptability	  
Wynne	   (2013)	  describes	   how	   perceptions	   of	   trustworthiness	   and	   credibility	   of	   institutions	  
disseminating	  knowledge	  is	  paramount	  to	  how	  people	  engage	  with	  that	  knowledge.	  Wynne	  
also	  	  highlights	  how	  social	  relations	  and	  identity-­‐negotiation	  are	  evolving	  processes	  that	  can	  
afect	  an	  individual’s	  ability	  wilingness	  to	  engage	  with	  and	  accept	  information	  (Wynne,	  2013).	  
Chapter	  2	  introduced	  Wynne	  (2013)’s	  set	  of	  seven	  criteria	  that	  are	  presented	  as	  central	  to	  the	  
public	  acceptance	  of	  scientific	  information.	  The	  seven	  criteria	  are	  discussed	  below:	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Criteria	  1:	  Does	  the	  scientific	  knowledge	  work?	  
For	   Rangitāiki	   Plains	   farmers,	   they	   do	   not	   have	   any	   regulation-­‐induced	   incentives	   or	  
imperatives	  to	  check	  the	  accuracy	  of	  Overseer’s	  predictions	  or	  how	  it	  calculates	  the	  numbers.	  
Investigating	  the	  accuracies	  of	  Overseer	  is	  not	  important	  to	  these	  farmers	  and	  they	  are	  able	  
to	   spend	   more	   time	   on	   other	   farming	   matters.	   The	   farming	   consultant,	   participant	   14(C),	  
explained	  that	  because	  these	  farmers	  used	  Overseer	  for	  decision-­‐support	  to	  indicate	  trends	  
in	   nutrient	   losses,	   they	   looked	   at	   the	   bigger	   picture	   and	   did	   not	   feel	   compeled	   to	   look	  
specificaly	   at	   the	   models	   uncertainties	   or	   be	   concerned	   about	   its	   inner	   workings.	   Dairy	  
farmers	  are	  likely	  to	  appreciate	  the	  help	  Overseer	  ofers	  for	  decision-­‐support,	  as	  it	  helps	  them	  
make	  decisions	  about	  what	  actions	  to	  take	  using	  the	  numbers	  as	  guidance.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  
these	  farmers	  felt	  that	  Overseer	  adequately	  represented	  their	  farm	  for	  what	  they	  were	  using	  
it	  for.	  
Conversely,	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   farmers	   hold	   significant	   concerns	   on	   the	   accuracy	   of	   Overseer.	  
Their	   fears	   are	   significant	   because	   the	   ability	   to	   profitably	   run	   their	   businesses	   could	   be	  
undermined	   by	   a	   model	   that	   appears	   to	   produce	   numbers	   which	   are	   too	   inaccurate	   and	  
cannot	  adequately	  represent	  their	  farming	  system.	  Farmers	  mentioned	  specific	  examples	  of	  
imprecise	   data	   including	   the	   soil	   map	   data	   layer,	   rainfal	   assumptions,	   and	  groundwater	  
catchment	   boundaries.	   However,	   the	   most	   notable	   inaccuracy	   examples	   were	   those	   which	  
unfold	   folowing	   Overseer	   version	   changes.	   Version	   changes	   occur	   overnight,	   usualy	   once	  
every	  six	  months,	  and	  automaticaly	  update	  farm	  nutrient	  budgets	  resulting	  in	  an	  increase	  or	  
decrease	  in	  nutrient	  output	  predictions.	  According	  to	  farmers,	  Overseer	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  imposing	  
order	  and	  control	  over	  their	  ability	  to	  farm	  how	  they	  see	  fit.	  The	  typical	  features	  of	  certainty	  
and	   control	   expected	   from	   science	   have	   not	   been	   experienced	   by	   farmers	   using	   Overseer;	  
farmers	  believe	  that	  the	  current	  regulations	  that	  use	  Overseer	  aim	  impose	  significant	  control	  
over	  the	  management	  of	  the	  farm,	  where	  rather,	  farmers	  believe	  what	  is	  needed	  is	  flexible	  
adaptation	  in	  an	  uncertain	  world	  is	  necessary.	  
Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers	  do	  not	  have	  specific	  examples	  of	  how	  Overseer	  misrepresents	  their	  
farm.	   In	   contrast,	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   farmers	   have	   more	   invested	   in	   the	   numbers	   Overseer	  
produces.	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  have	  spent	  more	  time	  on	  investigating	  the	  assumptions	  and	  
inaccuracies	   Overseer	   employs	   to	   represent	   their	   farm.	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   farmers	   perceived	  
Overseer	   to	   be	   more	   inaccurate	   than	   Rangitāiki	   Plains	   farmers,	   and	   held	   greater	   concerns	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about	  these	  inaccuracies	  due	  to	  the	  higher	  stakes	  they	  had	  in	  the	  numbers	  it	  produced	  to	  
represent	  their	  farm.	  
Criteria	  2:	  Do	  scientific	  claims	  pay	  attention	  to	  other	  available	  knowledge?	  
Focusing	  this	  criterion	  solely	  on	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers,	  they	  feel	  as	  though	  the	  council	  and	  
scientists	  are	  ignoring	  farmers’	  knowledge	  of	  diferent	  farm	  practices	  and	  avoiding	  working	  
with	  farmers	  who	  have	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  real	  world	  practices	  (participants	  (6(D,P),	  
7(D,P).	  This	  is	  why	  some	  Rangitāiki	  farmers	  are	  concerned	  that	  their	  identity	  as	  farmers	  wil	  
be	   compromised	   by	  Overseer	   in	   the	   future.	   Currently,	   the	   only	   Overseer	   reporting	   these	  
farmers	  currently	  do	  is	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  “box	  to	  tick”	  (participants	  1(D,P),	  3(D,)	  for	  Fonterra.	  
There	  is	  minimal	  prospect	  of	  regulation	  from	  this	  exercise	  and	  farmers	  think	  of	  it	  as	  a	  nuisance	  
rather	  than	  a	  threat	  to	  their	  farming	  practice.	  Looking	  ahead,	  farmers	  spoke	  of	  wanting	  to	  
“keep	   [their]	   licence	   to	   farm”	   (participant	   5(D,P),	   where	   future	   regulations	   with	   Overseer	  
could	   shift	   from	   ‘boxes	   to	   tick’,	   to	   boxes	   to	   live	   by.	   While	   Rangitāiki	   Plains	   farmers	   voiced	  
concerns	  for	  their	  farming	  future,	  at	  present	  they	  are	  not	  concerned	  enough,	  i.e.	  the	  stakes	  
are	  not	  high	  enough,	  to	  fuly	  invest	  in	  exploring	  the	  problems	  of	  Overseer	  in	  detail.	  
Criteria	  3:	  Does	  scientific	  practice	  pay	  attention	  to	  other	  available	  knowledge?	  
Addressing	  this	  criterion	  towards	  the	  events	  unfolding	  in	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  catchment,	  the	  
farmer	  here	  articulated	  the	  perception	  that	  Overseer	  is	  destabilising	  their	  identity	  as	  a	  farmer.	  
Farmers	  feel	  that	  council	  scientists	  have	  left	  them	  out	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  ignoring	  
the	   knowledge	   they	   have	   of	   their	   local	   environments.	   An	   example	   of	   the	   disagreement	   in	  
knowledge	  between	  farmers	  and	  council	  scientists	  was	  explained	  by	  participants	  8(D,L)	  and	  
13(D,L)	  where	  the	  new	  assumption	  that	  groundwater	  and	  surface	  water	  boundaries	  are	  the	  
same,	  was	  disputed.	  The	  farmers	  believe	  that	  council	  have	  over-­‐estimated	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  
boundaries	  to	  include	  properties	  which	  are	  in	  another	  zone,	  incorrectly	  including	  additional	  
land	  under	  the	  Overseer	  regulations.	  These	  farmers	  pointed	  out	  that	  they	  know	  surface	  water	  
from	  these	  farms	  does	  not	  run	  into	  the	  lake;	  they	  bear	  physical	  witness	  to	  where	  the	  water	  
runs	  every	  time	  it	  rains	  on	  the	  property.	  Participant	  13(D,L)	  recaled	  a	  council	  scientist	  coming	  
onto	   his	   property	   when	   Rule	   11	   was	   introduced	   in	   2005	   to	   confirm	   the	   surface	   water	  
movement	  into	  a	  diferent	  catchment.	  This	  information	  is	  not	  accepted	  by	  the	  council,	  who	  
continue	  to	  regulate	  these	  additional	  areas	  within	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  lake	  catchment.	  Farmers	  
perceive	  these	  encounters	  as	  their	  knowledge	  being	  ignored	  which	  results	  in	  farmers	  feeling	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as	  though	  their	  social	  identity	  as	  specialists	  in	  their	  particular	  environment	  is	  under	  threat	  by	  
Overseer	  regulations.	  	  
Criteria	  4:	  Is	  the	  form	  of	  the	  knowledge	  as	  wel	  as	  the	  content	  recognizable?	  
The	  significance	  of	  knowledge	  and	  content	  is	  described	  by	  Wynne	  (2013)	  as	  how	  lay	  people	  
acknowledge	  the	  degree	  of	  certainty	  expressed	  by	  scientists	  and	  those	  in	  authority.	  Rangitāiki	  
Plains	  farmers	  have	  had	  limited	  experiences	  with	  being	  afected	  by	  council	  science	  and	  appear	  
confident	  in	  council’s	  ability	  to	  handle	  Overseer	  regulations.	  There	  is	  some	  concern	  regarding	  
Overseer’s	   representation	   of	   individual	   farms,	   but	   farmers	   were	   found	   to	   consider	   that	   a	  
problem	  of	  model	  application	  rather	  than	  limitations	  of	  the	  model.	  For	  example,	  participant	  
5(D,L)	  stated	  “I	  think	  there’l	  be	  less	  than	  50%	  of	  farms	  who	  put	  in	  accurate	  information”,	  due	  
to	  a	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  sacrificing	  valuable	  time	  to	  correctly	  input	  the	  data.	  	  
Farmers	  in	  Rotorua	  hold	  on	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  council	  scientists	  have	  pushed	  through	  regulations	  
using	  science	  that	  the	  farmers	  understand	  is	  incorrect.	  Consequently,	  farmers	  do	  not	  trust	  the	  
science	  used	  by	  council.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  rejection	  of	  science	  is	  shown	  when	  revisiting	  the	  
groundwater	   catchment	   boundaries	   conflict	   with	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   farmers.	   The	   uncertainty	  
surrounding	   the	  boundaries	   has	   resulted	   in	   an	   undermining	   of	   scientist’s	   credibility	   with	  
farmers,	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  proof	  the	  scientists	  have	  been	  able	  to	  give	  farmers.	  Participant	  
13(D,L)	   described	   a	   situation	   during	   a	   meeting	   with	   council:	   “it	   was	   "I	   guess",	   "I	   think",	  
"maybe",	  "we	  assume"	  …	  there	  was	  actualy	  no	  hard	  evidence”.	  Farmers	  consider	  Overseer	  as	  
part	  of	  the	  package	  of	  inaccurate	  science	  within	  multiple	  policies;	  there	  is	  a	  general	  lack	  of	  
trust	  towards	  many	  things	  the	  regional	  council	  enforce.	  
In	  this	  situation	  described	  above,	  farmers	  felt	  like	  the	  council	  had	  exaggerated	  the	  certainty	  
of	  the	  science,	  where	  in	  reality,	  as	  far	  as	  farmers	  are	  concerned,	  the	  science	  was	  uncertain	  
and	  not	  accurate	  enough	  to	  be	  used	  for	  regulation.	  This	  is	  what	  Wynne	  (2013)	  describes	  as	  
the	  “reflection	  of	  the	  culture	  and	  institutional	  form	  of	  science,	  not	  of	  what	  specificaly	  it	  claims	  
to	  know”	  (p.	  209).	  This	  tension	  described	  by	  Wynne	  (2013)	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  how	  farmers’	  
knowledge	  conflicts	  with	  the	  typical	  scientific	  idiom	  of	  prediction	  and	  control.	  Farmers	  are	  
accustomed	  to	  working	  with	  complicated,	  uncertain	  circumstances	  in	  which	  sudden	  changes	  
in	   the	   environment	   or	   farm	   system	   require	   suitable	   adjustments	   to	   farm	   management.	  
Scientific	  processes	  aim	  to	  produce	  accurate	  predictions	  and	  control	  over	  the	  environment	  or	  
processes,	  which	  is	  discordant	  with	  the	  reality	  of	  farmers	  who	  need	  the	  capacity	  for	  flexibility	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and	  adaptation	  in	  farming	  practices.	  Examples	  like	  the	  one	  described	  above,	  where	  council	  
staf	   have	   been	   unable	   to	   convince	   farmers	   of	   their	   scientific	   certainty,	  have	   resulted	   in	   a	  
contradictory	  loop	  of	  negative	  perception	  of	  farmers	  towards	  authority,	  separated	  into	  two	  
concepts	  of	  which	  Wynne	  (2013)	  names	  the	  “conspiracy	  theory”	  and	  “arrogance	  theory”	  (p.	  
290).	   Supported	   by	   the	  perception	   of	   threat	   to	   social	   identity,	   both	   result	   in	   negative	  
perceptions	  towards	  regulators.	  Because	  the	  farmers	  believe	  that	  their	  knowledge	  is	  accurate,	  
the	  conspiracy	  theory	  suggests	  that	  council	  scientists	  are	  aware	  the	  science	  they	  are	  using	  is	  
incorrect	  and	  have	  an	  agenda	  against	  the	  farmers	  (see	  criteria	  6).	  The	  alternative	  option,	  the	  
arrogance	  theory,	  is	  that	  council	  scientists	  are	  unaware	  that	  they	  are	  incorrect,	  and	  therefore	  
inept	   to	   control	   farmers	   who	   hold	   more	   knowledge	   about	   the	   environment	   they	   are	  
attempting	   to	   regulate.	   These	  concepts	   describe	   a	   lose-­‐lose	   scenario	   for	   increasing	   farmer	  
confidence	  in	  council,	  and	  trust	  in	  Overseer.	  
Criteria	  5:	  Are	  scientists	  open	  to	  criticism?	  
Wynne	  (2013)’s	  criteria	  here	  looks	  into	  whether	  scientists	  are	  wiling	  to	  accept	  that	  they	  have	  
made	  mistakes	  and	  whether	  they	  would	  be	  wiling	  to	  use	  alternative	  methods	  of	  regulation	  or	  
incorporate	  other	  ideas	  into	  their	  models.	  What	  separates	  the	  two	  farmer	  groups	  is	  how	  they	  
perceive	   the	   future	   outlook,	   with	   Rangitāiki	   Plains	   farmers,	   participants	   3(D,P)	   and	   6(D,P),	  
speaking	  positively	  of	  wanting	  to	  work	  alongside	  council	  with	  Overseer	  and	  use	  their	  own	  data	  
to	  shape	  future	  nutrient	  regulations.	  They	  were	  confident	  in	  council’s	  attitude	  of	  accepting	  
farm-­‐specific	  data	  which	  may	  contradict	  Overseer.	  These	  farmers	  feel	  this	  way	  about	  council	  
due	  to	  past	  experiences	  where	  regulations	  have	  been	  flexible	  enough	  to	  change	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐
case	  basis:	  “my	  dealings	  with	  regional	  council,	  if	  you	  can	  provide	  factual	  information	  on	  the	  
efect	  on	  your	  property,	  it’s	  very	  easy	  to	  get	  on	  with	  them	  and	  get	  what	  you	  want”	  (participant	  
6(D,P).	  These	  farmers	  feel	  assured	  that	  council’s	  use	  of	  Overseer	  wil	  not	  be	  heavy-­‐handed,	  
and	   unlikely	   to	   be	   detrimental	   to	   their	   ability	   to	   farm	   as	   long	   as	   they	   have	   options	   to	  
supplement	  Overseer	  with	  their	  own	  data,	  as	  needed.	  This	  positive	  outlook	  is	  summarised	  by	  
participant	   6(D,P):	   “if	   you	   can	   use	   [Overseer]	   to	   demonstrate	   what	   you’re	   doing,	   I	   think	  
[council]	  wil	  work	  with	  you,	  everyone	  wil	  work	  with	  you”.	  	  
Having	   used	   Overseer	   for	   regulatory	   purposes	   for	   over	   a	   decade,	   Rotorua	   farmers	   feel	  
diferently	  about	  council	  accepting	  alternative	  information,	  feeling	  trapped	  by	  the	  impending	  
regulations.	  Again	  taking	  the	  groundwater-­‐surface	  water	  catchment	  boundary	  issue,	  farmers	  
felt	  as	  though	  council	  were	  unwiling	  to	  listen	  to	  their	  opinion.	  Unlike	  in	  the	  past,	  no	  council	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staf	   had	   returned	   to	  the	   Rotorua	   farmer’s	   property	  to	   physicaly	   witness	   surface	   water	  
movements,	  or	  had	  been	  able	  to	  supply	  substantial	  scientific	  evidence	  to	  explain	  the	  councils	  
reasoning.	   This	   is	   coupled	   with	   many	   other	   examples	   of	   council	   being	   unwiling	   to	   shift	   its	  
views	   on	   past	   scientific	   findings:	   “council	   are	   so	   pig	   headed,	   the	   science	   is	   clearly	   wrong	  
because	  it’s	  not	  stacking	  up	  with	  what	  the	  lake	  is	  actualy	  doing	  …	  but	  they	  won’t	  accept	  it”	  
(participant	   11(D,L).	   Participant	   8(D,L)	   described	   how	   after	   many	   years	   of	   farmers	   arguing	  
against	  the	  science	  stating	  Lake	  Rotorua	  was	  nitrogen	  limited,	  “[council]	  have	  actualy	  now,	  in	  
the	  last	  six	  months,	  come	  around	  to	  agree	  with	  us”.	  Farmers	  are	  concerned	  that	  council	  is	  too	  
slow	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  accept	  alternative	  information,	  refusing	  the	  farmers’	  knowledge	  that	  
could	  improve	  the	  benefits	  of	  nutrient	  management.	  
Criteria	  6:	  What	  are	  the	  social/institutional	  afiliations	  of	  experts?	  
Decision-­‐making	   is	   never	   without	   some	   form	   of	   bias.	   According	   to	  Jasanof	   (1990),	   policy	  
compromises	  a	  trade-­‐of	  between	  health	  and	  environmental	  risks,	  and	  economic	  and	  social	  
costs	  of	  regulation.	  Because	  it	  is	  dificult	  to	  accurately	  estimate	  the	  values	  of	  each	  trade-­‐of,	  
it	  is	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  guarantee	  whether	  regulators	  are	  objectively	  making	  policy	  decisions,	  
or	  being	  swayed	  by	  political	  inclination	  and	  judgement.	  
Both	  case	  study	  groups	  spoke	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  ‘the	  industry	  message’,	  where	  farmers	  
were	  influenced	  to	  alter	  their	  farming	  practices	  as	  suggested	  by	  the	  industry	  players	  such	  as	  
Fonterra,	  DairyNZ	  and	  fertiliser	  companies.	  What	  stood	  out	  was	  that	  some	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  
farmers	  mentioned	  a	  degree	  of	  distance	  felt	  by	  farmers	  to	  these	  messages,	  where	  the	  top-­‐
down	  information	  annoyed	  some	  farmers	  who	  felt	  like	  they	  were	  being	  told	  how	  to	  farm.	  This	  
was	  not	  the	  case	  in	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  where	  farmers	  spoke	  only	  positively	  about	  the	  industry	  
messages,	   perhaps	   suggesting	   that	   the	   farmers	   were	   more	   receptive	   to	   information	   from	  
players	  within	  their	  industry,	  harnessing	  an	  ‘us	  versus	  them’	  outlook.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  if	  could	  
explain	   why	   Rotorua	   farmers	   also	   spoke	   highly	   of	   their	   relationship	   with	   fertiliser	  
representatives,	  recognising	  a	  sense	  of	  kinship	  as	  members	  of	  the	  same	  industry.	  Comparing	  
this	  relationship	  with	  that	  of	  a	  council-­‐appointed	  consultant,	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  spoke	  of	  
feeling	   frustrated	   that	   the	   consultants	   did	   not	   understand	   their	   property	   like	   the	   fertiliser	  
representatives	  did,	  and	  feeling	  left-­‐out	  of	  the	  process	  when	  the	  consultants	  utilised	  Overseer.	  
Fertiliser	   representatives	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	   had	   been	   able	   to	   develop	   a	   history	   with	   the	  
farmer	  and	  their	  property,	  and	  had	  made	  a	  point	  to	  sit	  down	  and	  discuss	  the	  fertiliser	  budget	  
with	   the	   farmer.	   Fertiliser	   representatives	   were	   not	   trying	   to	   tel	   farmers	   how	   to	   farm.	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Although	   farmers	   were	   stil	   aware	   that	   fertiliser	   representatives	   were	   salesmen	   and	   made	  
sure	  to	  check	  their	  fertiliser	  recommendation	  to	  make	  sure	  it	  was	  correct,	  they	  felt	  a	  greater	  
sense	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  fertiliser	  representatives	  than	  with	  the	  council-­‐designated	  consultants	  in	  
town.	   This	   was	   diferent	   to	   the	   Rangitāiki	   Plains	   farmers,	   who	   spoke	   of	   holding	   fertiliser	  
representatives	  with	  the	  same	  regard	  as	  anyone	  coming	  onto	  their	  property	  trying	  to	  sel	  them	  
a	  product,	  with	  a	  “pinch	  of	  salt”	  (participants	  2(D,P),	  3(D,P).	  The	  interviews	  with	  dairy	  farmers	  
revealed	  the	  importance	  of	  trust	  and	  working	  relationships	  between	  diferent	  actors	  in	  the	  
dairy	   industry	   and	   the	   authorities	   who	   regulate	   their	   activities.	  To	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   farmers,	  
council	  staf	  and	  council-­‐appointed	  consultants	  were	  influenced	  with	  the	  agenda	  to	  control	  
how	  farmers	  used	  their	  land,	  to	  reduce	  the	  level	  of	  farming	  in	  the	  area.	  
Criteria	  7:	  What	  issue	  “overspil”	  exists	  in	  lay	  experience?	  
Criteria	  seven	  refers	  to	  how	  acceptance	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  by	  lay	  people	  is	  shaped	  by	  a	  
history	  of	  perceptions	  and	  experiences	  which	  have	  afected	  the	  person.	  Overspil	  relates	  to	  
past	  experiences,	  where	  overspil	  of	  past	  perceptions	  and	  experiences	  is	  not	  recognised	  by	  
the	  scientific	  method	  of	  developing	  knowledge	  as	  the	  institutional	  dimensions	  of	  science	  are	  
governed	   by	   connecting	   theory	   to	   relevant	   experiments	  (Wynne,	   2013).	   For	   laypeople,	  
decision-­‐making,	   knowledge	   construction,	   and	   acceptance	  of	   information	   are	   constructed	  
continuously	  by	  the	  coalescence	  of	  social	  dependencies,	  self-­‐identity,	  and	  past	  experiences,	  
shaping	  the	  position	  and	  mentality	  of	  a	  person	  towards	  new	  information.	  
Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers	  have	  a	  history	  with	  their	  regional	  council	  that	  is	  seemingly	  unscathed	  
by	   any	   recent	   environmental	   controversies.	   The	   Rangitāiki	   area	   is	   dominated	   by	   the	   rural	  
industry,	  where	  urbanisation	  has	  been	  limited	  thus	  far	  and	  farmers	  have	  been	  largely	  left	  as	  
they	  are.	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers	  were	  aware	  of	  chalenges	  between	  farmers	  and	  council	  with	  
using	  Overseer	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  country,	  but	  consider	  themselves	  lucky	  to	  be	  living	  in	  an	  area	  
that	   maintains	   a	   positive	   council	   relationship.	   Contact	   was	   described	   with	   regional	   council	  
“only	   doing	   their	   jobs”	   (participant	   4(D,P)	   and	   seeming	   “quite	   reasonable”	   (participant	  
3(D,P).	  In	  terms	  of	  ‘overspil’,	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers	  are	  limited	  on	  experiences	  that	  cause	  
negative	   perceptions	  of	   Overseer,	   but	   are	   wary	   of	   the	   future	   as	   introducing	   Overseer	  
regulations	  wil	  increase	  the	  incentive	  to	  query	  present	  concerns	  about	  the	  model	  further.	  
In	  comparison,	  many	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  have	  been	  exposed	  to	  Overseer	  regulations	  from	  
regional	  council	  for	  over	  a	  decade,	  since	  2005.	  While	  no	  farmer	  mentioned	  any	  events	  leading	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to	   their	   perceptions	   of	   Overseer	   prior	   to	   2005,	   the	   decade	   since	   has	   provided	   enough	  
experiences	  to	  shape	  their	  perceptions	  of	  the	  model,	  its	  outputs	  and	  the	  policy	  prescriptions	  
it	  operates.	  Examples	  of	  this	  include	  the	  meeting	  of	  when	  a	  councilor	  stood	  up	  to	  announce	  
his	  goal	  of	  getting	  rid	  of	  farmers	  in	  the	  area,	  the	  debate	  and	  eventual	  acceptance	  by	  council	  
of	   the	   importance	   of	   phosphorus	   to	   water	   quality	   degradation,	   and	  the	   controversies	  
surrounding	   the	   groundwater	  –	  surface	   water	   catchment	   boundaries,	   among	   others.	   Al	  
previous	   experiences	   are	   brought	   to	   the	   present,	   influencing	   the	   perceptions	   of	   Overseer	  
updates.	  Wynne	   (2013)	  describes	   ‘overspil’	   using	   a	   past	   example	   of	   an	   environmental	  
controversy	  unrelated	  to	  the	  present,	  but	  very	  much	  part	  of	  shaping	  knowledge	  acceptance,	  
but	  unaccounted	  for	  in	  the	  scientific	  process.	  The	  experiences	  in	  this	  case	  study,	  referring	  to	  
the	  incomplete	  list	  of	  examples	  portraying	  controversy	  for	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  above,	  
show	  that	  even	  though	  they	  should	  not	  impact	  the	  science	  Overseer	  uses,	  they	  shape	  the	  way	  
farmers	  perceive	  and	  accept	  the	  information	  it	  produces.	  The	  findings	  indicate	  that	  Rotorua	  
Lakes	  farmers	  have	  far	  less	  trust	  in	  Overseer	  than	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  
due	  to	  their	  past	  experiences	  with	  the	  regional	  council.	  
	   94	  
Chapter	  7	  
Conclusions	  
In	  this	  concluding	  chapter,	  the	  main	  findings	  from	  this	  research	  are	  summarised.	  This	  chapter	  
also	  includes	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  study	  limitations,	  which	  outlines	  any	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  
study	  and	  their	  efect	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  research,	  and	  a	  brief	  exploration	  of	  opportunities	  
for	  future	  research.	  
7.1	  Conclusions	  from	  this	  research	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  research	  was	  to	  investigate	  the	  perceptions	  of	  dairy	  farmers	  and	  farm	  
consultants	  with	  Overseer’s	  change	  from	  a	  decision-­‐support	  to	  compliance	  tool.	  This	  research	  
has	  found	  that	  the	  role	  of	  numbers,	  power	  and	  authority,	  model	  credibility,	  perceived	  fairness,	  
farmer	   social	   identity,	  and	   the	   relationship	   to	   data	   production	   were	  significant	   to	   the	  
perception	  of	  Overseer	  by	  farmers.	  The	  perception	  farmers	  have	  of	  Overseer	  is	  a	  key	  influence	  
in	  their	  acceptance	  of	  nutrient	  regulation	  and	  adoption	  of	  sustainable	  nutrient	  management	  
practices.	  The	  folowing	  sections	  are	  broken	  down	  into	  separate	  summaries	  addressing	  the	  
three	  research	  objectives.	  
7.1.1	  Diferences	  between	  decision-­‐support	  and	  compliance	  use	  
The	  first	  research	  objective	  was	  to	  assess	  the	  diferences	  in	  perception	  of	  Overseer	  between	  
farmers	   using	   Overseer	   for	   decision-­‐support	   verses	   farmers	   using	   Overseer	   for	   compliance	  
purposes.	  As	  of	  late	  2016,	  when	  the	  interviews	  for	  this	  research	  took	  place,	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  
farmers	  used	  Overseer	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  decision-­‐support.	  With	  no	  regulatory	  incentives	  to	  
question	   Overseer’s	   figures,	   this	   research	   found	   that	   farmers	   in	   this	   catchment	   were	  less	  
interested	  in	  investigating	  the	  processes	  and	  calculations	  that	  Overseer	  uses.	  However,	  the	  
farmers	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  nutrient	  limit	  regulations	  around	  the	  country	  and	  
had	  been	  influenced	  by	  news	  that	  Overseer	  was	  not	  accurate,	  so	  there	  was	  concerns	  about	  
future	  policy	  reaching	  the	  Rangitāiki	  Plains.	  Nevertheless,	  at	  present,	  for	  many	  of	  the	  farmers	  
this	  was	  not	  an	  incentive	  great	  enough	  to	  warrant	  pro-­‐active	  farm	  system	  changes.	  	  
Overseer’s	  use	  for	  compliance	  by	  regional	  councils	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  shift	  from	  qualitative	  to	  
quantitative	  use.	  While	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers	  are	  wary	  of	  impending	  nutrient	  limitations,	  
Overseer’s	  shift	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  higher	  stakes	  for	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  dairy	  farmers,	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who	   are	   regulated	   by	   their	   figure	   produced	   by	   Overseer.	   This	  research	   has	   found	   that	   the	  
Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers,	  with	  higher	  stakes,	  have	  more	  incentive	  to	  oppose	  the	  regulations,	  
spending	  more	  time	  investigating	  the	  limitations	  of	  using	  Overseer	  to	  model	  nutrient	  losses,	  
and	  are	  more	  convinced	  that	  the	  process	  is	  inaccurate.	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  feel	  that	  they	  
need	   to	   understand	   how	   Overseer	   works	   because	   their	   farming	   future	   depends	   on	   it:	  
“Overseer	  from	  my	  perspective	  was	  never	  a	  powerful	  tool,	  it's	  only	  since	  we’ve	  gone	  into	  the	  
nutrient	  aspect	  that	  it’s	  certainly	  increased	  in	  mana.	  And	  coupled	  with	  that,	  the	  frustration	  
that	  we	  have	  is	  that	  for	  us	  to	  be	  able	  to	  focus	  on	  nutrients	  on	  farm,	  we	  need	  to	  know	  how	  
Overseer	  works”	  (participant	  8(D,L).	  The	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  also	  feel	  that	  the	  process	  of	  
mitigating	  nutrient	  loss	  is	  unfair,	  where	  council	  is	  prioritizing	  other	  industries	  over	  dairying	  
and	  encouraging	  land	  use	  change,	  rather	  than	  working	  with	  dairy	  farmers	  to	  encourage	  better	  
farm	  management	  practices.	  
7.1.2	  The	  efect	  of	  standardisation	  on	  model	  credibility	  
The	  second	  research	  objective	  was	  to	  evaluate	  how	  standardisation	  afects	  perceptions	  of	  the	  
on-­‐farm	  applicability	  of	  Overseer	  and	  its	  credibility	  as	  a	  regulatory	  tool.	  This	  research	  found	  
that	   when	   Overseer	  is	  used	   for	   compliance,	   the	   numbers	   it	   produces	   change	   meaning,	  
becoming	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  farmer’s	  performance.	  Using	  Overseer	  for	  compliance	  has	  
resulted	  in	  a	  shift	  from	  standardising	  the	  farm,	  to	  standardising	  the	  farmer.	  The	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  
farmers	   spoke	   of	   feeling	   frustrated	   that	   Overseer	   represent	   their	   farm	   and	   themselves	   as	  
farmers;	  Overseer	  was	  too	  inaccurate	  and	  simplified.	  Both	  groups	  of	  farmers	  were	  concerned	  
about	  regional	  council’s	  use	  of	  Overseer	  as	  a	  ‘truth	  machine’,	  where	  in	  a	  high	  level	  of	  trust	  is	  
placed	  on	  Overseer,	  a	  computer	  model,	  rather	  than	  real	  life.	  Farmers	  pointed	  out	  that	  they	  
require	   flexibility	   in	   their	   farming	   practices,	   due	   to	   the	   unpredictable	   behaviour	   of	   agri-­‐
environmental	  systems	  and	  specific	  processes	  that	  afect	  their	  farm.	  	  
Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  perceive	  that	  Overseer’s	  ability	  to	  measure	  their	  farms	  is	  impaired	  and	  
not	  representative	  of	  their	  farm.	  This	  frustration	  is	  summarised	  by	  participant	  13(D,L)	  with:	  
“you're	  calculating	  everything	  to	  seven	  decimal	  points,	  and	  then	  al	  of	  a	  sudden	  you're	  going	  
plus	  or	  minus	  10%	  contingency.	  It	  just	  doesn't	  make	  sense.	  Yeah	  it	  is	  the	  accuracy	  of	  Overseer	  
we	  are	  concerned	  about”.	  This	  concern	  surrounding	  Overseer’s	  inaccuracies	  is	  made	  greater	  
by	   the	   perception	   that	   model	   improvements	   (i.e.	   version	   changes)	   are	   developed	   for	  
regulatory	  purposes,	   rather	   than	  addressing	   farming	   system	  points	  of	   view.	  It	   is	   likely	   that	  
council	  staf	  are	  less	  concerned	  about	  Overseer’s	  limitations	  and	  assumptions	  than	  farmers.	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This	   explains	   why	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   farmers	   feel	   that	   council	   staf	   are	   unable	   to	   clearly	  
communicate	  diferent	  aspects	  of	  Overseer	  and	  answer	  the	  farmer’s	  queries	  about	  the	  science	  
behind	  it:	  “council	  have	  as	  much	  or	  more	  dificulty	  getting	  their	  head	  around	  it	  than	  we	  do	  as	  
farmers”	   (participant	   12(D,L).	  Farmers	   are	   focused	  on	   the	   contextual	   factors	   surrounding	  
Overseer,	  rather	  than	  the	  model	  itself,	  where	  any	  improvements	  to	  the	  science	  are	  intended	  
for	  regulation	  and	  felt	  to	  overlook	  farmers.	  The	  farmers	  are	  being	  standardised	  by	  Overseer	  
by	   being	   represented	   by	   a	   figure	   used	   for	   compliance.	  Overseer’s	   inability	   to	   demonstrate	  
precision	  weakens	  the	  farmer’s	  perception	  of	  the	  model’s	  suitability	  as	  a	  regulatory	  tool.	  
7.1.3	  Implications	  for	  sustainable	  nutrient	  management	  
The	   final	   research	   objective	   was	   to	   identify	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   use	   of	  Overseer	   as	   a	  
compliance	   tool	   for	   nutrient	   management	   and	   the	   chalenges	   these	   present	   for	   the	  
implementation	  of	  water	  quality	  limits.	  By	  taking	  the	  focus	  away	  from	  individual’s	  technical	  
understandings	   of	   scientific	   knowledge,	   this	   research	   has	   attempted	  to	   explore	   the	   social	  
identities	  that	  characterise	  public	  responses	  to	  regulations.	  Trust	  and	  credibility	  emerged	  as	  
key	  themes	  in	  the	  development	  of	  perceptions	  to	  the	  use	  of	  Overseer	  by	  farmers,	  shaped	  by	  
the	   working	   relationships	   between	   farmers	   and	   council	   staf,	   council	   scientists,	   private	  
consultants,	  members	  of	  the	  public,	  and	  industry	  workers.	  This	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  when	  
many	  farmers	  consider	  Overseer,	  they	  focus	  on	  the	  contextual	  factors	  surrounding	  its	  use,	  
rather	  than	  the	  practicalities	  of	  the	  model	  itself.	  An	  example	  which	  emphasises	  the	  focus	  on	  
Overseer’s	   contextual	   factors	   was	   described	   by	   several	   farmers,	   where	   farmers	   felt	   that	  
council	  wanted	  to	  remove	  al	  farming	  in	  the	  region	  to	  make	  way	  for	  other	  industries.	  This	  idea	  
was	  unfortunately	  highlighted	  by	  the	  event	  where	  a	  councilor	  (since	  departed)	  “stood	  up	  in	  a	  
meeting	  and	  said	  "I’m	  going	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  you	  bastards”	  (participant	  13(D,L).	  These	  Rotorua	  
farmers	  feel	  like	  the	  process	  of	  mitigating	  nutrient	  loss	  is	  unfair,	  where	  council	  is	  prioritizing	  
other	   industries	   over	   dairying	   and	   encouraging	   land	   use	   change,	   rather	   than	   working	   with	  
dairy	  farmers	  to	  encourage	  better	  farm	  management	  practices.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  greatest	  frustrations	  felt	  by	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  is	  the	  prospect	  of	  being	  locked	  
in	  to	  the	  seemingly	  arbitrary	  movements	  of	  Overseer	  through	  their	  farm	  consents,	  resulting	  
in	  farmers	  farming	  to	  Overseer.	  Because	  the	  penalties	  for	  not	  meeting	  NDA	  targets	  can	  be	  
severe,	  farmers	  are	  likely	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  numbers.	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  farmers	  feel	  trapped	  by	  
Overseer	   where	   decision-­‐makers	   are	   not	   taking	   their	   likely	   constrained	   future	   into	  
consideration.	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Assessing	   the	   implications	   of	   using	   Overseer	   for	  sustainable	  nutrient	   management	  in	   the	  
implementation	   of	   water	   quality	   limits,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   farmers	   wil	   remain	   sceptical	   of	  
Overseer’s	   suitability	   as	   a	   compliance	   tool	   unless	   eforts	   are	   made	   to	  improve	   farmers’	  
relationship	  with	  council.	  The	  results	  from	  this	  research	  demonstrate	  the	  predictions	  made	  by	  
Duncan	   (2014)	  and	  concepts	   discussed	   by	  Porter	   (1995)	  in	   which	   the	   use	   of	   numbers	   and	  
quantitative	   modeling	   does	   not	   provide	   clarity	   and	   remove	   ambiguity	  during	  the	  
implementation	  of	  resource	  limits.	  Continued	  eforts	  to	  increase	  the	  scientific	  accuracy	  of	  the	  
model,	  alone,	  wil	  not	  resolve	  the	  issue	  of	  distrust	  between	  farmers	  and	  Overseer.	  
7.2	  Study	  limitations	  
The	   most	   significant	   limitations	   of	   this	   study	   were	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   methodology	   and	  
temporal	   constraints	   of	   the	   research	   period.	  Participants	   for	   the	   Rangitāiki	   Plains	   dairy	  
farmers	  group	  were	  selected	  from	  a	  pool	  of	  personal	  contacts	  of	  the	  researcher.	  The	  fact	  that	  
al	  seven	  participants	  were	  known	  to	  the	  researcher	  and	  wiling	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  research,	  
meant	  that	  there	  was	  the	  possibility	  of	  only	  representing	  a	  limited	  pool	  of	  perspectives.	  In	  
order	  to	  overcome	  this,	  the	  researcher	  actively	  tried	  to	  contact	  a	  diverse	  group	  of	  participants,	  
selecting	  farmers	  whose	  farms	  varied	  greatly	  in	  size,	  location,	  geography	  and	  management	  
practice.	  However,	  it	  cannot	  be	  assumed	  that	  al	  Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers’	  perspectives	  were	  
represented	  in	  this	  study.	  
Due	  to	  not	  having	  any	  personal	  contacts	  within	  the	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  dairy	  farmers	  group,	  initial	  
participants	   were	   contacted	   by	   obtaining	   their	   details	   from	   their	   submission	   against	   Plan	  
Change	  10.	  The	  fact	  that	  these	  farmers	  had	  submitted	  documents	  for	  consideration	  indicates	  
that	  they	  are	  proactive	  within	  the	  community,	  which	  could	  indicate	  that	  they	  only	  represent	  
farmers	  who	  are	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  plan	  change.	  Their	  act	  of	  submitting	  indicates	  that	  they	  
hold	  strong	  perspectives	  opposing	  the	  introduction	  of	  nutrient	  limits	  and	  use	  of	  Overseer	  in	  
their	  catchment.	  Although	  those	  interviewed	  spoke	  of	  their	  opinion	  being	  representative	  of	  
al	   farmers	   in	   the	   catchment,	   it	   also	   became	   apparent	   that	   many	   farmers	   did	   not	   openly	  
discuss	  their	  NDA	  figures,	  and	  thus	  it	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  for	  granted	  that	  al	  farmers	  in	  the	  
catchment	  hold	  the	  same	  opinion	  as	  the	  six	  interviewed	  for	  this	  research.	  
Another	   limitation	  was	   the	  lack	  of	  perspectives	   held	   by	   regional	   council	   staf	   and	   private	  
council-­‐appointed	   nutrient	   consultants.	   This	   research	   focused	   entirely	   on	   the	   perspectives	  
held	  by	  the	  users	  of	  Overseer	  (i.e.	  dairy	  farmers	  and	  farm	  consultants)	  due	  to	  the	  infeasibility	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of	  obtaining	  and	  analysing	  qualitative	  interviews	  for	  more	  participant	  groups.	  However,	  for	  
contextual	  purposes,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  valuable	  to	  gain	  insights	  from	  those	  developing	  and	  
enforcing	  the	  nutrient	  regulations	  and	  those	  benefitting	  financialy	  from	  using	  Overseer	  for	  
compliance	   use.	  The	   inclusion	   of	   the	   two	   farm	   consultants	   was	   beneficial	   for	   contextual	  
purposes,	  but	  did	  not	  fuly	  represent	  the	  Bay	  of	  Plenty	  region.	  
Finaly,	  the	  procedure	  used	  to	  code	  the	  qualitative	  data	  (using	  MAXQDA	  software)	  included	  
some	  unavoidable	  subjectivity.	  In	  order	  to	  make	  the	  analysis	  as	  objective	  as	  possible,	  coding	  
rules	  were	  created	  and	  folowed	  to	  identify	  themes.	  Although	  coding	  was	  attempted	  to	  be	  
kept	   within	   the	   research	   scope	   (with	   frequent	   referral	   to	   the	   research	   question,	   aim,	  
objectives	  and	  theoretical	  framework)	  some	  amount	  of	  subjectivity	  is	  inevitable.	  	  
7.3	  Future	  research	  opportunities	  
The	  limitations	  of	  the	  research	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  could	  be	  addressed	  through	  
further	   research.	  Future	   research	   would	   benefit	   from	   involving	   greater	   numbers	   of	  
participants,	  representatives	  from	  al	  afected	  groups	  (i.e.	  farmers	  from	  al	  disciplines,	  regional	  
council	  staf,	  farm	  consultants	  and	  industry	  professionals),	  and	  a	  larger	  temporal	  scale	  to	  alow	  
for	  understanding	  changes	  to	  perceptions	  during	  rule	  changes	  and	  regulation	  enforcement.	  
This	   study	   focused	   on	   a	   narrow	   temporal	   scale	  from	   the	   introduction	   of	  Overseer,	   to	   the	  
calculation	   of	   NDA	   figures	   for	   farmers	   in	   the	   Rotorua	   Lakes	   are,	   and	   a	   time	   period	  where	  
Rangitāiki	  Plains	  farmers	  were	  without	  nutrient	  limits.	  By	  continuing	  research	  into	  the	  period	  
of	   enforcing	  NDA	   targets	   in	  the	  Lake	   Rotorua	   catchment,	   a	   greater	  understanding	   of	   the	  
complexity	  surrounding	  farmers’	  perceptions	  of	  trust	  towards	  authority	  could	  be	  achieved.	  
Obtaining	   qualitative	   data	   during	   and	   folowing	   the	   release	   of	   Plan	   Change	   12,	  on	   the	  
Rangitāiki	   Plains,	  would	   also	   add	   depth	   to	   understanding	  the	  perceptions	   of	   trust	   and	  
credibility	  towards	  predictive	  models.	  
Finaly,	   this	   research	  has	   only	   focused	   on	  dairy	   farmers	   and	   farm	   consultants	   in	   two	  
catchments	   in	   the	   Bay	   of	   Plenty.	   Nutrient	   regulations	   involving	   Overseer	   have	   been	  
implemented	   throughout	   the	   country,	   and	   wil	   continue	   to	   as	   regional	   plan	   changes	   are	  
produced	   to	   fulfil	   NPS-­‐FM	  requirements.	   Further	   studies	   could	   be	   undertaken	   in	   other	  
catchments	  around	  New	  Zealand	  to	  enable	  comparisons	  with	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study.	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Appendix	  A	  
Interview	  Questions	  	  
A.1	  Questions	   used	   for	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   with	   Rangitāiki	   Plains	  
dairy	  farmers	  
Background	  –	  Describing	  your	  farming	  operation	  	  
1.	  How	  long	  have	  you	  been	  farming,	  been	  on	  this	  farm?	  
2.	  Can	  you	  please	  describe	  your	  farming	  operation?	  E.g.	  farm	  size,	  production	  type,	  
length	  of	  time	  the	  farm	  has	  been	  in	  this	  production	  type.	  	  
3.	  Can	  you	  please	  discuss	  the	  irrigation	  and	  efluent	  management	  on	  the	  farm?	  What	  
soil	  types	  are	  on	  the	  property?	  (i.e.	  free	  or	  poorly	  draining,	  clay	  content)	  
4.	  How	  would	  you	  describe	  the	  water	  quality	  of	  streams	  and	  rivers	  in	  or	  near	  your	  
property?	  
5.	  How	  would	  you	  describe	  your	  farm’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  level	  of	  nutrients	  in	  
waterways	  in	  this	  area?	  
6.	  What	  is	  your	  understanding	  of	  how	  Overseer	  is	  being/to	  be	  used	  in	  this	  catchment	  to	  
address	  water	  quality?	  
Overseer	  use	  	  
7.	  How	  long	  have	  you	  been	  using	  Overseer,	  and	  who	  introduced	  you	  to	  it?	  
8.	  How	  do	  you	  use	  Overseer?	  
9.	  What	  information	  are	  you	  most	  interested	  in	  receiving	  from	  Overseer?	  
10.	  What	  happens	  to	  your	  Overseer	  reports	  once	  they	  have	  been	  produced?	  	  
11.	  How	  wel	  do	  you	  think	  the	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  of	  Overseer	  represent	  your	  farm?	  
12.	  Are	  there	  any	  parameters	  or	  aspects	  of	  the	  model	  you’d	  like	  to	  know	  more	  about?	  
13.	  What	  is	  your	  understanding	  of	  how	  Overseer	  calculates	  nutrient	  losses	  to	  water?	  
14.	  Can	  you	  explain	  if/how	  you	  use	  any	  mitigation	  features	  in	  Overseer	  folowing	  the	  
initial	  reports?	  
Overseer	  and	  nutrient	  measurement	  	  
15.	  Did	  you	  have	  any	  form	  of	  nutrient	  measurement	  in	  place	  before	  you	  used	  Overseer?	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16.	  How	  have	  your	  farm	  operations	  benefitted	  from	  the	  use	  of	  Overseer?	  
17.	  Have	  you	  been	  afected	  by	  changes	  in	  versions	  of	  Overseer?	  If	  so,	  were	  the	  numbers	  
higher	  or	  lower	  than	  expected?	  
18.	  Are	  you	  interested	  to	  know	  how	  your	  nutrient	  output	  compares	  to	  others?	  
Broader	  picture	  
19.	  How	  do	  you	  think	  Overseer	  data	  wil	  be	  used	  to	  address	  water	  quality	  and	  nutrient	  
issues	  in	  the	  Bay	  of	  Plenty?	  	  How	  do	  you	  think	  it	  should	  be	  used?	  
20.	  What	  do	  you	  think	  the	  benefits	  of	  Overseer	  are	  for	  addressing	  water	  quality	  through	  
nutrient	  management	  on	  farms?	  
21.	  Any	  other	  comments	  you	  would	  like	  to	  add?	  	  
A.2	  Questions	  used	  for	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  Rotorua	  Lakes	  dairy	  
farmers	  
Background	  –	  Describing	  your	  farming	  operation	  	  
1.	  How	  long	  have	  you	  been	  farming,	  been	  on	  this	  farm?	  
2.	  Can	  you	  please	  describe	  your	  farming	  operation?	  E.g.	  farm	  size,	  production	  type,	  
length	  of	  time	  the	  farm	  has	  been	  in	  this	  production	  type.	  	  
3.	  Can	  you	  please	  discuss	  the	  irrigation	  and	  efluent	  management	  on	  the	  farm?	  What	  
soil	  types	  are	  on	  the	  property?	  (i.e.	  free	  or	  poorly	  draining,	  clay	  content)	  
4.	  How	  would	  you	  describe	  the	  water	  quality	  of	  streams	  and	  rivers	  in	  or	  near	  your	  
property?	  
5.	  How	  would	  you	  describe	  your	  farm’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  level	  of	  nutrients	  in	  
waterways	  in	  this	  area?	  
6.	  What	  is	  your	  understanding	  of	  how	  Overseer	  is	  being/to	  be	  used	  in	  this	  catchment	  to	  
address	  water	  quality?	  	  
Overseer	  use	  	  
7.	  How	  long	  have	  you	  been	  using	  Overseer,	  and	  who	  introduced	  you	  to	  it?	  
8.	  How	  have	  you	  used	  Overseer	  in	  the	  past?	  
9.	  How	  do	  you	  use	  Overseer	  currently?	  Have	  you	  begun	  working	  with	  a	  consultant	  to	  
calculate	  your	  nitrogen	  alowance	  number?	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10.	  What	  information	  are	  you	  most	  interested	  in	  receiving	  from	  Overseer?	  
11.	  What	  happens	  to	  your	  Overseer	  reports	  once	  they	  have	  been	  produced?	  	  
12.	  How	  wel	  do	  you	  think	  the	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  of	  Overseer	  represent	  your	  farm?	  
13.	  Are	  there	  any	  parameters	  or	  aspects	  of	  the	  model	  you’d	  like	  to	  know	  more	  about?	  
14.	  What	  is	  your	  understanding	  of	  how	  Overseer	  calculates	  nutrient	  losses	  to	  water?	  
15.	  Can	  you	  explain	  if/how	  you	  use	  any	  mitigation	  features	  in	  Overseer	  folowing	  the	  
initial	  reports?	  
Overseer	  and	  nutrient	  measurement	  	  
16.	  Did	  you	  have	  any	  form	  of	  nutrient	  measurement	  in	  place	  before	  you	  used	  Overseer?	  
17.	  How	  have	  your	  farm	  operations	  benefitted	  from	  the	  use	  of	  Overseer?	  
18.	  Have	  you	  been	  afected	  by	  changes	  in	  versions	  of	  Overseer?	  If	  so,	  were	  the	  numbers	  
higher	  or	  lower	  than	  expected?	  
19.	  Are	  you	  interested	  to	  know	  how	  your	  nutrient	  output	  compares	  to	  others?	  
Broader	  picture	  
20.	  How	  do	  you	  think	  Overseer	  data	  wil	  be	  used	  to	  address	  water	  quality	  and	  nutrient	  
issues	  in	  the	  Bay	  of	  Plenty?	  	  How	  do	  you	  think	  it	  should	  be	  used?	  
21.	  What	  do	  you	  think	  the	  benefits	  of	  Overseer	  are	  for	  addressing	  water	  quality	  through	  
nutrient	  management	  on	  farms?	  
22.	  Any	  other	  comments	  you	  would	  like	  to	  add?	  
A.3	  Questions	  used	  for	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  farming	  consultants	  
Background	  –	  Describing	  your	  role	  	  
1.	  What	  services	  do	  you	  provide	  for	  dairy	  farms	  in	  the	  Bay	  of	  Plenty?	  
2.	  What	  is	  your	  understanding	  of	  how	  Overseer	  is	  being/to	  be	  used	  in	  this	  catchment	  to	  
address	  water	  quality?	  
Overseer	  use	  
3.	  How	  long	  have	  you	  been	  working	  with	  Overseer?	  How	  is	  Overseer	  used	  in	  your	  
current	  role?	  Have	  you	  worked	  with	  Overseer	  in	  other	  regions	  in	  NZ?	  
4.	  What	  information	  are	  you	  most	  interested	  in	  receiving	  from	  Overseer	  as	  a	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consultant?	  
5.	  What	  chalenges	  do	  you	  face	  in	  using	  Overseer	  to	  accurately	  represent	  farm	  systems?	  
6.	  Have	  there	  been	  any	  chalenges	  incorporating	  S-­‐Map	  and	  rainfal	  data	  into	  the	  
model?	  	  Have	  these	  environmental	  databases	  improved	  your	  ability	  to	  represent	  the	  
farm	  system?	  	  
7.	  Have	  you	  noticed	  any	  change	  in	  how	  farmers	  approach	  Overseer	  when	  it	  is	  being	  
used	  for	  compliance	  rather	  than	  for	  decision	  support	  for	  fertilizer	  application?	  
8.	  Can	  you	  explain	  if/how	  you	  use	  any	  mitigation	  features	  in	  Overseer	  folowing	  the	  
initial	  reports?	  
Overseer	  and	  nutrient	  measurement	  	  
9.	  Can	  you	  explain	  if	  you	  think	  the	  shift	  in	  Overseer’s	  role	  from	  decision-­‐support	  to	  
compliance	  wil	  improve	  farm	  nutrient	  management?	  
10.	  In	  your	  opinion	  what	  are	  the	  key	  benefits	  of	  using	  Overseer	  for	  nutrient	  management	  
compliance?	  
11.	  What	  are	  the	  disadvantages	  of	  using	  Overseer?	  
12.	  What	  have	  been	  the	  main	  chalenges	  during	  this	  role	  shift?	  
13.	  How	  have	  farmers	  responded	  to	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  model?	  
14.	  How	  have	  farmers	  responded	  to	  changes	  in	  versions	  of	  the	  model?	  
Broader	  picture	  
15.	  Can	  you	  please	  describe	  your	  opinion	  on	  the	  current	  status	  of	  water	  quality	  in	  the	  
Bay	  of	  Plenty?	  
16.	  Do	  you	  think	  Overseer’s	  data	  wil	  be	  useful	  in	  addressing	  nutrient	  issues	  in	  the	  Bay	  of	  
Plenty?	  
17.	  What	  do	  you	  think	  the	  benefits	  of	  Overseer	  are	  for	  addressing	  water	  quality	  through	  
nutrient	  management	  in	  NZ?	  
18.	  Any	  other	  comments	  you	  would	  like	  to	  add?	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